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ABSTRACT
The Influence of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure on Stakeholder DecisionMaking
Andrew C. Stuart
Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Timothy B. Harbert Professor, Jean C. Bedard, Ph.D., CPA
Accountancy Department

As part of the Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative, the SEC is seeking public
comments on whether sustainability disclosures are important to investors’ decisions. The
interest in sustainability disclosures by the SEC coincides with the recent increase in
companies voluntarily publishing corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. My
dissertation consists of three studies that examine CSR disclosures, with an emphasis on
how disclosure influences stakeholder decision-making.
Part one reviews the CSR disclosure literature contained in accounting journals. I
find an overlap between CSR disclosure issues and traditional accounting issues
examined in the literature. Focusing on where the issues overlap, I separate the CSR
disclosure literature into three main sections. First, I examine the characteristics and
motives of companies that voluntarily report. Second, I review the studies examining
CSR disclosure accuracy and the role of CSR assurance in improving perceptions of
disclosure credibility. Finally, I review the studies examining stakeholder use of CSR
disclosure.
Part two provides the results of an experiment that examines the influence of the
type of CSR activity, independent CSR assurance and a company-specific negative event
have on investors’ judgments. Our results show contingent effects not found by prior
research. We confirm prior literature in finding that absent a negative event, investors’
judgments respond most positively to disclosures of strategic CSR activity that are
assured. However, in the presence of a negative event, the disclosure of strategic or nonstrategic CSR activity provides similar insurance-like protection against investors’
negative adjustments to their judgments, regardless of assurance.
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Part three consists of two studies that provide the results of an experiment
examining whether the type of CSR activity and CSR assurance interact to influence
jurors’ decision-making. Study 1 finds that jurors’ affective response to the defendant is
more favorable when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities. However,
neither the type of CSR activity nor CSR assurance directly influence jurors’ negligence
assessments. Study 2 finds that non-strategic CSR activities only provides protection
against compensatory and punitive damage assessments when the disclosure is assured.
Overall, findings suggest that the insurance-like protection of CSR and the influence of
CSR assurance extend to the litigation setting.
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Part One
A Review of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure in the Accounting Literature

1

I: INTRODUCTION
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and related voluntary disclosure is a
growing area of focus for companies as society continues to increase the expectations of
corporations beyond financial performance. Paralleling society’s increasing interest in the CSR
activities of companies; the accounting literature shows a spike of research studies investigating
CSR disclosure in recent years with many of the studies examining the same questions asked in
research on traditional accounting issues. The purpose of this study is to conduct a literature
review of CSR disclosure studies published in American Accounting Association (AAA)
journals plus five non-AAA journals generally regarded as “top tier” by accounting academics.
A literature review focusing on CSR disclosure in the accounting literature is timely and
needed for several important reasons. First, the number of companies voluntary reporting on
CSR activities continues to increase and provides an important information source to
stakeholders (KPMG 2015). Therefore, it is important for accounting researchers to understand
CSR disclosure data sources and measurement techniques in order for the literature to continue
to investigate how information is disclosed, what information is disclosed and how stakeholders
view the disclosure. Second, the continued increase in companies voluntarily purchasing CSR
assurance provides motivation to understand the full range of benefits associated with assurance
(KPMG 2015). Prior CSR literature reviews focus on the general topic of CSR by considering
CSR performance and disclosure as interchangeable. However, that approach fails to fully
recognize the risk that CSR disclosures may not always accurately portray the CSR performance
of a company. This literature review addresses this concern by discussing the credibility
concerns of CSR disclosure and the credibility-enhancing function of CSR assurance examined
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in the literature. Finally, little is known about how different stakeholder groups interpret CSR
disclosures. 1 This review synthesizes research that investigates how various stakeholder groups
consider CSR disclosure information during their decision-making processes and provides
suggestions on how future research can develop further understanding of the value-relevance of
CSR disclosure to various groups. This is important because companies provide voluntary CSR
information in order to manage their relationship with various stakeholders and companies
expect the information will influence judgment and decision-making behavior.
CSR has been researched across many disciplines, including management, marketing,
economics and others. 2 In an introduction to a CSR Issues in Accounting research forum, Moser
and Martin (2012) provide two suggestions that would benefit the CSR accounting research
literature. First, while shareholders have been the focus of the literature, accounting researchers
need to be more open to the idea that both shareholders and non-shareholders drive CSR
activities and related disclosure. Second, they suggest the use of experiments to complement
archival research by answering questions that cannot be addressed with archival data. As shown
in this literature review, accounting researchers have recently followed both of these suggestions,
but there is more work to be done.
I conduct this literature review following guidelines suggested by Torraco's (2005). I find
that the literature uses a variety of CSR disclosure data sources, ranging from annual reports
(e.g., the 10-k and stand-alone sustainability reporting) to more timely sources of news releases
and company websites. When assessing CSR disclosure, studies generally consider the extent of
1

In a review of the CSR literature, Aguinis and Glavas (2012) find a limited number of studies investigate use of
CSR information by individual stakeholders and call for future research to focus on the individual level of analysis.
2
For CSR literature reviews from the various disciplines see Aguinis and Glavas (2012) for management, Peloza
and Shang (2011) for marketing and Huang and Watson (2015) for accounting.
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disclosure or construct measures to proxy for disclosure quality. I find that some studies
examining the voluntary CSR reporting decision investigate company characteristics common to
reporting firms (e.g., size, risk), while others consider different theoretical motivations with the
primary focus being legitimacy theory. Further, the literature review reveals that studies examine
the use of CSR disclosure by stakeholders other than investors (e.g., analysts, consumers), but
investors remain the predominant stakeholder of interest in the literature. Also, I find a range of
research design methods including archival, experimental and qualitative surveys and interviews.
The remainder of this literature review is organized as follows. In Section II, I describe
the methods used to locate studies relevant to this review and detail the journals considered.
Section III discusses the sources of CSR disclosure and the various measures used in the
literature. Section IV discusses how the literature examines the motivations for companies to
voluntary report CSR information. In Section V, I discuss how the literature investigates
credibility concerns and how assurance of CSR reports influences credibility. Section VI
discusses how the literature investigates stakeholder perceptions and use of CSR disclosure.
Finally, Section VII summarizes my findings.
II: METHODS
According to Torraco (2015), the purpose of an integrative literature review is to generate
new frameworks and perspectives on a topic in order to synthesize the current understanding and
provide insight on how the research can move forward. Integrative literature reviews are used to
address either mature topics or new, emerging topics. As shown in this literature review, CSR
disclosure in some shape or form has been studied in the accounting literature for decades.
However, it cannot be considered a mature topic for two reasons. First, although the general
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concept of CSR disclosure has existed for many decades in the accounting literature, there has
been a significant increase recently in articles published on this topic. This trend is likely to
continue as the demand for social disclosures increases (KPMG 2015). Second, data sources for
CSR disclosure continue to grow and improve, providing greater opportunities for researchers to
examine areas of interest. Third, the concept of CSR, as defined by society, has continued to
evolve and requires further examination of the knowledge and structures found (Ghobadian,
Money, and Hillenbrand 2015; Carroll and Shabana 2010; Carroll 1999).
To identify the articles captured in this review, I searched for “corporate social
responsibility” on the American Accounting Association (AAA) digital library and the journal
websites of five additional journals commonly considered as top accounting journals. 3,4 I focus
on articles, excluding book reviews and introductions to special issues. This search resulted in
181 articles (83 from AAA journals and 98 from non-AAA journals) containing the phrase
“corporate social responsibility” somewhere in the body of the journal article. I completed the
following steps to determine which identified articles are most relevant to this review. First, I
read each abstract to determine whether CSR disclosure was the focus of the article. If this was
not evident, I searched the article for CSR to determine where and how the article used the
concept of CSR. After reviewing all 181 articles, I eliminated 119 of the articles whose focus
was not CSR disclosure. 5 I include the remaining 62 articles in this review. These studies are

3

The five additional journals searched include Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting
Research, Accounting Organizations and Society, Contemporary Accounting Research and Review of Accounting
Studies.
4
I use the broader search term of “corporate social responsibility” rather than searching for “corporate social
responsibility disclosure” to ensure all articles relevant to this review are captured.
5
For example, several of the eliminated articles focus on CSR performance ratings or use CSR as an example of a
potential area of interest that could be considered in future studies. Others cite articles with CSR in the title, but use
aspects of the study unrelated to CSR.
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described in the Appendices (a separate document distributed with this paper), and Table 1.1
shows details of the publications by journal and year of publication. It is clear from the table that
CSR has an increasing presence in the accounting literature. Prior to 2011, CSR was mainly
confined to Accounting, Organizations and Society, but since then there is an increase in the
breadth of journals containing CSR articles.
Insert Table 1.1 About Here
III: CSR REPORTING SOURCES AND MEASURES
This section outlines the various CSR disclosure sources and techniques used in
accounting research to measure and operationalize CSR reporting behavior of companies. I begin
with a discussion on the sources and measures of CSR disclosure in order to provide greater
context to the findings of the literature discussed in later sections. This context is needed because
unlike studies focusing on the CSR performance of companies that use performance results
contained in various databases, the CSR disclosure literature mainly uses content analysis of
hand-collected CSR information releases. 6
Source of Disclosures
Companies have many options when disclosing information to interested parties, ranging
from news releases, voluntary reports and SEC filings. Rockness and Williams (1988) survey
mutual fund managers to examine the sources of information on social responsibility they use
when making investment decisions. They find fund managers predominantly review information
directly from the companies or from government sources, but they also use other sources

6

The MSCI ESG Stats database, formerly KLD, is an example of a database of CSR performance ratings.

6

including industry and trade organizations, business publications, private social responsibility
organizations/publications and other miscellaneous sources.
The accounting literature reviewed supports the assertion that CSR information is
available in a variety of locations. I find studies using CSR information from analyst reports
(Huang, Zang, and Zheng 2014), press releases (Chakravarthy, DeHaan, and Rajgopal 2014;
Aerts and Cormier 2009), and private social and environmental reporting between companies
and investors (Solomon, Solomon, Joseph, and Norton 2013). Further, Cohen, Holder-Webb,
Nath, and Wood (2012) examine a variety of information bursts (mandatory filings, website,
governance documents, product fact sheets, CSR reports, press release and “other”) from
companies. Also, many studies focus on the disclosure contained in annual reports/10-ks (e.g., de
Villiers and van Staden 2006; Patten 2005; Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, and Hughes 2004; Adams
and Harte 1998; Teoh and Thong 1984; Wiseman 1982; Trotman and Bradley 1981). More
recently, stand-alone sustainability reports have been frequently used and are commonly
accessed via the Corporate Register, who maintains a repository of CSR reports, or directly from
company websites (e.g., Casey and Grenier 2015; Peters and Romi 2015; Gao, Lisic, and Zhang
2014; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang 2011; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009; Clarkson, Li,
Richardson, and Vasvari 2008).
Overall, I find that companies release CSR information from a variety of sources, but the
accounting literature focuses on CSR disclosures released as part of the annual reporting process
or from stand-alone CSR reports. This variety of sources provides researchers and users many
different options when examining the informational value of the disclosures. However, it also
makes comparisons across companies difficult since there is no common standard or outlet of
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information. The next section discusses how the literature addresses this issue by creating CSR
disclosure measures.
CSR Disclosure Measures
I find that content analysis of CSR disclosures is the primary method used in the
literature to measure either the extent of disclosure or the quality of disclosure. Content analysis
is the most appropriate method due to the lack of a database with comparable disclosure
information across a large number of companies, and allows flexibility in the type of data
collected from the disclosure. 7 However, content analysis is a subjective process requiring
careful and consistent treatment across disclosure sources and researchers.
The extent of disclosure is historically measured by quantifying the portion of the annual
report devoted to CSR disclosures. For example, Bowman and Haire (1976) count the number of
lines of text devoted to CSR and divide by the total lines of text. Similarly, Trotman and Bradley
(1981) determine on a line-by-line basis the percentage of total discussion focused on CSR
issues. Likewise, Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell (1998) measure the level of environmental
disclosure by counting the number of words related to environmental activities. One study
(Adams and Harte 1998) uses content analysis not to quantify the amount of the annual report
dedicated to CSR disclosures, but rather to examine the extent of gender and employment
disclosures by comparing corporate annual reports of major British banking and retail companies
over an extended period of time (1935-1993).

7

Krippendorff (2004) defines content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences
from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use”. Therefore, this methodology is well-suited to
analyze the text of CSR disclosures.
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Occasionally, studies rely on independent data sources for company disclosure levels
rather than performing content analysis. For example, Cowen, Ferreri, and Parker (1987) use the
Ernst & Whinney 1978 survey of CSR disclosures present in the annual reports of Fortune 500
companies. As CSR reporting guidance became available in later decades, researchers began to
use external frameworks as a way to measure the extent of CSR reporting (e.g., Ling and Mowen
2013; Clarkson et al. 2008). For example, Clarkson et al. (2008) develop an index based on the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines aimed at assessing the
level of discretionary environmental disclosure across 95 items with 79 classified as hard and 16
as soft disclosure items.
Content analysis to measure disclosure quality uses scoring methods to assess quality
across various CSR dimensions. For example, Wiseman (1982) assigns one to three points to an
identified set of 18 environmental disclosure topics considered essential for complete reporting.
Three points are awarded when the disclosure discussed the item in monetary or quantitative
terms, two points when it was specifically described and one point when discussed in general.
The same technique is used in later studies expanded to additional environmental disclosure
topics (e.g., Aerts and Cormier 2009; de Villiers and van Staden 2006; Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004).
Several studies suggest improvements to the Wiseman scoring method by relying on
analysis of external information or future firm behavior. Roberts (1992) uses a disclosure score
ranging from zero to two to represent poor, good or excellent levels of disclosure based on
evaluation of corporate social disclosures from the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP). He
suggests this is a more reliable measure of disclosure quality since the CEP evaluates many
alternative sources of information to corroborate performance with disclosure. Richardson and
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Welker (2001) consider social disclosure by using a disclosure score from the joint Society of
Management Accountants of Canada and University of Quebec at Montreal for Canadian firms.
Finally, Patten (2005) examines disclosure quality by examining the accuracy of projected future
expenditures.
Recent content analysis uses newer methods to examine qualitative aspects of disclosure
quality. Cho, Roberts, and Patten (2010) use DICTION software to assess disclosure optimism
and certainty level, and Cho, Michelon, and Patten (2012) review the content of CSR reports to
measure for impression management in graphs contained in the reports. Similarly, Cho, Laine,
Roberts, and Rodrigue (2015) qualitatively analyze annual reports, sustainability reports, website
disclosures and shareholder resolutions to compare company message and activities.
Overall, I find that CSR disclosures have been studied both in terms of the extent of
disclosures and the quality of the disclosures based on content analysis of hand-collected data.
The findings range from studies using very specific measures for one piece of CSR disclosure
(e.g., environmental) to studies that use a proxy to represent overall company CSR disclosure
practices. Further, the literature mainly focuses on the quantity of disclosures rather than
disclosure quality. A recent study by Zahller, Arnold, and Roberts (2015) suggests that CSR
disclosure quality as measured in the literature comprises the extent of disclosure, the inclusion
of negative information, disclosure accuracy and disclosure timeliness. The studies reviewed
above appear to support this idea. Until the availability of the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score,
a database did not exist to allow researchers to have a measure of CSR disclosure for a large
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number of companies. 8 Future research should continue to consider different ways to measure
CSR disclosure quality as CSR reporting practices evolve. Examining disclosure quality will
continue to be important when assessing how disclosures influence stakeholder reactions. As
shown above, one possible technique is to compare disclosures against commonly used reporting
frameworks like the GRI as they continue to develop an increased following. Further, studies can
consider how CSR assurance impacts disclosure quality.
IV: MOTIVATIONS FOR VOLUNTARY CSR DISCLOSURE
Traditionally, accounting researchers examine the flow of information from companies to
shareholders to better understand how capital markets use this information. 9 Disclosures can
either be mandatory as part of the annual report or companies can supplement the annual report
with voluntary disclosures. The CSR disclosure literature overlaps with traditional accounting
research by examining why companies choose to voluntarily provide CSR disclosures. In the
early years, CSR disclosure research was mainly concentrated on the examination of disclosures
of environmental issues around pollution (e.g., Wiseman 1982; Belkaoui 1980), with social
issues mostly relating to human rights issues with the Sullivan Principles (e.g., Arnold and
Hammond 1994; Patten 1990). Over the years, studies have broadened to include a much more
comprehensive examination of environmental and social disclosure as the availability of CSR
disclosure data increased with more companies voluntarily reporting. 10 Motivations for this

8

Recently, studies outside of the accounting literature have started to use Bloomberg Environmental, Social and
Governance (ESG) data as a source of ESG disclosure ratings and it is anticipated this data source will start being
used in accounting studies. Refer to Zuraida, Houqe, and Van Zijl (2016) for a more comprehensive description of
the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score.
9
For a review on corporate disclosure studies refer to Healy and Palepu (2001) and Verrecchia (2001).
10
KPMG performed an international survey of CSR reporting in 2015 by analyzing the CSR reports of more than
3,400 companies globally, including the 250 largest global companies (G250). They found that 92% of the G250
were producing some form of CSR report, which was a 11% increase from a similar study they performed in 2008.
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increase in voluntary reporting have been studied in two main ways. First, studies examine
company characteristics common to those that choose to report. Second, studies examine
theoretical explanations for why companies choose to voluntarily disclose CSR information.
Characteristics of Companies That Voluntarily Disclose
Studies examine company characteristics to investigate the type of firms that produce
reports, identifying a number of characteristics that differentiate these firms. Overall, the
findings suggest that larger firms (Casey and Grenier 2015; Simnett et al. 2009; Neu et al. 1998;
Cowen et al. 1987; Teoh and Thong 1984; Trotman and Bradley 1981), firms with greater CSR
strategic alignment (e.g., Roberts 1992; Trotman and Bradley 1981; Bowman and Haire 1976),
firms with higher systematic risk (Trotman and Bradley 1981), firms with CSR corporate
governance committees (Cowen et al. 1987), high cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011),
higher audit fees (Chen, Srinidhi, Tsang, and Yu 2016), and firms in certain industries (e.g.,
Casey and Grenier 2015; Simnett et al. 2009; Cowen et al. 1987) are more likely to disclose.
Also, studies with international samples find that the national origin of the corporation influences
the reporting decision (Simnett et al. 2009; Teoh and Thong 1984). Further, Luo and Tang
(2015) find that national cultural dimensions (e.g., masculinity, power distance, uncertainty) are
associated with the decision to report on carbon emissions. In likely the most comprehensive
firm characteristic study, Casey and Grenier (2015) find that CSR performance (positive or
negative), global companies, liquidity, leverage, cost of capital, competition, and advertising
intensity are predictors of CSR reporting by U.S. companies. They also find growth firms, firms
in high-litigation industries and firms that raise new capital are less likely to report.
They suggest that CSR reporting has stabilized at a high level as the reporting percentage has ranged from 92% to
95% since 2011 (KPMG 2015).
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Finally, studies highlight the fact that from time to time certain CSR disclosures become
mandatory as governments enact disclosure requirements. Sankara, Lindberg, and Razaki (2016)
and Herda and Snyder (2013) investigate Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (U.S. House of
Representatives 2010) which requires companies using conflict minerals at any point in their
supply chain to complete a new SEC filing requirement, Form SD and a Conflict Minerals
Report (CMR).
Future research could further examine these characteristics in greater detail to better
understand the motivation behind reporting. For example, Casey and Grenier (2015) find positive
or negative CSR performance to be a predictor of reporting. This could be further understood by
considering the different dimensions of CSR, especially within specific industries. Also, the
reporting practices of companies continue to evolve with increased reporting guidance available
from the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board and the Global Reporting Initiative. Future
studies could examine characteristics of companies electing to follow these reporting standards.
Finally, studies can investigate future government reporting requirements to understand how
reporting is influenced when new legislation is passed.
Theoretical Insights into Why Companies Disclose
I find the majority of studies examining theoretical motivations for companies to produce
voluntary CSR disclosure focus on legitimacy theory. 11 Legitimacy theory suggests companies
maintain legitimacy when they conform to the acceptable norms of society and are required to
maintain their legitimacy in society to remain in operation. Pressure to maintain corporate
legitimacy can come from internal motivations or external stakeholder pressure.

11

For a review of organizational legitimacy theory see Suchman (1995) or Dowling and Pfeffer (1975).
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Legitimacy Theory: External Pressure to Disclose
Several articles focus on external pressure to disclose. Motivated by legitimacy theory,
Neu et al. (1998) examine external pressure to report by considering whether firms disclose
positive action, obfuscate negative actions, or some combination of both. They find firms
increase the level of environmental disclosure when reacting to external pressure from
shareholders and regulators, but decrease disclosure when criticized by environmentalist groups.
They conclude that companies respond to the interests of the more important publics and not the
marginal publics, which suggests power of the external group is an important factor to
understanding company disclosure practices. Deegan and Blomquist (2006) consider the
implications of legitimacy theory and find that companies adjust their environmental reporting
practices when pressured by lobby groups. More recently, Bhimani, Silvola, and Sivabalan
(2016) examine the voluntary reporting decision by early and late adopters using survey and field
data. They interpret their findings using three types of isomorphism motivations explained by
Dimaggio and Powell (1983): coercive, normative and mimetic. 12 Isomorphism is related to
legitimacy theory in that the characteristics of companies become aligned as a way to conform to
societal norms, thus maintaining legitimacy. Bhimani et al. (2016) find that early adopters report
due to coercive and normative isomorphism in order to earn financial rewards by satisfying
external stakeholder demands. However, they find late adopters are driven by mimetic
isomorphism since they have CSR embedded in their operations; therefore, stakeholders do not
exert pressure on the company to report.
12

Coercive isomorphism refers to a company adopting CSR reporting due to pressures from external stakeholders,
while normative isomorphism refers to norms transferring from one firm to another. Finally, mimetic isomorphism
occurs when companies conform to the norms of other companies. Refer to Dimaggio and Powell (1983) for further
discussion.
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Two studies consider how the reporting process becomes normative in an organization.
Bebbington, Kirk, and Larrinaga (2012) compare reporting regimes in Spain and the UK from
1997 to 2001 to consider how normativity is created by focusing on environmental reporting.
Interestingly, they find reporting in Spain did not develop to meet the requirements of the
environmental disclosure law passed in 1998. However, without a law in place, the UK
developed an environmental reporting regime. They suggest the norm was constructed through
the actions of large companies. The study benefits the CSR literature by suggesting that firms in
the UK report because it is part of the norms of the society. Also, Contrafatto (2014) examines
how social and environmental reporting (SER) became institutionalized via a case study of one
Italian multinational company. This study identifies a three-step process of constructing a
common meaning system, routine practice by employees in their daily routine, and reinforcement
through managerial procedures and structures.
Legitimacy Theory: Internal Motivations to Disclose
Other studies also consider legitimacy theory, but focus on a company’s motivation for
using CSR disclosures as a marketing tool to manage company and brand image. Patten (2005)
examines environmentally sensitive industries to investigate whether firms disclose as a means to
seek or maintain social legitimacy by considering whether current environmental disclosures
accurately reflect future results. Finding a lack of value in the environmental disclosure, Patten
concludes disclosures are likely to be a legitimation tool. de Villiers and van Staden (2006) use
legitimacy theory to argue that a reduction in disclosures can also be explained by companies
concerned about the external perceived impression of the company. In a study of South African
company annual reports, they argue that companies consider general and specific environmental
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disclosures separately and will reduce specific disclosures when they perceive them as
threatening their legitimacy. Aerts and Cormier (2009) investigate environmental reporting by
considering the expectation of managers to manage both environmental performance and the
perceptions of that performance. Examining how the media portray the company, they find
companies influence stakeholders’ perceptions of environmental legitimacy by issuing reactive
environmental press releases and altering the extent and quality of environmental annual report
disclosures. Chakravarthy et al. (2014) examine the frequency and target audience of press
releases before and after a financial restatement, finding significant increases in releases during
the post-restatement period aimed at investors and other stakeholder groups in order to repair
reputation. As further evidence of the reputation-repair motivation for increasing their press
releases, they find the most relevant stakeholder groups are targeted. Durable products firms
target customers, firms with organized or highly skilled workers target employees, and firms
operating in many locations target community actions. Ling and Mowen (2013) investigate
company motivations for voluntary environmental disclosure with a focus on the
environmentally sensitive chemical industry by looking at a corporation’s competitive strategy to
determine whether strategy is driving the disclosure or whether disclosure is being used as a tool
to repair brand image after a negative event. They find image- and R&D-focused companies
produce more disclosure than companies without these strategies. Also, image companies are
more likely to produce more disclosures when their performance is low, consistent with the
brand image theory. Alternatively, R&D-focused companies are more likely to produce
disclosures when performance is higher. In general, this provides evidence that environmental
reporting decisions vary based on firm-specific factors and can signal information to
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stakeholders of the firm. Solomon et al. (2013) also consider impression management by
investigating the practice of private social and environmental reporting and find that investors
perceive the information as a brand impression mechanism and not an accountability mechanism.
Two studies examine the presentation of CSR disclosures to consider whether they are
used as an impression management tool. Cho et al. (2010) use legitimacy theory to hypothesize
that companies will use disclosure language optimism and certainty as a tool to manage
impressions of the firm. They find evidence that poor environmental performers use verbal tone
and language to bias the message contained in the disclosures. Similarly, Cho et al. (2012) find
impression management evidence in the graphs contained in CSR reports with reports showing
both a selectivity bias in the choice of items graphed and distortion in graphing favorable to the
company. Consistent with legitimacy theory, they conclude companies use CSR graphing
techniques to manage the company’s impression with stakeholders.
Overall, the accounting literature examining theoretical explanations for why companies
voluntarily disclose CSR information mainly considers legitimacy theory and finds that
companies initiate reporting in response to external pressure from stakeholders. Further, the
findings in these studies support that companies use CSR disclosure as a way to manage their
perceived legitimacy among stakeholder groups. The motivation to use CSR disclosure to build
and preserve organizational legitimacy can bring doubt about the credibility of the voluntary
disclosures, which I discuss in Section VI.
Beyond Legitimacy Theory: Other Motivations for Voluntary Disclosure
Legitimacy theory is not without limitations, and the literature examines other theories to
provide further insight into the reporting decision. One limitation of legitimacy theory is that it
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focuses on companies’ voluntary disclosing information only out of self-interest motives in order
to manage its perceived legitimacy among its stakeholders. However, this view fails to consider
whether companies undertake and report on CSR initiatives out of a genuine concern for the
environmental or social issue (i.e., values-drive motivations). Stakeholder theory suggests
companies have a responsibility to all stakeholders of the company rather than solely focusing on
shareholders (i.e., maximizing profits). Using stakeholder theory, Roberts (1992) finds firms
with greater stakeholder power disclose greater amounts of information. 13 Investigating the
limitations of legitimacy theory to explain motivations for company reporting, Clarkson et al.
(2008) rely on voluntary disclosure theory to examine the relationship between environmental
disclosure and performance. Voluntary disclosure theory predicts companies use disclosures to
signal their type (i.e., CSR initiatives are done out of genuine motives). They find that the extent
of disclosure is positively related to environmental performance, providing support for firms
using voluntary disclosure to signal their type to stakeholders. However, they also find some
evidence supporting impression management motivations as weak environmental performers
make soft claims around their commitment to the environment.
Cho et al. (2015) suggest that legitimacy and signaling theory present limits in
understanding sustainability reporting and provide new theoretical ways to examine reporting.
They position their argument from the standpoint that a gap remains between what companies
say they do and their actual actions. Referring to this as “organized hypocrisy” they suggest this
practice gives companies flexibility in managing conflicting stakeholder demands. They also
13

Stakeholder power refers to the stakeholder’s degree of control over required company resources (Roberts 1992).
He measures stakeholder power for shareholders (percentage of ownership by management and individual
shareholders owning more than 5% of outstanding shares), governmental stakeholders (dollars contributed by
corporate PACs to political campaigns) and creditors (debt to equity ratio).
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consider three different organizational facades: rational, progressive and reputation. 14 They test
their theoretical framework by examining the talk, decisions and actions of two oil and gas
corporations during debate over drilling in the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge. They find that
within each façade a corporation’s message and activities are generally consistent; however,
inconsistencies exist when comparing across facades. This provides motivation for future studies
to consider the gap between a company’s actions and a company’s disclosure.
Overall, there is much evidence that supports the use of legitimacy theory to explain the
reporting motivations of companies. However, Cho et al. (2015) provide motivation to move past
this theory to look at a more refined breakdown of the “organizational facades” of companies.
Future research should continue to investigate motivations for companies to voluntarily produce
CSR disclosures, in order to examine the value-relevance of the information reported in light of
the potential for companies to issue them out of self-interested motives. Future research could
also examine how the impression management attempts influence various stakeholder reactions.
Finally, future research could also examine the transition from voluntary to mandatory CSR
disclosures like those contained in Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
V: CREDIBILITY CONCERNS AND ASSURANCE OF CSR REPORTS
A second area where CSR disclosure research overlaps with traditional accounting
research issues is consideration of disclosure accuracy. Accounting academics are interested in
understanding disclosure accuracy and the role of assurance in improving the usefulness of
information provided to users. As a response to the concerns of companies having self-interested

14

Cho et al. (2015) refer to Abrahamson and Baumard (2008, 438) who define facades as “a symbolic front erected
by organizational participants designed to reassure their organization’s stakeholders, of the legitimacy of the
organization and its management”.
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motives for voluntary reporting, I find that the literature examines disclosure accuracy by
comparing disclosure to actual performance (e.g., Clarkson et al. 2008; Patten 2005; Al-Tuwaijri
et al. 2004; Wiseman 1982). In an early study, Wiseman (1982) finds disclosures to be vague,
incomplete, inconsistent between firms, general rather than specific in nature, and a lack of
evidence of disclosures relating to actual performance. More recently, Patten (2005) finds actual
CSR spending is lower than the projection in 75 percent of the sample, yet total capital
expenditure projections are accurate. In sum, these studies suggest voluntary CSR disclosure can
be inaccurate, further raising the concern over the usefulness of the information in decisionmaking.
Users notice the concern over the accuracy of CSR disclosures. Rockness and Williams
(1988) survey fund managers and find that social information is difficult to obtain and
incomplete. Also using survey data, Cohen, Holder-Webb, Nath, and Wood (2011) find that
retail investors prefer CSR and governance information coming from external sources rather than
directly from the company. Further, Solomon et al. (2013) interview UK institutional investors to
understand how they perceive the social and environmental information disclosed privately to
them directly from the company. They find the investors view the disclosure as the company’s
attempt to disclose information they think the investors want to hear. Together, these studies
suggest users are skeptical of voluntary CSR information coming directly from the company and
therefore are likely to discount its usefulness to their decision-making.
The concern about a company’s motivations for voluntarily reporting of CSR information
and the apparent lack of disclosure accuracy is addressed in the literature by considering the
influence of CSR assurance. As CSR reporting is voluntary, CSR assurance is also a voluntary
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action companies can decide to undertake for their CSR reports. 15 Similar to financial statement
audits, many professional accounting firms also offer assurance services for CSR reports. 16 In
order to understand how accounting firms developed this new line of service, O’Dwyer, Owen,
and Unerman (2011) perform a qualitative study to determine how accounting firms seek to
establish legitimacy for sustainability assurance services. They discover that it is a process
involving three important players: the client, the client’s stakeholders who use the report, and the
audit firm’s internal risk department. They conclude that the firms need to establish pragmatic
legitimacy with the clients but can only do so by first establishing pragmatic legitimacy with the
audit firm’s internal risk department and moral legitimacy with the client’s stakeholders.
In order to understand how the accounting literature has studied this new line of service, I
group the studies into four sections. First, early literature investigates common characteristics of
companies that make the voluntary decision to purchase assurance of their reports. Second, a
segment of the literature examines from whom companies are purchasing assurance. Third,
studies consider the value added to CSR reports when assurance services are provided by
examining whether assurance increases users’ perceptions of credibility. Finally, recent studies
examine factors that can influence CSR assurance quality.
Characteristics of Companies That Purchase Assurance
Similar to the literature that examines the voluntary reporting decision, studies examine
factors that influence the CSR assurance decision. For example, Simnett et al. (2009) perform an
international comparison on assurance of sustainability reports, finding that companies seeking
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Cohen and Simnett (2015) provide a review of the CSR assurance literature.
Accounting firms have a history of trying to apply auditing expertise to other settings. For example, in the 1990s
the AICPA developed WebTrust assurance services to increase consumer confidence in e-commerce (Primoff 1998).
16
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to enhance the credibility of the CSR report or enhance their company image are more likely to
purchase assurance. This is primarily evident in their finding that companies in industries with
higher environmental and social risks (i.e., mining, finance and utilities) have the greatest
demand for report assurance. Casey and Grenier (2015) extend Simnett et al. (2009) by focusing
on the U.S. assurance market, to seek understanding of why U.S. firms lag their international
counterparts. Contrary to Simnett et al. (2009) they do not find support for greater demand in
industries with higher environmental and social risks. One possible explanation they provide is
that higher regulation placed on those industries in the U.S. is acting as a substitute tool for
credibility enhancement. Additionally, Casey and Grenier (2015) find that CSR performance
influences the assurance decision as companies with CSR strengths are more likely to purchase
assurance. They conclude this is most likely due to the need to increase the credibility of
disclosing positive information. Further, they find that companies with CSR weaknesses are also
more likely to purchase assurance. They conclude this is likely due to weak CSR performers
being incentivized to report positive CSR efforts, which stakeholders view skeptically.
Peters and Romi (2015) add to the literature by investigating the association between
corporate governance characteristics and the assurance decision. Their focus is primarily on
whether companies have established an environmental committee of the board and whether there
is a chief sustainability officer (CSO). They fail to find an association between the existence of
an environmental committee and CSR assurance, unless the committee is composed of
environmental experts. However, they do find a positive association between the presence of a
CSO and demand for CSR assurance, which is enhanced when the CSO is also an expert. These
studies provide important insights into the factors influencing the assurance decision by
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suggesting companies recognize when there are credibility concerns and attempt to increase the
perceived credibility among users by purchasing assurance.
Choice of Assurance Providers
Unlike mandatory assurance of traditional financial reporting, CSR assurance is a
voluntary action of the company requiring company expenditures. Therefore, unlike the financial
statement audit, public companies are not bound to professional accounting firms as the only
source of assurance services. Boutique consulting firms with CSR expertise and companies’
internal audit departments are potential options when determining who should provide assurance
services.
The CSR disclosure literature examines each of these options by investigating factors
associated with engaging each type of assurer. Simnett et al. (2009) find larger companies and
companies with lower leverage are more likely to purchase assurance from a professional
accounting firm. They suggest this could be due to the inability of small firms or firms with high
leverage to afford the fee premium of professional accountants. Also, they find companies
domiciled in stakeholder-oriented countries are more likely to choose professional accountants as
their assurance provider. Interestingly, they do not find support for companies in greater need of
credibility enhancement (i.e., those in mining, production or utilities industries). Casey and
Grenier (2015) replicate most of the Simnett et al. (2009) findings, with the exception of larger
firms not being more likely to purchase assurance from a professional accountant. When
investigating how CSR performance influences the choice of assurance provider, they find that
companies with strong CSR performance are more likely to purchase assurance from a
professional accountant, while companies with low CSR performance are more likely to use non-
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accounting assurance providers. This brings into question whether non-accounting assurance
providers are able to perform high-quality assurance. Finally, Peters and Romi (2015) find
companies with an environmental committee prefer hiring professional accounting firms and
CSOs prefer consultants to internal auditors.
Two additional studies examine the role of internal audit by surveying or interviewing
internal auditors. Gray, No, and Miller (2014) focus on internal auditors’ experiences and
opinions of “green IT.” 17 They find that internal auditors are not typically involved in green IT
activities, but the majority believe they should be involved in the assurance and control
monitoring of these activities. Trotman and Trotman (2015) also focus on the internal auditor’s
role in environmental sustainability. The general consensus across their interviewees is that
internal audit should and most likely will in the future play a role in the assurance of
sustainability information due to their expertise in regulation and compliance, managing risk and
reporting.
The above studies suggest there are three options available to companies when choosing
an assurance provider. Future research should continue to investigate the choice of assurance
provider as reporting standards become more widely used and as public accounting firms
continue to grow their CSR assurance practices. Future research could also consider the
differences in quality of the three providers. It is not clear which of these providers offer higher
assurance quality as auditors lack CSR subject knowledge, consultants lack audit knowledge and
internal auditors lack full independence. Understanding differences in quality will help inform

17

Gray et al. (2014) define “green IT” as the environmental compliance aspects of information technology.
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how users should respond to the assurance signal. In the next section I discuss studies that
examine how users perceive CSR assurance.
Users’ Perceptions of CSR Assurance
Several studies find that users recognize when companies voluntarily disclose incentiveconsistent information and rely on CSR assurance to provide a credibility-enhancing effect. For
example, Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett (2011) find that financial analysts recognize the
incentive for companies in environmentally sensitive industries to voluntarily report on their
CSR activity, which increases the credibility-enhancing effect of assurance. Also, Brown-Liburd
and Zamora (2015) find that investors recognize the incentive for management to overstate their
CSR activities when their pay is tied to CSR performance, as stock price assessments are only
greater for high CSR investment levels when CSR assurance is also present. Similarly, Cheng,
Green, and Ko (2015) find that investors recognize managements’ incentive for disclosing CSR
information aligned with the company’s overall strategy as investors are more willing to invest
when CSR assurance is present. In sum, these findings suggest that CSR assurance increases
users’ perceptions of credibility, which influences their investment decisions.
Pflugrath et al. (2011) also examine the credibility-enhancing effect of different types of
assurance providers by investigating whether financial analysts from Australia, the United States,
and the United Kingdom perceive a difference in credibility of sustainability disclosures based
on who provides the assurance. In the U.S. analyst group, they find that the perceived credibility
of the disclosures increases to a greater extent when the assurance is provided by professional
accountants. However, analysts from Australia and United Kingdom did not perceive a
difference in increased credibility between professional accountants or sustainability experts. In
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sum, the literature suggests that CSR assurance influences users’ perceptions of disclosure
credibility, which increases the value-relevance of the information to their decision-making.
CSR Assurance Quality
The CSR assurance literature also examines factors that might influence CSR assurance
quality. Building on the literature that examines the type of assurance provider, recent research
identifies that CSR assurance is performed using multidisciplinary audit teams. For example,
Kim, Green, and Johnstone (2015) investigate potential issues with audit quality arising from
mixed audit teams during a greenhouse gas (GHG) assurance engagement. They find support that
traditional audit participants incorrectly rely on a team member with GHG expertise. Also,
Moroney and Trotman (2016) find that auditors evaluate materiality differently during
sustainability audits compared to traditional financial statement materiality as qualitative factors
have a greater impact.
Overall, the above studies suggest that companies choosing to purchase assurance do so,
at least in part, to enhance users’ perceptions of credibility of the CSR disclosure, which is not
surprising due to the credibility concerns surrounding voluntary disclosure. Future research
should continue to investigate the assurance decision, including who provides the assurance as
well as whether all assurance providers’ result in similar value-added results. For example, a
study could examine the perceived credibility enhancement that comes from external assurance
versus internal assurance. Future studies should also consider how CSR assurance engagements
are conducted and what factors are associated with higher assurance quality. Also, studies could
examine whether assurance provides the same level of credibility-enhancement to a company’s
CSR information as firms that are listed on recognized lists such as CR Magazine’s list of best
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corporate citizens. Further, recent studies examine disclosure quality. For example, Al-Shaer and
Zaman (2016) find that companies with gender-diverse boards are associated with higher
reporting quality. Also, Zahller et al. (2015) find that high disclosure quality is associated with
higher perceptions of credibility. Future research can combine disclosure quality and CSR
assurance to examine the incremental credibility available from CSR assurance when disclosures
are high quality.
VI: STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS AND USE OF CSR DISCLOSURE
The third area of overlap between traditional accounting issues and CSR disclosure is
how the disclosure information is viewed by users. Developing an understanding of how CSR
disclosure is perceived and used by stakeholders is important to help understand the valuerelevance of the information being voluntarily disclosed. The previous sections discuss CSR
disclosure by focusing on the motives and needs of the company. However, that view is limited
as it does not consider how the information is used by a cross section of stakeholders. I find a
range of studies examine how CSR disclosure information is used by user groups in various
contexts.
Users of CSR Reports
At the time of this review, the majority of studies examining stakeholders’ use of CSR
disclosure focus on the capital market participants of analysts and investors. I review and
synthesize the literature by first grouping studies based on the user group investigated and then
by the research method used.
Analysts
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Two studies focus on the use of CSR information by analysts. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find
high CSR performers that initiate CSR reporting attract analyst coverage. Further, they find that
analysts of those companies achieve lower absolute forecast errors and dispersion. In an
international study, Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and Yang (2012) investigate whether
financial analysts use the nonfinancial information contained in the CSR report to improve their
forecast accuracy. They find companies issuing CSR reports have lower analyst forecast errors,
with findings being stronger in companies that operate in countries with a greater stakeholder
focus and in countries with greater financial opacity. The findings suggest that CSR reports are
used as complementary information by analysts but in varying levels depending on the
importance of the CSR information. In countries with higher stakeholder orientation the CSR
performance is likely to have a more direct connection to financial performance and in financial
opaque countries the information is used to help alleviate information transparency issues.
Investors
The majority of studies in this literature review focus on investors as users. Therefore,
this section is broken down by the research methods used in the studies.
Survey methods.
Survey techniques are helpful to gain insight into investors’ demand for CSR disclosure,
as well as how CSR information is used when making decisions. Two early studies investigate
how mutual funds consider CSR information when making investment decisions. Buzby and
Falk (1978) survey 102 mutual fund presidents to gain insight into whether the investment
policies of the funds consider nine areas of social concern. They find mixed results, in that some
of the nine areas are considered, but not all. However, the importance of eight out of the nine

28

areas was deemed to be less than the six financial items contained on the questionnaire.
Similarly, Rockness and Williams (1988) find mutual fund managers value six performance
factors of environmental protection, equal employment opportunity, treatment of employees,
business relations with repressive regimes, product quality and innovation and defense
contracting. In a pair of more recent surveys, Cohen et al. (2011) survey 750 retail investors and
Cohen, Holder-Webb, and Zamora (2015) survey 228 professional investors to examine their
perceptions of CSR information, and how they process information available to them when
making decisions. Areas of available information include indicators of economic performance,
corporate governance policies and performance, and corporate social responsibility. They find
that while not as important as economic performance or governance characteristics, investors do
use CSR information when analyzing investments. In supplemental questions the respondents
note a desire to increase the use of nonfinancial information in the future. Together, the survey
literature suggests that investors find CSR information relevant to their investment decisions, but
not as important as traditional financial information. However, investors express increasing
demand for CSR information in the future.
Experimental designs.
A second segment of the literature uses experimental methods to examine whether CSR
disclosures influence investors’ behavior. For example, Belkaoui (1980) find that disclosure of
pollution abatement costs effect participants’ investment decisions. Huang et al. (2014) conduct a
study on whether the text in analyst reports is useful to investors beyond the information
contained in the quantitative summary measures. While the study covers many different aspects
of the text in the reports, one hypothesis deals with investors’ reactions to nonfinancial
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information. They find that investors react more intensely when there is a greater emphasis
placed on nonfinancial topics. This lends support to the idea that investors use CSR information
to help remove information asymmetry problems.
Other studies examine factors that moderate investors’ reactions to CSR information.
Elliott, Jackson, Peecher, and White (2014) investigate whether unintentional effects of CSR
performance can impact an investor’s estimated value of the firm and whether the unintentional
effect can be mitigated by explicit assessment of CSR performance. They find that participants
not asked to explicitly assess CSR performance have higher (lower) valuations for strong (weak)
CSR performance compared to those prompted to assess CSR performance. Cheng et al. (2015)
examine whether the type of CSR activity moderates investors’ perceptions of CSR information.
They find investors perceive the disclosures as more important and are more willing to invest in
the company when the indicators have a high level of strategic relevance.
Two studies consider whether disclosure quality influences investors’ reactions. Basoglu
and Hess (2014) find that enhanced media contained in high quality electronic business reporting
increases the perceived trustworthiness of the firm and investment quality and therefore induce
more favorable buy and sell intentions. Zahller et al. (2015) examine the influence of disclosure
quality on nonprofessional investor decisions and finds support that companies can enhance
organizational legitimacy and build social resilience to exogenous shocks impacting another
company in the industry. In sum, the experimental literature suggests that CSR information
influences investors’ decision-making.
Archival studies.
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Archival studies are helpful as they provide information on how the market as a whole
reacts to CSR information. In general, archival studies find that the market incorporates CSR
information into stock prices. For example, Patten (1990) investigates market reaction to social
responsibility disclosures by examining volume and stock price impacts for companies signing
the Sullivan Principles versus companies that did not sign. They find that companies not signing
had greater unexpected trading volume and conclude that the difference is attributed to investors
using social responsibility disclosure information when making investment decisions. Further,
Herremans, Akathaporn, and McInnes (1993) find investors are aware of the reputation
differences between companies as evidenced by positive abnormal returns for industries involved
in higher levels of social conflict. More recently, Jain, Jain, and Rezaee (2016) examine investor
use of CSR information by focusing on short sellers, which represent informed investors. They
find that short sellers avoid firms with high CSR performance and target firms with low
performance and conclude that disclosures are perceived as value-relevant to investors. Using an
international context, Subramaniam, Samuel, and Mahenthiran (2015) find that higher levels of
CSR disclosures increase the liquidity of public companies listed on Malaysian stock exchange,
which suggests disclosures help reduce information asymmetry.
Other studies examine whether a company’s disclosure decisions are priced by the
market. Motivated by the increased attention on greenhouse gas emissions and climate change,
Matsumura, Prakash, and Vera-Muñoz (2013) find that the market integrates both carbon
emission levels and emissions disclosure practices into firm valuations. Firms are penalized as
carbon emissions levels increase with an additional penalty when a firm does not disclose the
emission level. Further, Christensen (2016) finds that companies that produce CSR reports
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experience less negative market reaction following high-profile misconduct. The findings
suggest that the market views the presence of CSR activities and disclosures as a signal of
managerial intent. In a recent study, Chen et al. (2016) find higher-quality financial statement
audits (evidenced by higher audit fees) improves the credibility of voluntary CSR disclosures.
Further, the market accelerates the incorporation of future earnings into the stock price
Finally, studies investigate how the market reacts to CSR disclosure by examining the
cost of equity capital. Richardson and Welker (2001) find that investors react negatively to
higher social disclosure scores, resulting in a greater cost of equity compared to firms with lower
social disclosure scores. However, this relationship is moderated by financial performance of the
companies, with strong performers being penalized less. They suggest this could be caused by
the timeframe of their study being during a recession and investors placing more weight on
economic performance; or it could be that investors perceive social activities to be valuedecreasing. Either conclusion suggests that economics of the firm operations outweigh the social
activity considerations of investors. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) investigate whether the cost of equity
capital influences a company to initiate voluntary CSR reporting. They find that firms initiating
disclosures of CSR activities experience a decrease in cost of equity capital and attract dedicated
institutional investors.
In summary, studies show that investors are willing to consider CSR information when
analyzing investments, but regard it is as less important than financial information. The
experimental literature suggests that CSR information does impact investor judgment and
decision making, but as Elliott et al. (2014) shows it might not be intentional. Finally, there is
overall support for the market reacting, with abnormal returns or changes in the cost of equity.
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Future studies should continue to investigate the use of CSR information when analyzing
investment options compared to other information used in those decisions. As socially
responsible investing strategies grow, the relative importance of financial and nonfinancial
information could shift. Future research could examine the use of financial and CSR information
by tracking participant’s movements across information screens while performing an investment
decision. Finally, future research on market reactions could examine retail versus institutional
investment behavior, as well as consider specific CSR reporting requirements. For example,
section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires companies to report on conflict minerals in their
supply-chain. Examining how the market reacts could provide additional understanding of
investor use of CSR information.
VII: CONCLUSION
Overall, this review of the CSR literature in top accounting journals finds a good deal of
diversity. Studies use evolving measures of CSR disclosure to examine a range of topics. While
the roots of CSR research extend back many decades, there appears to be an increased interest in
recent years in terms of number of studies, as well as a broader range of journals.
Future research can still use Moser and Martin (2012) as a basis for the motivation to
continue the work to understand the complex concept of CSR. Studies should continue to
investigate the use of CSR performance and disclosure by stakeholders other than investors. For
example, Bradford, Earp, Showalter, and Williams (2017) examine the GRI framework to
consider whether its requirements provide useful information to consumers. Interestingly, they
find a disconnect between the GRI framework and the information demands of consumers. This
highlights the importance of recognizing the broader audience for CSR disclosures compared to
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traditional financial reporting and the ability of accounting researchers to transfer expertise to
non-capital market stakeholder groups. Additionally, while many recent studies use archival and
experimental designs, qualitative methods should be used more frequently to further understand
why CSR influences stakeholders.
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Part Two
The Influence of Contingent Factors on Investors’ Use of Corporate Social
Responsibility Disclosure (co-authored with Jean C. Bedard and Cynthia E. Clark)
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I. INTRODUCTION
As part of its Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative, the SEC is seeking public
comments on modernizing business and financial disclosure requirements in Regulation
S-K (SEC 2016). One area of interest to the SEC is disclosure on sustainability matters,
with a specific call for comments on whether sustainability disclosures are important to
investors’ decisions. The interest by the SEC on the possibility of mandated sustainability
disclosure coincides with the recent trend in companies voluntarily providing information
to stakeholders via stand-alone corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. 18,19 Interest
in CSR disclosure has grown in recent years as investors look for new information
avenues that reduce information asymmetry and allow better informed capital allocation
decisions. Prior research suggests CSR disclosures can influence market participants’
decisions (e.g., Cohen, Holder-Webb, and Zamora 2015; Cheng, Green, and Ko 2015;
Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang 2011). In this study, we build on research showing that
CSR reporting may provide “insurance-like” protection (Godfrey 2005) against users’
reactions to a corporate negative event by investigating whether that protection is
contingent on the type of CSR activity disclosed, and whether the CSR information in the
disclosure is independently assured.
Research on investors’ reactions to CSR disclosure is important because public
opinion on the net benefit of CSR disclosures is divided (SEC 2016). Some individuals
cited in the SEC document suggest this type of disclosure is imperative for reducing

18

The most recent KPMG International Survey of Corporate Responsibility reporting cites the growth of
corporate responsibility reporting from 24% in 1999 to 73% in 2015 among the largest 100 companies in
40 countries (KPMG 2015).
19
Throughout this study we use the terms voluntary CSR disclosure and CSR disclosure synonymously.
Literature and practice use various terms when referring to CSR disclosure, including sustainability
reporting and corporate responsibility reporting. We use the CSR term since Carroll and Shabana (2010)
suggest it is the dominate term used in the academic literature.
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information asymmetry and overcoming the limitations of traditional financial disclosure.
Others suggest the cost of producing CSR disclosures is an unnecessary resource drain.
Therefore, examining how investors view the usefulness of CSR disclosures across
contingent factors helps provide information on whether and under which circumstances
investors incorporate CSR information into their investment decisions.
The definition of CSR has evolved over the decades as researchers debate the role
of business in society. 20 For this study, we rely upon McWilliams and Siegel (2001, 117)
who define CSR as “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests
of the firm and that which is required by law”. Therefore, CSR activities are undertaken
at the discretion of company management, and CSR disclosures are the information
avenue that informs investors about these activities. Prior literature suggests CSR activity
types can be categorized based on the relationship between the activity and the
company’s business operations. 21 Research shows that investors react more favorably to
CSR disclosures when there is a strategic connection to future net cash inflows (Cheng et
al. 2015). Our interest lies in whether investors’ reaction to a negative event (i.e., an
event that leads to a material negative impact on at least one stakeholder group) changes
based on CSR activity type. 22 Following a negative event, investors might focus on CSR

20
For a history of the evolution of CSR refer to Carroll (1999) and Ghobadian, Money, and Hillenbrand
(2015). Also, Dahlsrud (2006) examines 37 definitions of CSR.
21
For example, Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen (2010, 12) defines CSR fit as “the perceived congruence
between a social issue and the company’s business”. Also, Aguinis and Glavas (2013, 315) suggest CSR
can be classified as either embedded (i.e., “relies on an organization’s core competencies and integrates
CSR within a firm’s strategy, routines, and operations”) or peripheral (i.e., “focuses on activities that are
not integrated into an organization’s strategy, routines, and operations”). In the accounting literature, Cheng
et al. (2015), manipulate ESG indicators, often contained in CSR reports, on whether they are aligned with
the company’s overall strategy.
22
In this study, we examine the influence of a negative event reported in the business press as opposed to a
negative event reported by the company. For additional information on investors’ reactions to negative
events based on the source of disclosure, refer to Reimsbach and Hahn (2015) who examine investor
judgments when disclosure of a negative event comes directly from the company versus a third-party nongovernmental organization.
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disclosure to provide a context in which to view the financial prospects of the company.
Prior literature suggests that CSR performance can signal a strong underlying corporate
ethical culture (e.g., Gao, Lisic, and Zhang 2014; Koh and Tong 2013; Kim, Park, and
Wier 2012), which might persuade investors to react less negatively to a crisis. Other
studies find CSR performance is associated with lower future firm risk (e.g., Chang, Kim,
and Li 2014; Koh, Qian, and Wang 2014; Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001) and can provide
insurance-like protection from negative market reactions in times of crisis (e.g.,
Christensen 2016; Zahller, Arnold, and Roberts 2015; Chang et al. 2014; Godfrey,
Merrill, and Hansen 2009; Godfrey 2005). 23 Finally, studies show different types of CSR
activities are perceived differently by the capital markets (e.g., Groening and Kanuri
2016; Godfrey et al. 2009). Taken together, we expect the presence of a negative event to
interact with the CSR activity type to alter investors’ response to a negative event. Yet,
we don’t know under what conditions this alteration is more or less likely to occur.
Another important area of inquiry is the effect of CSR assurance. Prior research
finds that assurance of CSR disclosures influences the extent to which users place
reliance on them, by increasing credibility of the disclosures (e.g., Cheng et al. 2015;
Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2015; Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 2011). However, in a
review of the CSR assurance literature, Cohen and Simnett (2015) highlight the value of
CSR assurance may be contingent upon various factors, and they suggest the need to
consider a contingency framework when examining the value of CSR assurance.
Accordingly, we posit one such factor is the presence of a negative event, which prior
23

Much of this literature relies on the theoretical work of Godfrey (2005) who examines the risk
management perspective of corporate philanthropy (i.e., one element of CSR). Godfrey (2005) argues
companies can build moral capital that can be drawn from in times of crisis if CSR activities are
discretionary, align with the values of stakeholders and do not involve an exchange of value between the
company and stakeholders.
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research has not considered. Prior studies suggest in general that the effect of assurance is
impacted by users’ perceptions about the company’s incentives to issue the disclosure,
since incentive-consistent disclosures are perceived as less credible (e.g., Cheng et al.
2015; Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2015). We predict in a negative event setting, that the
influence of CSR assurance on investors’ valuation judgments depends on CSR activity
type.
We test these expectations using an experiment for several reasons. First, it
enables us to measure intermediate variables in a controlled manner, to shed light on the
mechanisms through which investors’ judgments are made. Specifically, we examine
whether investors prefer the connection to future cash inflows or look for information
about future risk by seeking a signal about a company’s ethical culture, as well as how
perceptions of credibility influence their decisions. This allows us to build on related
archival literature to better understand why investors react in certain ways. Second, in
practice CSR disclosures are lengthy and contain a mixture of disclosure topics. 24 Using
an experiment allows us to isolate specific CSR activity types to understand how
investors respond in differing contexts.
To investigate how these factors interact to influence investors’ judgments, we
employ a 2x2x2 experimental design. Participants were solicited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk, yielding a sample of 399 usable observations. The case company is
XYZ, Inc., a company that procures, processes and transports branded food products sold
at national grocery stores, with mixed financial performance relative to its industry. We

24

Dhaliwal (2012) reports the average length of CSR report of U.S. companies in their sample is 32.69
pages. Also, the G4 reporting guidelines from the global reporting initiative (GRI) recommend disclosures
cover six topics including, economic, environmental, labor practices, human rights, society and product
responsibility. Further, under each of these topics there are numerous subtopics (GRI 2013).
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manipulate the presence of a company-specific negative event by providing participants
in the negative event treatment with a press release describing the company’s
involvement in a food safety recall due to cases of foodborne illness among customers.
We manipulate CSR activity type as strategic or non-strategic. Following the definition
of McWilliams and Siegel (2011), we operationalize strategic CSR as activity that is
undertaken for the purpose of increasing market share and future net cash inflows.
Alternatively, we operationalize non-strategic CSR as activity that does not allow a firm
to increase market share or future net cash inflows. 25 Participants in both CSR activity
type manipulations receive information about the company’s investment in clean energy
and production process equipment upgrades. In the strategic condition, the equipment
upgrades are associated with a reduction in operating costs, as well as increased market
share and revenue. In the non-strategic condition, disclosures state that the investments
are not expected to impact operating costs, market share, or future review. Finally, we
manipulate CSR assurance as either present or absent. We measure investors’ use of
information using changes in their investment valuation and desirability judgments preand post-manipulations.
We confirm prior literature in finding that overall, the presence of a negative
event reduces investors’ valuation and desirability judgments. Also consistent with prior
research, we find that absent a negative event, investors react more favorably to strategic
CSR activity relative to non-strategic CSR activity. While we predicted that investors
might react more favorably to non-strategic CSR activity in the presence of a negative

25

We acknowledge that non-strategic CSR activities could have an impact on the company’s competitive
advantage and therefore increase market share and future net cash inflows. However, the connection would
be indirect and difficult for investors to incorporate in their judgments about the company. Therefore, we
expect investors to perceive strategic CSR activities differently than non-strategic CSR activities.
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event, based on prior archival research, this was not observed in our controlled
experiment. Rather, neither CSR activity type predominated, suggesting investors have a
more balanced view of CSR activity type in the presence of a negative event regardless of
the negative event being attributed to either managerial lack of skill or ill-will (Godfrey et
al. 2009). It is possible that following a negative event, investors view CSR as a
misallocation of resources at a time when the company should focus on its core business,
supporting the criticisms of CSR. This might especially be the case in our context in
which the company has a mixed financial background. Alternatively, the negative event
context might raise the importance of non-strategic CSR activity, but not to a level where
it is preferred over strategic CSR activity.
Results also show that CSR assurance improves investors’ views of the company,
and the value of assurance extends to the negative event setting. However, contrary to our
prediction, CSR assurance is not found to provide incrementally greater value when a
negative event is present vs. absent. Finally, we find that the presence of a negative event
alters how investors view the interaction of CSR activity type and CSR assurance. When
a negative event is absent, results suggest investors value more highly disclosures of
strategic CSR activity that have been assured. However, when a negative event is present,
results suggest both strategic and non-strategic CSR activities are valued similarly by
investors, regardless of whether or not disclosure is assured.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the
literature investigating how investors use CSR disclosure by considering how the
occurrence of a negative event alters investors’ perceptions of the importance of CSR
connecting to future net cash inflows. Examining across characteristics of the disclosures
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or the disclosing firm builds on prior literature by providing evidence on whether and
under which combinations of factors investors find CSR disclosure useful to decisionmaking. Second, this study adds to the developing discussion on the value of CSR
assurance by examining the value of CSR assurance in the negative event context. Third,
this study examines whether CSR assurance adds incremental credibility beyond
credibility that comes from high disclosure quality, building on Zahller et al. (2015) who
examine disclosure credibility via high disclosure quality.
Our study also has implications for practice by providing information on the
mechanisms influencing investors’ reactions when companies undertake strategic versus
non-strategic CSR activities, as well as evidence to support when companies experience
benefits from purchasing CSR assurance. Finally, our study has implications for
regulators considering whether CSR disclosures should be part of mandatory reporting by
providing information on how investors incorporate the disclosures into their investment
decision-making.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents background
information briefly discussing how the financial reporting research has moved from
examining investor decision usefulness of financial to nonfinancial information, of which
CSR disclosures are one component. Section III reviews relevant prior literature and
develops the hypotheses. Section IV discusses the research design and participants.
Section V presents the results and Section VI discusses conclusions, limitations and
opportunities for future research.
II. BACKGROUND
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Financial reporting research has come to recognize that CSR disclosure can
complement traditional financial reporting (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and Yang
2012). 26 The foundation of financial reporting research is the Financial Accounting
Standards Board’s (FASB) Conceptual Framework, which defines the objective of
financial reporting as “…to provide financial information about the reporting entity that
is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making
decisions about providing resources to the entity” (FASB 2010, 1). According to the
FASB, information is useful if it is relevant and reliable, allowing investors the
information needed to project future net cash inflows in order to make efficient capital
allocation decisions. Historically, investors have concentrated on using financial
performance information from the company’s general purpose financial statement reports
as the basis for making investment decisions. However, in recent studies researchers have
considered whether and how investors use information beyond mandatory financial
reporting in their decisions; e.g., voluntary disclosures containing nonfinancial
information (e.g., Cohen et al. 2015; Cohen, Holder-Webb, Nath, and Wood 2012;
Cohen, Holder-Webb, Nath, and Wood 2011; Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010;
Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Healy and Palepu 2001). 27
The voluntary disclosure literature considers managers’ motivations for providing
information to investors not required in mandatory financial reporting. Reviewing this
literature, Healy and Palepu (2001) discuss forces that influence manager’s disclosure

26

Using CSR reports as a proxy for nonfinancial information, Dhaliwal et al. (2012, 752) states, “Overall,
our results suggest that nonfinancial disclosure is not only associated with a better information
environment, as measured by analyst forecast accuracy, but also complements financial disclosure by
mitigating the negative effect of financial opacity on forecast accuracy.”
27
This study focuses on investors as one stakeholder group. However, it is important to recognize that the
audience for nonfinancial reporting, especially CSR disclosure, can consist of many different stakeholder
groups (e.g., consumers, employees, labor unions, investors, creditors, etc.).
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choices, including capital market transactions, litigation, and management talent
signaling. The commonality between these forces is that management has incentives to
provide disclosures in order to reduce information asymmetry with investors and accrue
business rewards. 28 Their review concludes that greater disclosure leads to positive
outcomes such as increased market liquidity, lower cost of capital and an increase in
analyst following. Thus, the literature generally provides evidence that investors find
voluntary nonfinancial disclosures useful when making decisions.
Disclosure of nonfinancial information can relate to a multitude of topics, but
literature examining nonfinancial disclosures examines three main categories of
information: economic leading indicators, governance, and CSR activities, which is our
interest (Cohen et al. 2015; Cohen et al. 2011). Similar to mandatory financial
performance indicators, market participants will likely perceive CSR disclosure as useful
when they perceive a connection between CSR activities and future net cash inflows
(Groening and Kanuri 2016; Cheng et al. 2015; Cohen et al. 2011). The management
literature has focused a great deal of attention on examining the relationship between
CSR and corporate financial performance, partly in an effort to make a business case for
widespread CSR adoption (Carroll and Shabana 2010). 29 Overall, the management
literature provides some evidence of a positive relationship between CSR and financial
performance (e.g., Margolis et al. 2009; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003). 30 This

28

For example, companies looking to access capital markets can use voluntary disclosure to influence how
investors perceive the company with the intention of reducing the cost of capital. Alternatively, risk of
litigation can lead to manager’s reducing disclosure due to fear of legal action using their statements
against them.
29
The management literature examining this relationship often refers to CSR as corporate social
performance (i.e., CSP). Further, Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2009) suggest that despite attempts to
distinguish the two terms, CSP and CSR are often used interchangeably in empirical studies.
30
In their meta-analyses of studies examining the relationship between corporate social performance and
financial performance, both Margolis et al. (2009) and Orlitzky et al. (2003) conclude there is a positive
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suggests market participants can use CSR disclosure as incremental information beyond
traditional financial reporting when estimating future net cash inflows. 31
Prior literature examines whether individual market participants view CSR
information as incrementally useful to mandatory financial reporting. Findings of these
studies suggest that both analysts (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2012; Dhaliwal et al. 2011) and
investors (e.g., Cohen et al. 2015; Cheng et al. 2015; Elliott, Jackson, Peecher, and White
2014; Cohen et al. 2011) consider CSR information in their decisions. Similarly,
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and Dhaliwal et al. (2012) find firms that initiate CSR reporting
achieve lower absolute analyst forecast error and dispersion. Further, Dhaliwal et al.
(2012) conclude that CSR reports provide complementary information to analysts.
Together, these studies suggest CSR disclosure provides information that reduces
information asymmetry and allows analysts to make better predictions on future financial
performance.
As with analysts, prior literature also supports investors finding CSR disclosure to
be useful in decision-making by examining how the financial markets react to the
disclosures. For example, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find that companies initiating voluntary
CSR reporting attract dedicated institutional investors and experience a decrease in the
cost of equity capital. Also, Matsumura, Prakash, and Vera-Muñoz (2014) find investors
in S&P 500 firms incorporate voluntary disclosure of carbon emissions data into their
decisions by finding the market reacts negatively as emissions levels increase. Both of
relationship. Also, refer to Carroll and Shabana (2010), who review the business case for CSR, including
the literature examining this connection.
31
It is important to note that CSR disclosure is how the company signals their participation in voluntary
CSR activities. This is similar to the voluntary adoption literature. For example, the XBRL literature finds
early adopters provide a signal of superior corporate governance and financial performance (Premuroso and
Bhattacharya 2008). Also, this signal provides market benefits with Hao, Zhang, and Fang (2014) finding a
negative association between adoption and cost of equity capital. In the same way, the voluntary adoption
of CSR activities and disclosure can reduce information asymmetry and provide a signal to the market.
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these studies suggest the market impounds CSR information into equity prices. In an
experimental setting, Elliott et al. (2014) find that CSR information influences investors’
fundamental value estimates and willingness to invest. Further, Cohen et al. (2015) and
Cohen et al. (2011) use survey responses to explore whether investors use CSR
information. They find that professional and nonprofessional investors consider CSR
information and express an increasing interest to incorporate CSR information into future
investment decisions. In summary, studies examining investor decision usefulness have
moved from financial to nonfinancial information, of which CSR is a central piece.
Further, the literature generally finds support that CSR information is useful to investors
as it reduces information asymmetry and helps project future net cash inflows. 32
III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Prior research discussed in Section II suggests that overall, investors find CSR
disclosure useful when making decisions. The usefulness of the CSR disclosure appears
to result from an improved information environment allowing for better forecasts of
future net cash inflows. More recently, studies explore situations in which the influence
of CSR on investor decisions varies. In the next three sections, we review literature
relating to three contingent factors: the occurrence of a company-specific negative event,
differences in the type of CSR activity companies undertake, and assurance of the CSR
disclosure.
Negative Events and CSR; Development of H1

32
The general findings in the CSR literature are consistent with the forces that influence manager’s
disclosure choices identified by Healy and Palepu (2001). Specifically, CSR disclosure can provide capital
market benefits if there is a connection between CSR activities and increased future net cash inflows, which
sends a signal of management ability. However, the CSR disclosure literature goes beyond these forces by
considering how CSR information can send a signal about company culture separate from corporate ability.
This argument is further developed in the next section.
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Negative events often come with a negative financial impact to the affected
company in the form of fines, litigation, reduction in sales, etc. 33 The heightened risk
environment from the occurrence of a negative event provides a setting where investors
might use CSR disclosure in ways other than examining the connection to future net cash
inflows. Instead, investors might look for a signal of the corporate ethical culture (Du et
al. 2010) to determine whether to invest in a company run by management that somehow
allowed a negative event to occur due to lack of skill or ill-will (Godfrey et al. 2009).34
Prior literature suggests CSR information can provide signals to investors about the ethics
of a company’s corporate culture. For example, Kim et al. (2012) find that companies
with positive CSR performance are less likely to engage in aggressive earnings
management or be the subject of SEC investigations. After controlling for reputation and
financial performance, they conclude that greater reporting transparency is driven by
ethical concerns of management. Gao et al. (2014) find CEOs of companies with a
positive CSR image are less likely to participate in and profit from insider trading. They
suggest it is due to higher costs of engaging in activities inconsistent with a positive CSR
image. Koh and Tong (2013) find higher audit fees for companies that participate in
controversial activities (i.e., negative CSR performance). They conclude this is due to
auditors perceiving higher business risk due to heightened concerns about managers’

33

For this study we define negative events consistent with Godfrey et al. (2009) who suggest a negative
event is a negative outcome to at least one stakeholder group. Further, since we are examining investor
response following a negative event we operationalize the construct by requiring the negative event to be
material.
34
Du et al. (2010) refer to this signal as a signal of corporate identity as distinct from corporate ability.
Further, they suggest corporate identity is enduring and influences how stakeholders’ view CSR activities.
The signal of the corporate ethical culture is important to this study since it relates to the potential signal
CSR can send that is unrelated to future net cash inflows, but still useful to investors.
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integrity and ethics. 35 Together this literature suggests that CSR performance information
can provide insight into the ethical culture at a company.
The influence of CSR information on investors’ decisions following a negative
event has also been studied by examining whether CSR can provide an insurance-like
benefit that protects shareholder value (e.g., Christensen 2016; Zahller et al. 2015; Chang
et al. 2014; Godfrey et al. 2009; Godfrey 2005). Much of this literature relies on the
theoretical work of Godfrey (2005) who examines the risk management perspective of
corporate philanthropy. 36 Godfrey (2005) argues that CSR can build moral capital among
stakeholders that companies can draw on in times of crisis. 37 Further, he argues that
companies can only build moral capital from CSR activities if they are discretionary,
align with the values of stakeholders, and do not involve an exchange of value between
the company and stakeholders. In other words, they must be altruistic activities that
benefit society without a direct link to an increase in future financial performance. 38
Alternatively, CSR activities that do not fit these criteria generate exchange capital, as
they are viewed as a self-serving exchange benefiting the company.
Godfrey et al. (2009) test the theory by segregating CSR performance into CSR
activities aimed at primary versus secondary stakeholders, finding that not all CSR

35

In the cited studies, CSR performance is measured by indicators of CSR strengths and concerns as
reported in the KLD database. The indicators are helpful in capturing when a company has a CSR strength
and/or concern, but is not a continuous performance measure.
36
Godfrey (2005, 778) uses corporate philanthropy as a “discretionary manifestation of CSR”. This is
consistent with the discretionary nature of the definition of CSR used in this study. Further, corporate
philanthropy is similar to our non-strategic CSR manipulation (further developed in the following section)
in that both involve expenditures without the expectation of value coming back to the company. However,
they are different in that corporate philanthropy involves expenditures given to external parties, while nonstrategic CSR involves expenditures within the company.
37
Godfrey (2005, 783) defines moral capital as “the outcome of the process of assessment, evaluation, and
imputation by stakeholders and communities of a firm’s philanthropic activities”.
38
This is consistent with the definition of the non-strategic CSR activity type used in this study. We further
develop the distinction between strategic and non-strategic CSR activity types in the next section.
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activities have the same influence on investment decisions following a negative event. 39
They find support for insurance-like protection coming from CSR activities aimed at
secondary stakeholders and conclude this is due to the moral capital generated. Further,
CSR based moral capital creates value if it helps stakeholders attribute the negative event
to managerial lack of skill and not ill will. The market thus views the activities as
altruistic and other-regarding (Godfrey 2005) similar to categorizing them as nonstrategic. In contrast, no insurance-like protection is found for CSR activities aimed at
primary stakeholders as these generate exchange capital that is seen as self-serving.
Examining investor reaction to same day news about CSR and corporate social
irresponsibility (CSiR) Groening and Kanuri (2016) find investors initially react less
negatively to CSiR when CSR activities are aimed at secondary stakeholders, but this
protection declines as the company’s participation in these types of activities increases. 40
The opposite is found for CSR activities aimed at primary stakeholders, with investors
reacting less negatively when there are many CSR activities aimed at primary
stakeholders. They conclude this is due to investors perceiving too many CSR activities
aimed at secondary stakeholders as value-decreasing and CSR activities aimed at primary
stakeholders as a commitment to positive future net cash inflows. The findings provide a
mixed picture: investors look for altruistic CSR activities, but do not completely forget
about the connection to future net cash inflows.
39

The term primary stakeholder refers to stakeholder groups such as shareholders, employees and
consumers, while secondary stakeholder refers to the community or the environment. The major difference
between the two classifications is that the company is dependent on primary stakeholders for its survival
due to the economic exchange between the company and the stakeholder group. Secondary stakeholders,
while lacking in power, are still influenced in some way by the firm. For more information, refer to the
stakeholder framework developed by Clarkson (1995).
40
To operationalize their study, Groening and Kanuri (2016) examine same day changes to the KLD
database that tracks the number of CSR strengths and CSR concerns of companies. Specifically, they
categorized the addition of a strength or the deletion of a concern as CSR and the addition of a concern and
deletion of a strength as CSiR.
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This line of literature focuses on quantitative CSR performance indicators and
does not capture the effect that CSR disclosure can have on investor reactions. Bansal
and Clelland (2004) argue that companies can deflect negative reactions to poor
environmental performance by expressing a commitment to the environment, which helps
decouple the negative aspect from other positive aspects of the company. Therefore,
considering the role of disclosure in investors’ response to negative events is a key aspect
to better understanding their response. Two studies have helped further our
understanding: Christensen (2016) finds that companies producing CSR reports are less
likely to engage in high-profile misconduct, but among those that do, those who
previously produced a CSR report experience less negative stock price reactions. Zahller
et al. (2015) find high disclosure quality is associated with investors perceiving greater
organizational legitimacy, which then provides social resilience from negative investor
reactions following a negative event at another company in the same industry.
Overall, the literature suggests that CSR can provide insurance-like protection
from negative investor reaction following a negative event. This protection comes when
companies build moral capital by participating in CSR activities that are perceived by
investors as altruistic, and provides investors with a signal of a company’s ethical culture.
The overall conclusion is that companies producing CSR reports are influencing the
perceptions of managerial intent by building a positive reputation based on their CSR
activities. 41 We first propose H1, a replication hypothesis predicting that in our
experimental context, the presence of a negative event will reduce investors’ valuation
judgments relative to the absence of a negative event.
41

Companies producing CSR reports to manage their reputation leads to concerns over “greenwashing”
(Lyon and Maxwell 2011). We discuss this concern in more detail in a later section when developing H2
that examines investors’ perceptions of the credibility of CSR disclosures.
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H1: The presence of a negative event will decrease investors’ valuation
judgments compared to the absence of a negative event.
CSR Activity Type and Negative Events; Development of H2a and H2b
We build on the negative event literature by considering the contingent influence
of CSR activity type on investor use of CSR disclosure. Previous studies across various
literature streams categorize CSR activities in order to examine the relative benefits
available to companies from engaging in different activity types (e.g., Cheng et al. 2015;
Aguinis and Glavas 2013; Du et al. 2010; Godfrey et al. 2009). Many of these studies
categorize CSR in differing ways largely based on reasoning that some CSR activities
have an easily identified connection to the company’s performance, while others appear
to be unrelated. 42
Strategic CSR is defined as “any ‘responsible’ activity that allows a firm to
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage, regardless of motive” (McWilliams and
Siegel 2010, 1481). Therefore, strategic CSR activities, by achieving a sustainable
competitive advantage, are intended to increase market share and future net cash inflows.
And therefore, we reason, non-strategic CSR activities are activities that do not result in a
sustainable competitive advantage, and are perceived as having no direct link to market
share or future net cash inflows. 43 The contingent impact of CSR activity type was also
considered by Cheng et al. (2015), who use an experimental setting to examine the
42

There is not a standard classification of CSR activities in the literature. For example, in a review of the
CSR communication literature, Du et al. (2010, 12) present a framework that considers the influence of
“CSR fit”. CSR fit is defined as “the perceived congruence between a social issue and the company’s
business”. Focusing on industrial and organizational psychology, Aguinis and Glavas (2013, 315) suggest
CSR can be classified as either embedded or peripheral. They define embedded CSR as “relies on an
organization’s core competencies and integrates CSR within a firm’s strategy, routines, and operations.” In
contrast, peripheral CSR “focuses on activities that are not integrated into an organization’s strategy,
routines, and operations.”
43
It might be argued that non-strategic CSR activities, while lacking a direct link to future financial
performance, could have an indirect link. However, if so, the indirect link is difficult for investors to
incorporate into their estimates of future net cash inflows.
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alignment of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) indicators with the
corporation’s overall strategy. 44 They employ a low risk setting by providing positive
financial performance information in the company background information and by not
considering the influence of a negative event. Findings suggest that when strategic
alignment is high, investors perceive ESG indicators as more important and are more
willing to invest in the company as opposed to when there is low strategic alignment.
This suggests that in a low risk setting, investors are likely to prefer adoption of strategic
CSR activities perceived as likely to increase future financial performance. Therefore, it
appears that absent a negative event, investors may view the usefulness of CSR
disclosure much like traditional financial disclosure.
When a negative event occurs, investors might seek a signal of the company’s
ethical culture in order to make a judgment on managerial intent and the likelihood of
future negative events. In general, the negative event literature reviewed above suggests
investors might be influenced by a signal given by the company through CSR disclosure
rather than purely analyzing the connection to future net cash inflows. However, this
assumption is not without tension as Groening and Kanuri (2016) suggest investors still
consider the connection between CSR activities and future net cash inflows when
responding to CSiR. The findings of Godfrey et al. (2009) suggest the signal comes when
CSR activities are perceived by investors as altruistic in nature and do not have a direct
connection to economic benefits available to the company. Therefore, we expect
investors will view non-strategic CSR activities as more useful following a negative
event as they look beyond the immediate relationship between CSR and future financial
performance. Similarly, we expect non-strategic CSR to provide a signal of a genuine
44

Cheng et al. (2015) focus on ESG indicators, which are often contained in voluntary CSR reports.
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actor and, combined with the act of disclosing, to generate the positive moral capital
necessary to provide insurance-like protection against the negative event (Godfrey et al.
2009). We thus predict the disordinal interaction illustrated in Figure 2.1, where
disclosure of strategic CSR activities influences investors’ valuation judgments to a
greater extent absent a negative event but investors react more favorably to non-strategic
CSR activities following a negative event. Specifically, we propose the following
hypotheses:
H2a: In the absence of a negative event, disclosure of strategic CSR activities will
increase investors’ valuation judgments to a greater extent than disclosure of nonstrategic CSR activities.
H2b: In the presence of a negative event, disclosure of non-strategic CSR
activities will increase investors’ valuation judgments to a greater extent than
disclosure of strategic CSR activities.
Insert Figure 2.1 About Here
H2a is a partial replication of Cheng et al. (2015), in examining the influence of
strategic-alignment on investors’ willingness to invest in a low risk setting. We differ
from their study in two important ways, as discussed in detail in the following section.
First, we measure investor perceptions using a valuation judgment in order to capture
investors’ perception of how the overall market will value the company. Second, their
case study features strong financial performance, while we examine judgments in a
company with mixed financial performance that is more representative of the average
firm. H2b builds on this test by manipulating the presence of a negative event specific to
the subject company. A riskier company provides an interesting context to examine
investor reaction to a negative event as investors are more likely to excuse a negative
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event when there is strong financial performance, and thus weaker companies are more in
need of “insurance-like” protection from CSR activity (e.g., Godfrey 2005).
CSR Assurance and Negative Events; Development of H3 and H4
H2b, which predicts the usefulness of CSR disclosure in the presence of a
negative event is derived from the value of the signal being sent from the company to
investors. However, due to the voluntary nature of CSR disclosure, the company might
use the signal to manage its image. Because investors might only find the signal of CSR
disclosure useful if they perceive it to be credible, we also examine CSR assurance as a
contingent factor that influences investors’ reactions to CSR disclosures in the context of
a negative event. 45
Legitimacy theory suggests companies maintain legitimacy when they conform to
the acceptable norms of society and are required to maintain their legitimacy in order to
continue to exist. Prior research supports the quest for legitimacy as being at least part of
the motivation for companies’ reporting choices, as companies try to build or maintain
their legitimacy by altering their disclosure practices due to pressure from external parties
(i.e., shareholders, regulators, environmentalist and lobby groups) (e.g., Deegan and
Blomquist 2006; de Villiers and van Staden 2006; Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell 1998).
This motivation to attain legitimacy can cause companies to misrepresent their CSR
activities, instead engaging in what the literature refers to as “greenwashing” (i.e., using

45

In a review of the discretionary narrative disclosures literature, Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007)
discuss studies that assume the disclosures provide useful incremental information, versus those that
assume disclosures are used as an opportunistic way for the company to manage its image. Studies arguing
useful incremental information suggest companies can reduce information asymmetries by providing
detailed narratives and explanations not contained in mandatory financial reporting, consistent with the
broader voluntary disclosure literature. However, impression management concerns relate to whether
management uses this information avenue as an opportunistic image management tool. While the focus of
their review is primarily on narratives in annual reports, the same concerns exist for voluntary CSR
disclosure.
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CSR disclosures to manage company image). 46 Several studies examine this practice.
Aerts and Cormier (2009) find companies influence perceived legitimacy among
stakeholders by issuing reactive environmental press releases and altering the extent and
quality of environmental annual report disclosures based on media coverage. Ling and
Mowen (2013) find evidence that environmental reporting decisions vary based on firmspecific factors; with image- and R&D-focused companies producing more disclosure
than companies without these strategies. Cho, Roberts, and Patten (2010) find that worse
environmental performers use verbal tone and language to bias the message contained in
the disclosures. Similarly, Cho, Michelon, and Patten (2012) find impression
management evidence in the graphs contained in CSR reports, showing both a selectivity
bias in the choice of items graphed and distortion in graphing favorable to the company.
Further, reasons to doubt the credibility of CSR disclosure are supported by several
studies that find inconsistencies between disclosure and actual performance (e.g.,
Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari 2008; Patten 2005; Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, and
Hughes Ii 2004; Wiseman 1982). The evidence suggests that companies can and do use
voluntary CSR disclosure as an impression management tool, leading to concerns over
the credibility of the information.
In response to credibility concerns, the accounting literature examines the
influence of voluntary CSR assurance on how CSR disclosures are perceived. Prior
research finds that investors view CSR assurance as credibility-enhancing and place
greater reliance on assured CSR disclosures (e.g. Cheng et al. 2015; Brown-Liburd and
46

Lyon and Maxwell (2011) present an economic model of “greenwashing” to investigate firms that
strategically disclose information and the impact of activist groups “audit” of the disclosure. They define
greenwash as “selective disclosure of positive information about a company’s environmental or social
performance, without full disclosure of negative information on these dimensions, so as to create an overly
positive corporate image” (Lyon and Maxwell (2011, 9).
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Zamora 2015; Pflugrath et al. 2011; Hodge, Subramaniam, and Stewart 2009). Therefore,
we propose a replication hypothesis that in our setting, the presence of CSR assurance
will increase investors’ valuation judgments compared to when CSR assurance is absent.
Specifically, we propose the following:
H3: The independent assurance of CSR disclosures increases investors’ valuation
judgments compared to when assurance is absent.
However, the effect of CSR assurance might vary in the negative event context, as
investors might lose confidence in the company. For example, Chakravarthy, DeHaan,
and Rajgopal (2014) suggest that restatements (one type of negative event) reduce a
company’s reputation among stakeholders, as they view restatements as a violation of the
company’s commitment to investors to provide reliable financial statements. This
violation of one commitment can lead to skepticism about the company’s willingness to
meet future commitments. Further, Elliott, Hodge, and Sedor (2011) find that investor
trust mediates investment recommendations following an accounting restatement. Lost
trust in management can lead to a reduction in the perceived credibility of CSR
disclosures. Therefore, we expect that assurance by an independent professional will be
perceived as more important in the negative event context, as investors will be more
skeptical of information coming from management and look for independent assurance.
Formally, we predict the following (see Figure 2.2):
H4: The independent assurance of CSR disclosures increases investors’ valuation
judgments to a greater extent when a negative event is present compared to when
a negative event is absent.
Insert Figure 2.2 About Here
CSR Activity Type, CSR Assurance and Negative Events; Development of H5a and
H5b
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H2a and H2b predict the presence of a negative event will alter how investors
perceive the usefulness of strategic versus non-strategic CSR disclosure, while H4
predicts that the presence of a negative event will cause investors to be more skeptical of
CSR disclosure and rely more on CSR assurance. However, it is unclear whether
investors will place similar reliance on CSR assurance for both strategic and non-strategic
CSR disclosures in the presence of a negative event. This issue is motivated by Cohen
and Simnett (2015), who suggest the need to consider a contingency framework when
examining the value of CSR assurance. 47 They note several studies in the CSR assurance
literature that examine factors influencing whether an assurance effect is recognized by
participants. Most relevant to the current study, Cheng et al. (2015), find that CSR
assurance enhances the perceived importance of strategically relevant ESG indicators,
while not influencing ESG indicators lacking strategic alignment. 48 The current study
extends Cheng et al. (2015) by considering how CSR activity type and assurance interact
within the negative event context. Absent a negative event, managers’ motivations for
disclosure of strategic CSR activities may be perceived as self-serving by investors. If so,
investors view the connection between strategic CSR activities and increased future
financial performance with greater skepticism, since management has an incentive to
share this information. Alternatively, disclosure of non-strategic CSR is not likely to be
viewed as self-serving since management does not have an incentive to report valuedecreasing activities. Therefore, consistent with the findings of Cheng et al. (2015), we
47

This view is consistent with Mercer’s (2004) framework examining investor response to voluntary
disclosure that suggests situational incentives influence how investors perceive disclosure credibility. In the
context of this study, we are examining the negative event setting as the situation where investors will
perceive disclosure credibility as companies have incentives to produce voluntary disclosure.
48
Further examples of factors influencing whether an assurance effect is recognized comes from Pflugrath
et al. (2011) who find the assurance effect exists for mining companies but not for those in the retail
industry. Also, Brown-Liburd and Zamora (2015) find an assurance effect for CSR disclosures when
managers have a compensation incentive to overinvest in CSR, but not in other conditions.
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expect that absent a negative event, CSR assurance will influence investors’ willingness
to invest to a greater extent when the disclosures detail strategic CSR activities.
However, in the presence of a negative event this view might be altered. As
previously discussed, a negative event might cause investors to alter which CSR
disclosures are useful to their decision-making. Non-strategic CSR activities are those
that lack a direct link to future net cash inflows. Therefore, when management decides to
undertake these activities, they are potentially reducing the value of the company to
investors. While prior literature supports that investors are likely to see these activities as
value-decreasing (e.g., Groening and Kanuri 2016; Cheng et al. 2015), they can provide a
signal of the corporate ethical culture. In the presence of a negative event, if investors do
find a signal about the ethical culture useful, then they could view non-strategic CSR
activities being disclosed out of self-serving motives. In other words, investors will view
non-strategic CSR activities as a self-serving attempt at impression management when
the company is faced with a negative event. 49 Therefore, we anticipate investors will find
high quality (i.e., accurate) non-strategic CSR disclosure more useful following a
negative event if it has been assured.
In the presence of a negative event, companies might also have an incentive to
emphasize their strategic CSR activities in order to reassure investors of the potential
increase in future net cash inflows, as a way to compensate for any financial losses
incurred from the negative event. For example, Groening and Kanuri (2016) find
investors react less negatively to CSiR when a company has a high level of CSR
49
Despite CSR assurance being perceived as more important when investors view the motivation for CSR
disclosure as self-serving, this might not be the case for disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities. The
usefulness of non-strategic CSR is not tied to the actual activity, but rather to the underlying motivation for
participating in the activity (i.e., altruism). To address this, we use non-strategic CSR activities that can be
measured in verifiable terms that lend themselves to assurance.
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activities focused on primary stakeholders (i.e., there is a direct connection to financial
benefits accruing to the company) and conclude this is due to investors’ preference for
companies to invest in activities that accrue future cash inflows. If investors recognize
this incentive, they might also value the assurance of disclosures detailing strategic CSR
activities following a negative event. However, based on the negative event literature
reviewed above and consistent with our H2b prediction, we expect that in the presence of
a negative event investors will be primarily interested in the signal of the company’s
ethical culture and not with the connection to future cash inflows. Therefore, despite this
tension, we expect investors to prefer assurance of non-strategic CSR activities compared
to assurance of strategic CSR activities. Formally, we predict the following (see Figure
2.3):
H5a: In the absence of a negative event, external assurance of CSR disclosures
will increase investors’ valuation judgments to a greater extent when the
disclosures are strategic than when they are non-strategic.
H5b: In the presence of a negative event, external assurance of CSR disclosures
will increase investors’ valuation judgments to a greater extent when the
disclosures are non-strategic than when they are strategic.
Insert Figure 2.3 About Here
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
Experimental Design
To examine investor reaction to CSR disclosure, we employ a 2x2x2 betweenparticipants experimental design with participants taking on the role of an investor in a
company. The three independent variables are negative event (present versus absent),
CSR activity type (strategic versus non-strategic) and CSR assurance (present versus
absent). The primary dependent variable is the change in valuation judgments regarding
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an investment target after reviewing the voluntary CSR disclosure. Company
characteristics are held constant across all groups in order to isolate the effects of the
independent variables.
Participants
A total of 497 participants were solicited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) and passed screening criteria to ensure they represent nonprofessional investors.
Consistent with prior studies soliciting investor participants from MTurk (e.g., Koonce,
Leitter, and White 2016; Koonce, Miller, and Winchel 2015; Asay, Libby, and
Rennekamp 2014; Rennekamp 2012) participants met the following criteria: (1)
participants are over 18 years of age; (2) participants are physically located in the United
States; (3) participants have an MTurk approval rate of 95% or higher on at least 50 or
more completed assignments; (4) participants consider themselves proficient in the
English language; (5) participants have purchased or sold individual stocks at least three
times in the past; (6) participants have familiarity reading financial statements; (7)
participants have taken at least two accounting and/or finance classes. 50 Participants were
paid $2.00 upon completion of the experimental task.
Experimental Task
Participants are given basic background information on the company, condensed
financial statements and summary financial performance data including common
financial ratios (e.g., return on investment, debt to equity, etc.). Unlike prior studies that
examine investor reactions when there is strong financial performance (e.g., Cheng et al.
50
Screening criteria available on MTurk are similar to studies using other participant sources. For example,
Zahller et al. (2015) use the follow screening criteria when using participants from a survey firm: (1) age
(greater than 18 years), (2) nonprofessional investor status, (3) possession of an investment or retirement
account, (4) at least some degree of participation in the management of that accounting, (5) comfort reading
financial statements, (6) use of financial or investment media.
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2015), we introduce business risk by presenting a mixed picture of financial performance.
While investors are more likely to excuse a negative event from strong financial
performers, a mixed picture of financial performance allows us to examine weaker
companies that are more in need of the “insurance-like” protection from CSR activity
(e.g., Godfrey 2005). In order to ensure that the participants recognize mixed financial
performance, we explicitly state that the financial results of XYZ, Inc., a food processing
and wholesale company, are mixed compared to the industry average. Similar to prior
studies examining investor behavior, participants are prompted to consider this
investment decision to be long-term in nature (e.g., Zahller et al. 2015). 51 At this point,
participants provide an initial valuation judgment for the common stock of the company.
Following the background and financial information and initial assessment of
valuation, participants are randomly assigned to treatment groups to receive the
manipulations. To minimize the risk of order effects, we randomize the order that
participants in the negative event present condition receive the manipulations, with some
participants receiving the negative event manipulation prior to receiving the CSR
disclosure and others receiving it after. Participants are given excerpts from the XYZ’s
most recent CSR report, where the CSR activity type and CSR assurance manipulations
are included. Prior research suggests that investors’ reactions to CSR disclosure are
influenced by the level of disclosure quality (Zahller et al. 2015). Therefore, we hold high
disclosure quality constant across all treatments, including quantifiable and verifiable
performance indicators, as well as both positive and negative performance (i.e.,

51

We chose to prompt a long-term investment horizon due to the likelihood of CSR activities not having an
immediate impact on financial performance.
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completeness). 52 Participants in the negative event treatment receive information
detailing the company being involved in a negative event, as described below. After
receiving the manipulations, participants again provide a valuation judgment for the
common stock of the company. Next, participants rate their perceptions of the connection
between the CSR activities and future net cash inflows, as well as whether the disclosure
provides a signal of the company’s ethical culture. Participants then provide judgments
on their perceptions of disclosure credibility. Finally, demographic and manipulation
check questions are answered. See Figure 2.4 for phases of the experiment.
Insert Figure 2.4 About Here
CSR Activity Type Manipulation
We manipulate the CSR activity type (CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE) as strategic or
non-strategic. We operationalize strategic CSR activities (CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE =1) as
those that are associated with an increase in market share and future net cash inflows,
while non-strategic (CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE =0) lack a direct link to market share and
future net cash inflows. We provide participants in the strategic CSR condition two
disclosures discussing XYZ’s commitment to CSR issues. In each of the disclosures we
provide participants with a dollar value of the investment made in the CSR activity and
the cost savings or revenue enhancements expected from the activities. Thus, providing a
clear connection to an increase in future net cash inflows of the company. In the nonstrategic CSR condition, we provide participants with the same disclosures discussing
XYZ’s commitment to CSR issues. In each of the disclosures we provide participants
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Despite disclosure being presented to participants as accurate (quantifiable and verifiable) it does not
suggest that the disclosure is credible. Therefore, an assurance effect can still influence investor use of the
information. Also, “Negative performance” does not refer to a negative event, but rather to the company
not reaching all CSR targets for the year.
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with a dollar value of the investment made in the CSR activity. The non-strategic
disclosure differs from the strategic disclosure by explicitly stating that the CSR activities
do not influence market share or result in a reduction in future net cash inflows.
We adapt the strategic and non-strategic alignment manipulation used by Cheng
et al. (2015) for several reasons. First, this is the established CSR activity classification in
the accounting literature and allows for a cleaner comparison of our findings to prior
literature in the negative event absent condition. This is important due to our inclusion of
business risk via mixed financial performance ratios given prior studies hold strong
financial performance constant. Second, when manipulating the type of CSR activities,
we want to ensure that strategic CSR clearly relates to an increase in net future cash
inflows, while non-strategic CSR does not. This allows participants the opportunity to
consider whether non-strategic CSR activities are signals of altruism without
confounding the results.
CSR Assurance Manipulation
We manipulate CSR assurance (CSR_ASSURANCE) consistent with prior studies.
Following Brown-Liburd and Zamora (2015), participants in the assurance present
treatment (CSR_ASSURANCE =1) are provided with an assurance report which concludes
that the CSR disclosure provides an accurate and complete description of the CSR
activities of XYZ for that year. Following Cheng et al. (2015), participants in the
assurance absent treatment (CSR_ASSURANCE =0) are told that XYZ Inc. chose not to
engage an independent assurer for their CSR disclosures. 53

53

There are other ways to manipulate the absence of CSR assurance. For example, Brown-Liburd and
Zamora (2015) omit any mention of CSR assurance. We include a statement saying there was no
independent assurance for two reasons. First, to ensure the assurance absent treatment is salient to
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Negative Event Manipulation
Following Zahller et al. (2015), participants in the negative event present
treatment (NEGATIVE_EVENT =1) read an excerpt from the business press, rather than
receiving information directly from the firm. This gives the negative event more
credibility to the participants since it is coming from an independent source. The Godfrey
et al. (2009) findings suggest that insurance-like protection from CSR is found when the
negative event challenges the integrity of the company. Therefore, we choose a negative
event that is harmful to the consumer stakeholder group to elicit concerns about the
integrity of management. The business press article details a voluntary food safety recall
that occurred at XYZ, Inc. following incidences of consumers becoming sick after eating
their products. Further, we employ this negative event because it has both integrity and
financial implications to the company. Negative financial complications are important for
our study due to our interest in how investors view the connection between CSR and
future net cash inflows. 54 Participants in the negative event absent treatment
(NEGATIVE_EVENT =0) do not receive any information about the negative event.
Measured Variables
Consistent with the discretionary disclosure literature (Koonce et al. 2016;
Rennekamp 2012), the primary measured variable is a valuation judgment; participants
indicate on a 101-point scale with labels of 0 (low), 50 (average) and 100 (high) what
they believe is an appropriate value for the common stock of XYZ Inc. 55 Asking

participants. Second, to allow a more direct comparison of findings, we keep the CSR assurance absent
treatment consistent with Cheng et al. (2015).
54
Another reason for choosing a food safety issue is due to the recent press received by Chipotle and
General Mills. Using a negative event recently covered in the news helps make the negative consequences
more salient to participants.
55
There are other possible ways to measure investors’ perceptions. For example, Zahller et al. (2015) use a
disinvestment measure by using a task where participants inherit shares of the firm’s stock and can
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participants to provide this judgment both before (VALUATION_1) and after
(VALUATION_2) receiving the manipulations allows isolation of their reactions to the
treatments. Therefore, we use the change in judgments (ΔVALUATION) as the dependent
variable when formally testing the hypotheses. We also capture a “willingness to invest”
measure by asking participants their perceptions on the desirability of XYZ, Inc. as an
investment opportunity (Koonce et al. 2016). 56 Participants indicate their response on a
101-point scale with labels of 0 (not at all desirable), 50 (average) and 100 (very
desirable) (DESIRABILITY_1; DESIRABILITY_2; ΔDESIRABILITY). Our primary
motivation for including a “willingness to invest” measure is that participants might
differ in how they perceive the task. The primary valuation judgment might elicit
participants’ perceptions on how the overall market would value the investment, while
the willingness to invest measurement provides an individual reaction.
In order to add to the archival literature in this space and to shed more light on the
motivations behind participant responses, we also ask participants two questions on how
they perceive the usefulness of CSR disclosure. To prevent order effects, we randomize
the order in which participants answer the following questions. Participants are asked
about their perceptions on the likelihood of CSR activities resulting in positive future
financial performance. This is captured on an 11-point scale ranging from 1 (highly
unlikely) to 11 (highly likely) (FCF_CONNECTION). Also, participants are asked about
their perceptions on whether the CSR activities provide a signal of the corporate ethical

reallocate their shares to an index fund. Also, Elliott et al. (2014) require participants to estimate a
fundamental value of the firm’s stock, as well as identifying the maximum price per share at which they
would be willing to invest their inheritance in the firm’s stock. We chose to use a valuation judgement
primarily because the change in valuation amount allows us to isolate the reaction to the manipulations.
56
This willingness to invest measurement also allows for a direct comparison to Cheng et al. (2015) who
use a willingness to invest measure as their primary dependent variable.
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culture. This is captured on a 11-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely does not provide a
signal) to 11 (definitely does provide a signal) (ETHICS). We also measure participants’
perceptions of the credibility of the CSR disclosure. Similar to Zahller et al. (2015), we
ask participants to indicate on an 11-point scale how believable they find XYZ’s CSR
disclosures ranging from 1 (very doubtful) to 11 (very believable) (CREDIBILITY). Since
the company has a mixed financial background, we measure participants’ perceptions of
the financial health of the company relative to its industry peers on a 11-point scale
ranging from 1 (very low) to 11 (very high) (FIN_HEALTH). Finally, we measure
participants’ perceptions of XYZ’s motives for undertaking the CSR activities contained
in the disclosures by asking participants if they think XYZ, Inc. practices CSR primarily
to be a good corporate citizen (CSR_MOTIVES) on an 11-point scale ranging from 1
(highly unlikely) to 11 (highly likely).
V. RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
A total of 497 participants passed the screening requirements and completed the
study. To ensure the negative event and CSR assurance manipulations had the intended
effect, the experiment asked two memory manipulation check questions. First,
participants were asked whether they recall receiving information on a negative event
occurring at the company. Second, participants were asked if the company engaged an
accounting firm as an independent assurer of the CSR disclosure. A total of 98 (19.7%)
participants failed at least one of these manipulation checks and were removed from the
sample. 57 The manipulation failure rate is comparable with prior CSR assurance studies
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A total of 61 (12.3%) participants failed the negative event recall question. Of the 61 failures, 20
occurred when participants in the negative event present treatment responded that there was no negative
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(e.g., Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2015; Cheng et al. 2015). Our final sample comprises
399 participants that passed both memory checks, with cell sizes ranging from 42 to 57.
To ensure the CSR assurance manipulation had the intended effect, we examine the
treatment means for CREDIBILITY. Consistent with expectations, investors in the
assurance present treatment perceived higher disclosure credibility (mean = 7.83) relative
to investors in the assurance absent treatment (mean = 6.16; t = 6.81, one tailed p <
0.000). Results suggest the CSR assurance manipulation had the intended effect.
To ensure that the CSR activity type manipulation had the intended effect, we
examine treatment means for FCF_CONNECTION and CSR_MOTIVES. As expected,
participants in the strategic CSR activity treatment found it more likely that the company
primarily practiced CSR to improve future net cash flows (mean = 7.05) than those in the
non-strategic CSR activity treatment (mean = 5.46, t = 6.32, one-tailed p < 0.000). Also,
participants in the non-strategic CSR activity treatment found it more likely that the
company primarily practiced CSR to be a good corporate citizen (mean = 6.46) than
those in the strategic CSR activity treatment (mean = 5.64, t = 3.265, one-tailed p =
0.001). The results suggest the CSR activity type manipulation was successful.
Descriptive Statistics
Of the 399 participants included in the final sample, 72 percent are between the
ages of 25-44, and 54 percent are male. In addition, 54 percent of participants earned a
bachelor’s degree and participants took on average 3.15 accounting and 2.73 finance
event. The remaining 41 failures occurred when participants in the negative event absent treatment
responded that there was a negative event. A possible explanation for this manipulation check failure is that
participants perceived the mixed financial background as a negative setting. A total of 62 (12.5%)
participants failed the CSR assurance recall question. Of the 62 failures, 18 occurred when participants in
the assurance present treatment responded that there was no assurance. The remaining 44 failures occurred
when participants in the assurance absent treatment responded that there was assurance. A possible
explanation for this manipulation check failure is that participants saw the phrase CSR assurance and did
not read the manipulation wording carefully to recognize assurance was absent.
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courses. In terms of work experience, 28 percent have between six to ten years of
professional experience with a mean of eight years of personal investing experience. The
majority of the participants have professional experience as CPAs (n = 348, mean = 0.61
years), lawyers (n=338, mean = 0.20 years) and investors (n = 376, mean = 4.38 years).
Further, 79 percent of participants responded that they are solely responsible for
managing their investment portfolio and are likely to invest in the next 12 months (mean
= 7.68) (1 = Highly unlikely, 11 = Highly likely). Participants also have a slightly
optimistic overall view of the market (mean = 6.99 on a scale of 1= Pessimistic, 6 =
Neutral, 11 = Optimistic). Finally, participants rate themselves slightly above average on
their CSR knowledge (mean = 6.33, where 1 = Below average, 11 = Above average) and
their sustainability consciousness (mean = 7.00, where 1 = Not at all conscious, 11 =
Very conscious).
Table 2.1 displays summary statistics for the dependent and control variables and
Table 2.2 displays the correlation matrix.
Insert Tables 2.1 and 2.2 About Here
Hypothesis Testing
Prior to testing the formal hypotheses, we examine whether the presence of CSR
information provides insurance-like protection to the company following a negative event
by comparing primary dependent variable means (ΔVALUATION, ΔDESIRABILITY) in
the control group to the treatment groups, who receive the negative event manipulation
but no information about either type of CSR. Untabulated results show that the mean
change in investors’ valuation judgments for participants in the control group is -15.66
compared to -5.81 for participants who also receive the CSR manipulations. The net
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difference in investors' valuations judgments of 9.84 is significant (p < 0.000). Further,
the mean change in investors’ desirability judgments is -17.92 for those in the control
group and -9.00 for those who also receive the CSR manipulations. The net difference in
investors’ desirability judgments of 8.92 is significant (p <0.000). Thus, results suggest
the presence of CSR disclosure overall provides insurance-like protection following a
negative event. 58
Negative Events and CSR; Test of H1
H1 predicts that the presence of a negative event will result in lower valuation
judgments than when a negative event is absent. Table 2.3 Panel A shows that absent a
negative event investors’ mean valuation judgments increase from the baseline of the premanipulation judgment after receiving the CSR manipulations (5.01), but decrease when
a negative event is present (-5.81). Similarly, Table 2.3 Panel B shows that investors’
mean perceptions of investment desirability increase from the baseline of the premanipulation judgment when a negative event is absent (6.51), but decrease when a
negative event in present (-9.00). Table 2.4 Panel A reports standard three-way
ANCOVA models for both dependent variables. Results show that the main effect of
NEGATIVE_EVENT is significant for both the change in valuation judgment (F=22.04,
p<0.000) and the change in investment desirability (F=50.86, p<0.000), supporting H1.
Thus, investors in our setting react to the company’s involvement in a negative event by
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Also, we compare control group to participants receiving disclosure of strategic or non-strategic CSR
activity. Results suggest that either type of CSR activity provides an insurance-like benefit as disclosure of
either type reduces investors’ negative reactions to the negative event (ΔVALUATION: control vs. strategic:
p<0.000; control vs. non-strategic: p<0.000; ΔDESIRABILITY: control vs. strategic: p<0.000; control vs.
non-strategic: p=0.005). Further, follow-up tests show no difference in investors’ negative reactions based
on CSR activity type (ΔVALUATION: strategic vs. non-strategic: p=0.247; ΔDESIRABILITY: strategic vs.
non-strategic: p=0.168). We formally test for a difference in investor reaction to CSR activity type
following a negative event in H2b.
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decreasing their valuation judgments and perceiving the company as a less desirable
investment.
Insert Tables 2.3 and 2.4 About Here
CSR Activity Type and Negative Events; Tests of H2a and H2b
H2a predicts that in the absence of a negative event, disclosure of strategic CSR
activity will increase investors’ valuation judgments to a greater extent than disclosure of
non-strategic CSR activity. In contrast, H2b predicts that in the presence of a negative
event, disclosure of non-strategic CSR activity will increase investors’ valuation
judgments to a greater extent than disclosure of strategic CSR activity. The insignificant
interactions of NEGATIVE_EVENT and CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE on the changes in
valuation judgments (Table 2.4 Panel A – Model 1) and investment desirability
judgments (Table 2.4, Panel A – Model 2) suggest that the predicted interaction is not
supported. We formally test H2a through planned contrasts in the sub-sample of
observations that did not receive the negative event manipulation (n=187). Table 2.3
Panel A shows the mean change in valuation judgment of investors receiving disclosures
of strategic CSR activity is 6.87, compared to 3.18 among those receiving disclosure of
non-strategic CSR activity. Table 2.4 Panel B shows that this difference is significant
(p=0.046, one-tailed). Table 2.3 Panel A shows that the mean change in desirability
judgments of investors receiving disclosures of strategic CSR activity is 9.29, vs. 3.77
among those receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activity. Table 2.4 Panel B shows
that this difference is significant (p=0.010, one-tailed), supporting H2a. This implies that,
consistent with Cheng et al. (2015), absent a negative event, investors value more highly
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strategic CSR activity and this influence is not altered by the company’s mixed financial
performance.
We formally test H2b using planned contrasts in the sub-sample of investors
receiving the negative event manipulation (n=212). Table 2.3 Panel A shows that the
mean change in valuation judgments of investors receiving disclosures of non-strategic
activity is -6.87, vs. -4.87 for those receiving disclosures of strategic activity. A similar
pattern holds for the change in desirability judgments (-10.36 vs. -7.78). Table 2.4 Panel
B reports that these differences are not significant. Thus, H2b is not supported, contrary
to prior archival studies suggesting non-strategic CSR activity provides an insurance-like
benefit to companies following negative events. One possible explanation is that prior
archival studies do not control for performance (e.g., Groening and Kanuri 2016; Godfrey
et al. 2009), thus our mixed financial background could provide a context in which nonstrategic CSR is viewed as less important. Instead, investors seem to prefer a company
with mixed financial performance that experienced a negative event to focus on financial
recovery rather than investment in non-strategic CSR.
CSR Assurance and Negative Events; Tests of H3 and H4
H3 is a replication hypothesis predicting that assurance of CSR disclosures will
increase investors’ valuation and desirability judgments. Table 2.3 Panel A shows that
when CSR assurance is present, mean valuation judgments increase after receiving the
CSR manipulations (0.55), but decrease when assurance is absent (-2.20). Similarly,
Table 2.3 Panel B shows that mean perceptions of investment desirability increase when
CSR assurance is present (0.88), but decrease when assurance is absent (-4.64). We test
H3 using the main effect for ASSURANCE in the three-way ANCOVA models in Table
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2.4 Panel A. Results show that the difference between the means is marginally significant
for the change in valuation judgments (p=0.084) and significant for the change in
investment desirability (p=0.002), supporting H3. Thus, results suggest that overall, CSR
assurance improves investors’ view of the company in our context.
H4 predicts that assurance of CSR disclosures increases investors’ valuation
judgments to a greater extent when a negative event is present versus absent. We test this
ordinal hypothesis using planned comparisons. Results are reported in Table 2.5, with
descriptive statistics shown in Table 2.3 Panel A and depicted in Figure 2.5. Prior to
testing H4, we note differences associated with assurance within each negative event
condition. Table 2.3 Panel A shows that the mean change in valuation judgment is 6.50
(3.27) when CSR disclosure is assured (not assured) in the absence of a negative event.
The difference of 3.23 is significant (p=0.075, one-tailed), consistent with prior research
showing that assurance improves investors’ views of companies in the absence of
negative events (Cheng et al. 2015; Brown-Liburd & Zamora 2015). Table 2.3 Panel A
also shows that the mean change in valuation judgment is -4.87 (-6.77) when CSR
disclosure is assured (not assured) in the presence of a negative event. The net difference
of 1.90 is not significant (p=0.196, one-tailed). Table 2.3 Panel B shows that the mean
change in desirability judgments is 9.70 (2.77) when CSR disclosure is assured (not
assured) in the absence of a negative event, while the mean change in desirability
judgments is -7.19 (-10.84) when CSR disclosure is assured (not assured) in the presence
of a negative event. Consistent with the mean change in valuation judgment, the
difference in the mean change of desirability of 6.93 is significant (p=0.002, one-tailed)
in the absence of a negative event. However, the difference in the mean change in
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desirability judgment of 3.65 is marginally significant (p=0.086, one-tailed) in the
presence of a negative event. Results of planned contrasts in Panel C show that the
increase associated with assurance is similar across negative event conditions, and thus
H4 is not supported for either dependent variable. Findings suggest CSR assurance plays
an important role in increasing investors’ reactions to CSR disclosure, however it does
not have greater incremental value when a negative events occur.
Insert Figure 2.5 About Here
Insert Table 2.5 About Here
CSR Activity Type, CSR Assurance and Negative Events; Tests of H5a and H5b
H5a is an ordinal hypothesis, predicting that in the absence of a negative event,
CSR assurance will increase investors’ valuation judgments to a greater extent when the
disclosures discuss strategic CSR activity compared to non-strategic CSR activity. In
contrast, H5b predicts a different ordinal pattern, specifically that in the presence of a
negative event, CSR assurance will increase investors’ valuation judgments to a greater
extent when the disclosures discuss non-strategic CSR activity compared to strategic
CSR activity. We test H5a in the sub-sample of observations that did not receive the
negative event manipulation (n=187). Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.3 Panel
A & B and depicted in Figure 2.6 Panel A. Table 2.3 Panel A shows the mean change in
valuation judgment of investors receiving disclosures of strategic CSR activity is 8.55
when assured vs. 4.90 when not assured (difference = 3.65). Additionally, Table 2.3
Panel A shows the mean change in valuation judgment of investors receiving disclosures
of non-strategic CSR activity is 4.46 when assured vs. 1.67 when not assured (difference
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= 2.79). The planned contrast test 59 in Table 2.6 is significant (p=0.021, one-tailed),
supporting H5a. Results are similar when comparing the differences in desirability
judgments. Findings suggest, absent a negative event, assured and strategic CSR
disclosure has the largest impact on investors’ judgments.
Insert Figure 2.6 About Here
Insert Table 2.6 About Here
We test the predicted ordinal interaction in H5b in the sub-sample of observations
receiving the negative event manipulation (n=212). Descriptive statistics are shown in
Table 2.3 Panels A and B and depicted in Figure 2.6 Panel B. Table 2.3 Panel A shows
that the mean change in valuation judgment of investors receiving disclosures of strategic
CSR activity is -4.24 when assured, vs. -5.50 when not assured (difference = 1.23).
Additionally, Table 2.3 Panel A shows that the mean change in valuation judgment of
investors receiving disclosures of non-strategic CSR activity difference is -5.57 when
assured, vs. -8.19 when not assured (difference = 2.62). The planned contrast test 60 in
Table 2.6 is not significant (p=0.290, one-tailed), and so H5b is not supported. Results
are similar when comparing the differences in desirability judgments. Findings suggest
that the presence of a negative event does not alter investors’ views of the CSR activity
type as predicted. Consistent with H2b, results suggest that investors view strategic and

59
We test H5a using the same contrast weights as Cheng et al. (2015): +3 for strategic/assurance present,
+1 for strategic/assurance absent, -2 for non-strategic/assurance present and -2 for non-strategic/assurance
absent.
60
We tested H5b using the following contrast weightings: -2 for strategic/assurance present, -2 for
strategic/assurance absent, +3 for non-strategic/assurance present and +1 for non-strategic/assurance
absent.
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non-strategic CSR activity similarly in the negative event setting and the results of H5b
suggests that CSR assurance does not alter this view. 61
VI. CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH
In this study, we examine whether the presence of a negative event, CSR activity
type and CSR assurance jointly influence investors’ judgments. Results indicate the
presence of a negative event reduces investors’ valuation and perceptions of investment
desirability judgments. Consistent with prior experimental literature and absent a
negative event, we find investors react most favorably to strategic CSR activity (e.g.,
Cheng et al. 2015). However, contrary to prior archival literature, we find that nonstrategic CSR activity fails to provide incremental insurance-like protection relative to
strategic CSR in our experimental setting. Further, we find that absent a negative event
CSR assurance has a positive impact on investors’ reactions to CSR disclosures, and
marginal support that this effect extends to the negative event setting. Finally, results
suggest that absent a negative event, disclosures of strategic CSR activity that are assured
have the greatest positive influence on investors’ valuation and desirability judgments.
However, in the presence of a negative event, strategic and non-strategic CSR activities
have a similar influence on investors’ judgments, even when the disclosures have been
assured.
Our findings suggest that the CSR activity type does not influence the amount of
moral capital available to a company following a negative event. Godfrey (2005) argues
that moral capital, and the associated insurance-like protection, is influenced by
stakeholder evaluations of both the act and the actor. Further, he suggests that positive
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To provide additional support that the negative event setting alters investors’ views we use the same
contrast weightings used to test H5a. The planned contrast test is not significant.
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acts by genuine actors are the only circumstances where positive moral capital is
generated. In our setting, we expected that both strategic and non-strategic CSR would
provide a signal of a positive action. However, we expected only non-strategic CSR to
provide a signal of a genuine actor and, combined with the act of disclosing, to generate
positive moral capital to provide insurance-like protection against the negative event.
Results suggest this is not the case; both strategic and non-strategic CSR developed a
similar level of moral capital, as investors’ reactions to the negative event were not
different between the two treatment groups. Therefore, results suggest that strategic and
non-strategic CSR activities give investors a similar signal about the actor. Thus, the CSR
activity type does not alter whether investors attribute the negative event to managerial
maladroitness or malevolence as suggested by Godfrey and colleagues (2009). A possible
explanation for this difference could be that Godfrey (2005) argues moral capital is
generated by corporate philanthropy, which is different than non-strategic CSR activities
in our setting. The non-strategic CSR activities in the case relate to the company’s
production processes that are likely to have some future impact on the company’s
financial performance, while corporate philanthropy only involves benevolent cash
outflows that decrease firm value.
These findings provide several important contributions. First, we contribute to the
literature investigating investors’ use of CSR disclosure by considering how the
occurrence of a negative event alters perceptions of the importance of strategic CSR,
which connects to future net cash inflows. Results suggest that in the presence of a
negative event, investors no longer react more favorably to strategic CSR activity relative
to non-strategic CSR activity. Rather, both types of CSR activity have a similar impact on

76

investors’ valuation and desirability judgments. This could be due to investors viewing
strategic CSR activities as no longer playing an important role in the investment decision
(i.e., the negative event cancels out the strategic CSR effect). 62 Alternatively, it could be
due to investors perceiving non-strategic CSR activity as more important in this context
(i.e., as a signal of the company’s ethical culture), but not more important than the
connection between strategic CSR activity and future net cash inflows. These
explanations appear consistent with the mixed financial background we gave participants
and could help explain why our results differ from prior archival literature.
Second, we extend the CSR assurance literature by examining whether the value
of CSR assurance is affected by the presence/absence of a negative event. We find
marginal support that the value of CSR assurance extends to the negative event context,
and therefore provides value to the company in a setting where investors might lose trust
in management (Elliott et al. 2011). Further, this study examines whether CSR assurance
adds incremental value beyond credibility that comes from the high disclosure quality
featured in our experiment (i.e., the disclosure mentions both negative and positive
aspects of the CSR activity; Zahller et al. 2015). We find assurance provides incremental
value to high-quality CSR disclosures, suggesting companies can earn business rewards
from purchasing CSR assurance even when they produce high-quality CSR disclosures.
This study has several implications for practice. Our study informs the SEC
Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative by supporting that CSR disclosure provides important
information to investors when negative events are both present and absent. Therefore,
62
It is not clear why both types of CSR activity have a similar influence on investors’ judgments when a
negative event is present, however, further analysis of measured variables may aid in understanding this
result. Anecdotally, one participant emailed the researchers after completing the experiment to provide
context on their response. The participant suggested that CSR is the least of the company’s worries given
the lack of financial health of the company.
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voluntary CSR disclosure could help improve market efficiency by improving the
information environment. Future research could examine whether this result is also the
case if disclosures are mandatory. Also, our findings suggest that if companies consider
investor reaction to be a main goal of CSR activity and disclosure, they should focus on
strategic CSR activities. We show that disclosure of strategic CSR improves investor
judgments more than non-strategic CSR activities absent a negative event and provides
the same insurance-like protection as non-strategic activities in the presence of a negative
event. Further, our findings suggest that CSR assurance influences investors’ judgments
when a negative event is present. Thus, providing evidence that companies can improve
the impact of CSR activities following a negative event by purchasing assurance.
This study has several limitations that provide opportunities for future research.
First, by using MTurk participants, our study examines how nonprofessional investors
react to CSR disclosures. While it is important to understand this investor group,
professional investors’ reactions to CSR disclosure could differ. Future research could
use archival methods to examine whether the market reaction following negative events
differs based on CSR activity type and CSR assurance. Second, participants receive
disclosure of either strategic or non-strategic activities. While this manipulation is
important in our experimental setting, in order to isolate possible mediating factors
influencing participants’ decisions, in practice companies are likely to practice both types
of CSR activities. Future archival research could investigate investor reaction relative to
the ratio of a company’s strategic to non-strategic CSR activity, thus providing greater
insight into investors’ preference for various CSR activity types. Third, our study
presents investors with an excerpt of a company’s annual CSR report. However, investors
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can receive CSR information from a variety of sources (e.g., news release, company
website, etc.). Further research could examine whether the influence of CSR information
on investors’ judgments vary with difference information sources. Fourth, the focus of
this paper is to compare investors’ reactions to CSR disclosure when a negative event is
present or absent. As such, we do not study investors’ reactions to positive events, which
might not be symmetrical to negative event reactions. Finally, our study examines one
type of negative event (i.e., product safety failure), but the circumstances around other
negative events and the frequency of those events over time could lead to different
investor decisions. Future archival research could examine whether an array of negative
event scenarios interact with CSR activity type and assurance to influence investor
reaction. Further, investors’ reactions to the conditions that we study could vary by the
financial risk of the company, which is not considered by prior research (e.g., Groening
and Kanuri 2016; Godfrey et al. 2009). We hold financial risk constant in order to isolate
the effect of the negative event, but future archival and experimental research could
investigate whether financial risk affects the patterns we observe.
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Part Three
The Influence of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure on Jurors’ Judgments
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I: INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, companies are investing in corporate social responsibility (CSR)
initiatives and voluntarily reporting on their CSR activities.63 Prior literature mainly
focuses on this voluntary behavior by examining whether CSR information enhances firm
value (e.g., Aguinis and Glavas 2012; Carroll and Shabana 2010; Margolis, Elfenbein,
and Walsh 2009; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003). A segment of the CSR research
considers how CSR information can protect shareholder value following a negative event
(e.g., Christensen 2016; Zahller, Arnold, and Roberts 2015; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen
2009; Godfrey 2005; Klein and Dawar 2004). Godfrey (2005) provides a theoretical
argument suggesting CSR can provide insurance-like benefits during a corporate crisis by
generating positive moral capital among communities and stakeholders. Prior literature
supports Godfrey’s argument as CSR information is found to reduce negative reaction
following a negative event among both consumers (e.g., Klein and Dawar 2004) and
investors (Christensen 2016; Groening and Kanuri 2016; Zahller et al. 2015; Godfrey et
al. 2009). However, CSR reporting discloses information that could be seen as important
by a range of user groups (e.g., consumers, employees, investors, etc.). Therefore, I
examine whether CSR disclosure influences jurors’ judgments. Specifically, I examine
whether the type of CSR activity and CSR assurance influence jurors’ negligence and
damages assessments.
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According to the KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2015, 73% of the 100 largest
global companies and 92% of the 250 largest global companies report on their corporate responsibility. The
percentage of companies reporting has been stable since the KPMG 2011 report, but is a large increase
from 2002 when 28% of the 100 largest global companies and 45% of the 250 largest global companies
reported. The survey also finds the reporting rate of surveyed companies from the United States is
approximately 85% (KPMG 2015).
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Investigating jurors’ reactions to CSR disclosure is important for several reasons.
Jurors play a pivotal role in our society following the occurrence of a negative event by
being tasked with the responsibility of determining negligence and assigning associated
financial penalties. Therefore, research on understanding how CSR influences jurors’
reactions could provide key insight into the insurance-like protection available to
companies from their CSR activities. Second, prior literature suggests that stakeholder
reactions to CSR information are not always congruent (Groening and Kanuri 2013). 64
Further, the juror decision-making context is distinct from other users since there is no
economic transaction between jurors and the company. Therefore, jurors’ use of CSR
information might differ from other user groups as they have no incentive to consider
their own self-interest.
I complete two studies to contribute to the CSR literature by examining whether
CSR information can provide insurance-like protection by influencing jurors’ decisionmaking. In Study 1, I examine how CSR activity type (strategic versus non-strategic) and
CSR assurance influence jurors’ negligence assessments, while Study 2 extends the
analysis to jurors’ damage assessments. 65,66 Jurors’ damage assessments serve two
purposes. First, compensatory damages are designed to return the plaintiff to a state
comparable to where they were prior to the negative event. Second, jurors can assess
punitive damages to punish the defendant for their actions and deter the behavior from
64

For example, Groening and Kanuri (2013) find that at times the market reacts positively (negatively) to
CSR activities that have a negative (positive) impact on other stakeholder groups. The findings highlight
the importance of investigating users’ reactions to CSR disclosure across various user groups.
65
In this study, I examine how different types of CSR activities influence jurors’ reactions by manipulating
between strategic and non-strategic CSR activities. In Section II, I discuss the differences between the CSR
activity types, as well as how jurors’ reactions to the different CSR activity types could diverge.
66
Negligence is commonly defined as a failure to exercise the same level of care as a reasonable person
would use in the same situation (Seventh Circuit 2015). Refer to Kelley and Wendt (2001) for a review on
negligence instructions given to jurors, which includes discussion on different interpretations of the legal
definition of negligence.
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happening again (Greene and Bornstein 2000). Examining all three assessments
(negligence, compensatory damages, punitive damages) provides insight into the
influence of CSR information across the entire juror decision-making process.
In Study 1, I rely on the Culpable Control Model (CCM) (Alicke 2000), in order
to examine whether CSR information influences jurors’ negligence assessments. The
CCM suggests that jurors make negligence assessments based on their perceptions of the
defendant’s personal control over the negative event, as well as affective reactions to the
details of the case. The model also proposes that jurors’ perceptions of personal control
are influenced by perceptions of intentionality, foreseeability and causation, which in turn
are influenced by their affective reactions to the defendant. I build on this literature by
examining whether CSR information influences jurors’ judgments identified in the CCM.
Further, this study builds on the CSR literature that suggests stakeholders’ attributions of
CSR motives influence their reactions (e.g., consumers’ purchase intentions) (e.g., Groza,
Pronschinske, and Walker 2011; Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 2010; Ellen, Webb, and
Mohr 2006; Klein and Dawar 2004), and that their perceptions of CSR motives are
influenced by different CSR activity types (e.g., Groening and Kanuri 2016; Cheng,
Green, and Ko 2015; Godfrey et al. 2009). Godfrey et al. (2009) attribute the divergent
perceptions of CSR activity to whether stakeholders view CSR motives as otherregarding (i.e., altruistic) or self-serving. Therefore, I expect that the influence of CSR
information on jurors’ negligence assessments will depend on the CSR activity type
undertaken by the company. Specifically, I expect that CSR activity type will influence
jurors’ affective reactions to the defendant and jurors’ perceptions of intent. The CCM
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suggests these intermediate judgments should influence jurors’ perceptions of
controllability, which impacts their negligence assessments.
I also study the role of independent assurance of CSR information in this context.
Due to the voluntary nature of CSR disclosure, concerns exist over its credibility. Prior
literature suggests companies pursue CSR initiatives out of self-interest in an attempt to
develop and manage the company’s perceived organizational legitimacy. For example,
studies find that companies may alter their disclosure practices based on media coverage
(Aerts and Cormier 2009) and when their legitimacy is threatened (de Villiers and van
Staden 2006). Other research finds that disclosures can be inconsistent with future results
(Patten 2005) and that companies use impression management techniques in disclosure
language (Cho, Roberts, and Patten 2010) and graphs (Cho, Michelon, and Patten 2012).
Thus, users might doubt the veracity of CSR disclosures. One way for companies to
enhance disclosure credibility is through assurance by independent experts; for instance,
prior literature suggests that assurance can increase capital market participants’ views of
CSR disclosure credibility and increase reliance on this information (e.g., Cheng et al.
2015; Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2015; Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 2011; Hodge,
Subramaniam, and Stewart 2009). However, prior research has not examined whether
CSR assurance influences stakeholders other than capital market participants. This is
important to consider because CSR assurance is a costly voluntary action that companies
will only undertake if the benefits outweigh the costs. Therefore, understanding how CSR
assurance influences non-capital market participants, in the litigation setting, provides
key insight into the additional benefits available to companies that purchase this new
form of assurance. I expect that CSR assurance will moderate jurors’ reactions to CSR
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activity type by enhancing disclosure credbility. Specifically, I expect CSR assurance to
interact with the CSR activity type to increase jurors’ affective reactions to the defendant
and reduce jurors’ perceptions of negligence.
In order to investigate the influence of CSR information across all juror
assessments, Study 2 examines its influence on compensatory and punitive damage
assessments. While it is likely that there is spillover from the liability assessment (Lowe,
Reckers, and Whitecotton 2002; Kadous 2000), prior literature suggests that damage
assessments are influenced by factors distinct from the determinants of negligence
identified in the CCM (e.g., Reffett 2010; Lowe et al. 2002; Greene, Johns, and Smith
2001; Kadous 2000). Since damages are influenced by distinct factors, it is important to
examine whether CSR information provides incremental explanatory power in jurors’
damage assessments, beyond its role in explaining negligence assessments. For example,
CSR information could still provide insurance-like protection by decreasing damage
assessments, even if negligence assessments are not affected.
Study 2 builds on results of Lee and Sweeney (2015), who find jurors’ punitive
damage assessments are influenced by CSR disclosures related to the negative event that
provide additional information about how the company will address the issue going
forward (i.e., reactive CSR activities). I further consider the influence of different CSR
activity types, which can cause diverging stakeholder reactions (e.g., Groening and
Kanuri 2016; Cheng et al. 2015; Godfrey et al. 2009). In addition, I also consider the
credibility-enhancing effect of CSR assurance. Consistent with Study 1, I expect CSR
activity type to influence jurors’ damage assessments due to differences in perceived
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CSR motives (i.e., self-serving versus other-regarding), and CSR assurance to moderate
the influence of CSR activity type on damage assessments.
To investigate how CSR information influences jurors’ judgments, I employ a 2x2
(plus control group) experimental design that manipulates CSR activity type and
assurance. For Study 1, a final sample of 182 useable observations were solicited from
Amazon Mechanical Turk after participants passed screening requirements to ensure they
meet eligibility to serve for jury duty in the United States. The final sample for Study 2
consists of a subsample of participants from Study 1 that determined the case company to
be negligent, yielding 83 useable observations. Consistent with Paper 2 of my
dissertation, the case company, XYZ, Inc., procures, processes and transports branded
food products sold at national grocery stores, with mixed financial performance relative
to its industry. All participants receive background materials describing information
about a negative event that has implications for both the company’s reputation and its
financial condition, which has resulted in civil litigation being brought against the
company from consumers who have fallen ill after using the company’s products. 67
Consistent with prior literature examining different CSR activity types (e.g., Cheng et al.
2015), I examine the strategic nature of CSR activities. I manipulate strategic and nonstrategic CSR activities by following McWilliams and Siegel (2011, 1481), who define
strategic CSR as “any responsible activity that allows a firm to achieve a sustainable
competitive advantage, regardless of motive”. By creating a sustainable competitive
advantage, strategic CSR activity provides economic benefits to the company in the form
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The company information and negative event are similar to Paper 2 of this dissertation, which
investigates investors’ reactions to CSR activity type and CSR assurance in the negative event context.
Using a similar context across studies allows for consideration of whether and how the use of CSR
information diverges between the two groups.
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of increased market share and future net cash inflows. Alternatively, non-strategic CSR
activity does not have a direct link to economic benefits for the company. The CSR
activity type manipulations detail the company’s investment in clean energy and
production process equipment upgrades. Disclosures in the strategic condition detail that
the equipment upgrades are associated with a reduction in operating costs, as well as
increased market share and revenue. Disclosures in the non-strategic condition detail that
the investments are not expected to impact operating costs, market share, or future
review. Consistent with the CSR assurance literature, I manipulate CSR assurance as
either present or absent. In order to examine the influence of CSR activity type and
assurance on jurors’ judgments, Study 1 measures their perceptions of negligence, as well
as the intermediate judgments identified in the CCM (affective reactions to the defendant
and the case, foreseeability, causation, intentionality). Participants who judge the
company as negligent in Study 1 progress to Study 2 and provide compensatory and
punitive damage assessments.
Consistent with expectations, non-strategic CSR activities elicit perceptions of
other-regarding CSR motives and CSR assurance enhances jurors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility. As predicted, Study 1 finds that jurors’ affective response to the
defendant is more favorable when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities.
However, contrary to expectations, Study 1 finds neither the type of CSR activity nor
CSR assurance directly influence jurors’ negligence assessments, with indirect influence
working through jurors’ affective response to the defendant. 68

68

In order to examine the indirect effects of CSR activity type and CSR assurance on jurors’ negligence
assessments, I plan to conduct SEM analysis in the future.

87

Study 2 finds that CSR activity type and assurance interact to influence the level
of compensatory and punitive damage assessments. I find that jurors assess higher
compensatory damages when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities that is
not assured, suggesting that perceptions of disclosure credibility plays an important role
in influencing juror behavior. Further, CSR activity type and CSR assurance interact to
influence the level of punitive damages. Consistent with predictions, findings suggest that
jurors assess lower punitive damages when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR
activities that are assured compared to all other treatment groups. Overall, the findings
suggest that CSR information can influence jurors’ behavior and provide insurance-like
protection during the damage assessment phase of a trial if it is credible and elicits
perceptions of other-regarding motives.
These studies contribute to the literature in several important ways. First, this
research complements other studies that examine the insurance-like protection available
from CSR activities among other stakeholder groups (e.g., Christensen 2016; Zahller et
al. 2015; Godfrey et al. 2009). By examining jurors, these studies provide additional
insight into the insurance-like protection available to companies when facing litigation.
Second, Lee and Sweeney (2015) find that jurors receiving reactive environmental
disclosures assess lower punitive damages compared to jurors who do not. These studies
complement that research by examining how information pertaining to previous CSR
activities (i.e., proactive CSR activities), of differing types that are unrelated to the
specific negative event, influence jurors’ negligence and damage assessments. This is
important as prior literature suggests stakeholders react differently to proactive versus
reactive CSR activities due to their perceptions of organizational motives (e.g., Groza et
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al. 2011). Also, Lee and Sweeney (2015) only measure punitive damages, while this
research examines the influence of CSR disclosures across the entire juror decisionmaking process. Third, these studies extend the CSR assurance literature by examining
how jurors view the credibility of CSR disclosures and the enhancement available from
assurance. Prior CSR assurance studies focus on market participants (e.g., analysts and
investors) and do not consider how CSR assurance can influence other potential user
groups. Further, prior literature examines the benefits of CSR assurance when the
company is not involved in a negative event. Examining jurors’ perceptions of CSR
assurance in the litigation setting provides insight into additional benefits of CSR
assurance. Fourth, this research has implications for practice by examining how the
discretionary choices of companies influence jurors during the litigation process.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents background
information on the juror decision-making process and develops the hypotheses. Section
III provides details on the research design and participants for Study 1 and Section IV
discusses the Study 1 results. Section V provides details on the research design and
participants for Study 2 and Section VI discusses the Study 2 results. Finally, Section VII
presents conclusions, limitations and opportunities for future research.
SECTION II: BACKGROUND & DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
Jurors are responsible for listening to the evidence in a case, reconciling
conflicting arguments and processing unfamiliar language, before deciding on an
appropriate verdict (Winter & Greene 2008). In civil trials, jurors perform the
complicated task of making a negligence assessment, and then must decide whether
compensatory and punitive damages are warranted. In order for CSR information to
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influence jurors’ negligence and damage award assessments, jurors must find the
information relevant to their task. Prior research focusing on other stakeholders finds
CSR information to be useful to consumers (e.g., Du et al. 2010), employees (e.g., Glavas
2016), and investors (e.g., Cohen, Holder-Webb, and Zamora 2015; Dhaliwal,
Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and Yang 2012; Cohen, Holder-Webb, Nath, and Wood 2011;
Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang 2011). However, users of CSR information can have
conflicting reactions to the same CSR activities. For example, Groening and Kanuri
(2013) find that investor reaction is not always congruent with other stakeholder groups.
Therefore, it is important to understand how CSR information influences jurors’ decisionmaking.
The juror decision setting differs from other stakeholder groups, as jurors do not
participate in an exchange transaction with the company. Rather, their role is to make a
judgment on negligence and assess penalties, without receiving any value in return. This
difference is important as it allows jurors to make decisions without self-interested
considerations. In this section, I review prior literature that examines jurors’ decisionmaking and develop my research hypotheses. I begin with Study 1, which focuses on
jurors’ negligence assessments, before examining jurors’ damage assessments in Study 2.
Study 1
Background: Jurors’ Negligence Assessments
In order for jurors to make a negligence assessment, they must consider whether
the defendant is to blame for the negative event that caused losses to the plaintiff. In
considering how jurors process blame, Alicke (2000) proposes the CCM model. Figure
3.1 presents the CCM model as adapted by Backof (2015) for the auditor negligence
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setting. The CCM model suggests that jurors’ evaluations of negligence are influenced
not only by their direct spontaneous reaction to the case (i.e., affective reaction to the
case details), but also to the perceived personal control the defendant had over the
negative event. In turn, jurors’ perceptions of personal control are influenced by three
intermediate judgments: causation, foreseeability and intentionality. Causation refers to
the defendant’s impact on the negative event and influences jurors’ perceptions of
personal control based on whether the negative event would have been averted or
diminished if the defendant was not involved. Foreseeability refers to jurors’ perception
on whether the negative event could have been anticipated by the defendant.
Intentionality refers to whether jurors perceive the defendant had a desire for the negative
event to occur. Finally, the CCM suggests that jurors’ indirect spontaneous reaction to the
defendant influences their perceptions of causation, foreseeability and intentions, and
therefore plays a role on their evaluations of negligence by influencing perceptions of
personal control. Backof (2015) adapts the CCM to the auditor negligence setting to
examine juror negligence assessments in that context. Findings generally support the
CCM, with jurors’ negligence assessments being influenced by their perceptions of
controllability over the audit failure. In the following section, I rely on the CCM as the
theoretical basis when developing my hypotheses examining the influence of CSR
information on jurors’ affective reactions to the defendant, jurors’ perceptions of
intentionality and jurors’ negligence assessments.
Insert Figure 3.1 About Here
CSR Activity Type
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Companies have limited resources and must decide how to allocate them in order
to maximize business rewards. 69 In order for companies to maximize business rewards
from their CSR activities, the activities must elicit positive reactions from stakeholders.
In this study, I examine the extent to which strategic and non-strategic CSR activities
elicit positive reactions from jurors. In conceptualizing CSR activities that may elicit
differential responses from jurors, I rely on McWilliams and Siegel (2011, 1481) who
define strategic CSR as “any ‘responsible’ activity that allows a firm to achieve a
sustainable competitive advantage, regardless of motive.” In other words, strategic CSR
activities are responsible actions that provide an economic benefit to the company.
Alternatively, non-strategic CSR activities are responsible activities that do not have a
direct link to future financial performance. Prior literature finds that the types of CSR
activities companies undertake can influence stakeholders’ reactions. For example,
Cheng et al. (2015) use a similar classification system and find that investors perceive
strategically aligned activities as more relevant and that they are more willing to invest as
opposed to activities that lack strategic alignment. 70
Despite this general finding, other studies suggest that stakeholders’ perceptions
of corporate motives for practicing CSR activities are also an important predictor of
response (e.g., Groza et al. 2011; Du et al. 2010; Ellen et al. 2006; Klein and Dawar
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The importance of strategically allocating limited resources to earn business rewards is especially true in
the CSR context as prior literature finds CSR is an ambiguous topic with a continuously evolving definition
(e.g., Ghobadian, Money, and Hillenbrand 2015; Moura-Leite and Padgett 2011; Carroll and Shabana
2010; Dahlsrud 2008; Godfrey and Hatch 2007; Carroll 1999). The ambiguous and evolving nature of CSR
provides companies with a broad range of activities that can be considered as part of their CSR initiatives.
70
Other CSR type classification systems have been studied, with similar results. Du et al. (2010) argue that
CSR activities can have a natural fit with the company’s business (i.e., “CSR fit”), which leads to more
positive stakeholder reactions compared to CSR activities with no fit. Alternatively, Aguinis and Glavas
(2013) separate CSR activities into embedded versus peripheral activities. They define embedded CSR
activities as those activities that are integrated into the company’s core business operations and argue that
they elicit a more positive response from stakeholder groups than peripheral activities.
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2004). Particularly, Du et al. (2010) suggest that negative views arise from stakeholder
skepticism; that is, whether motives are viewed as self-serving rather than otherregarding (arising from a genuine commitment to CSR). Further, Godfrey (2005) argues
that other-regarding activities can generate positive moral capital that can provide
insurance-like protection during a crisis. Several studies support this assertion. For
example, Klein and Dawar (2004) find that CSR actions mediate a negative impact on
consumers’ brand evaluations by moderating attributions of blame in a product-harm
crisis situation. Similarly, Godfrey et al. (2009) find that insurance-like protection against
negative investor reaction following a corporate crisis is only available when companies
practice CSR activities perceived as other-regarding. In sum, these studies suggest that
perceptions of other-regarding motives generate favorable attributions towards the
company, while perceptions of self-serving motives do not.
Consistent with the above literature, I anticipate that jurors will view motives for
strategic CSR as self-serving since they are connected to future economic benefits for the
company, and the motives for non-strategic CSR as other-regarding since there is no
direct link to future financial performance. However, other studies find that reactions by
stakeholders to perceived organizational motives are more complicated as both selfserving and other-regarding activities can generate positive stakeholder attributions. For
example, Ellen et al. (2006) find consumers respond positively to other-regarding
activities because they are perceived as values-driven (genuine commitment to CSR), but
also respond positively to self-serving activities because they are perceived as strategic.
Likewise, Groening and Kanuri (2016) find that investors react less negatively following
a negative event when a company practices activities perceived as other-regarding.
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However, this insurance-like benefit erodes as the amount of activities perceived as
other-regarding increases. 71 The findings suggest that perceptions of CSR motives are
complex, with users preferring to see other-regarding motives, but also acknowledging
that companies have legitimate self-serving motives. This creates tension as to whether
jurors will react differently to strategic versus non-strategic activities.
In order for CSR information to influence jurors’ negligence assessments, there
should be a connection to the intermediate judgments identified in the CCM. I propose
that CSR information could influence jurors’ negligence assessments through their
affective reactions to the defendant. Prior literature suggests that affective reactions are
particularly important in the juror setting (Backof 2015; Kadous 2001). In order for CSR
information to influence jurors’ affective reactions, the information must elicit either a
positive or negative response towards the defendant. The literature cited above implies
that CSR information will influence jurors’ affective reactions towards the defendant
based on how they perceive the CSR motives of the company. I anticipate that jurors will
perceive strategic CSR activities as self-serving and therefore these activities will elicit
an unfavorable affective response toward the defendant. In contrast, I expect perceptions
of other-regarding motives from disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities to elicit a
favorable affective response towards the defendant since the activities should be
perceived as altruistic. However, it is possible that jurors might view the disclosures of
non-strategic activities as a “greenwashing” attempt, which could reduce their favorable
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Groening and Kanuri (2016) examine investors’ reactions to same day news of company activities that
provide a benefit to stakeholders (CSR) and activities that have a negative impact on stakeholders (CSiR).
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affective response towards the defendant. 72 Despite this tension, I expect perceptions of
other-regarding motives from non-strategic CSR activities will elicit a more favorable
affective response towards the defendant relative to disclosure of strategic CSR activities.
Formally, I predict the following:
H1: Jurors’ affective reaction to the defendant will be more favorable when
receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities compared to disclosure of
strategic CSR activities.
CSR activity type might also influence jurors’ views of management’s
intentionality; i.e., whether jurors perceive the defendant desired for the negative event to
occur. Greater perceptions of intent lead to greater perceptions of controllability over the
negative event and increase the likelihood of a negligent verdict. Prior studies examining
the influence of CSR information on investor reactions following a negative event rely on
the legal principle of mens rea, or the state of mind behind the company’s actions (i.e.,
“bad” actors are punished more severely for bad deeds than “good” actors) (Christensen
2016; Godfrey et al. 2009). Similarly, I expect CSR information to provide a signal about
the defendant type (i.e., “good” or “bad”) based on how jurors perceive the motives of the
company for undertaking the activity (i.e., self-serving versus other-regarding). I
anticipate that jurors receiving disclosure of strategic CSR activities will perceive the
company as a “bad” actor, motivated by self-interest that also led to the negative event
occurring. However, I expect jurors receiving disclosures of non-strategic CSR activities
will perceive other-regarding motives and therefore perceive the company as a “good”
actor. Similar to H1, tension exists as jurors might perceive non-strategic CSR activities
as a “greenwashing” attempt. However, consistent with prior literature that finds
72

Lyon and Maxwell (2011) define “greenwashing” as “selective disclosure of positive information about a
company’s environmental or social performance, without full disclosure of negative information on these
dimensions, so as to create an overly positive corporate image” (Lyon and Maxwell (2011, 9).
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stakeholders react positively to other-regarding motives, I expect jurors will give the
company the benefit of the doubt and perceive less intent when a company discloses nonstrategic CSR activities compared to strategic CSR activities. Formally, I predict the
following:
H2: Jurors’ perceptions of intentionality will be lower when receiving disclosure
of non-strategic CSR activities compared to disclosure of strategic CSR activities.
CSR assurance
The CSR communication framework presented by Du et al. (2010) suggests that
the credibility of the information plays an important role in how consumers and investors
react. Further, prior literature finds that credibility is important in the litigation setting.
For example, in an auditor negligence trial Grenier, Lowe, Reffett, and Warne (2015a)
find independent experts’ recommendations influence jurors’ judgments differently
depending on how jurors perceive the experts’ credibility. This study considers whether
jurors’ perceptions of CSR disclosure credibility influence the negligence decisionmaking process by examining the credibility-enhancing effect of CSR assurance. 73
One potential factor leading to skepticism of CSR disclosure is users’ perceptions
of the company’s incentives for voluntarily providing CSR information. Further, Lee and
Sweeney (2015) find that jurors recognize the incentives of companies to produce
voluntary disclosure. 74 Several studies consider the company’s incentives when
examining the credibility-enhancing effect of CSR assurance. For example, Pflugrath et
al. (2011) find that the credibility-enhancing effect of assurance only occurs for
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In general, the CSR assurance literature finds the external assurance of CSR information increases
stakeholders’ perceptions of credibility of the disclosures (e.g., Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2015; Pflugrath
et al. 2011; Hodge et al. 2009)
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Lee and Sweeney (2015) examine the influence of environmental disclosures on jurors’ punitive damage
assessments. I discuss their study in more detail in Study 2, which examines jurors’ damage assessments.

96

companies in the mining industry, and conclude that this is due to analysts perceiving that
mining companies have a greater incentive to provide positive CSR information due to
the environmentally sensitive nature of their industry. Also, Brown-Liburd and Zamora
(2015) find that when CSR performance is tied to managerial pay, investors realize
management has an incentive to overstate their CSR performance in order to reap
financial incentives, thereby leading to an increase in the effect of CSR assurance.
Similarly, Cheng et al. (2015) find that CSR assurance is more important to investors
when the disclosures are aligned to the company’s overall strategy. In sum, this line of
literature suggests that users consider the company’s incentive for issuing voluntary CSR
disclosures and discount the credibility of the information when they perceive it to be
incentive-consistent. Further, prior findings suggest that when receiving incentiveconsistent disclosures, CSR assurance increases users’ perceptions of credibility.
H1 and H2 predict that disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities will result in
jurors having more favorable attributions towards the company since they will view the
company’s motives as other-regarding. I expect CSR assurance to play an important role
in how jurors react to disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities. Consistent with prior
literature in the investor literature that suggests CSR assurance increases the credibility of
the information (e.g., Cheng et al. 2015), I expect jurors to react more favorably to nonstrategic CSR disclosures when assurance is present compared to when it is absent.
Specifically, I expect this stronger reaction will increase jurors’ affect towards the
defendant. However, I expect jurors to perceive disclosure of strategic CSR activities to
be incentive-inconsistent during litigation, since the company has no incentive to elicit
perceptions of self-serving motives. Therefore, I do not expect CSR assurance to
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influence jurors’ perceptions of strategic CSR activities. Together, as illustrated in Figure
3.2, I expect CSR assurance to interact with CSR activity type to moderate jurors’
reactions. Formally, I predict the following:
H3: External assurance of CSR disclosure will increase jurors’ affective reaction
to the defendant to a greater extent when receiving disclosure of non-strategic
CSR activities compared to disclosure of strategic CSR activities.
Insert Figure 3.2 About Here
H1 and H2 predict that the CSR activity type influences jurors’ affective reactions
towards the client and their perceptions of intent. However, the main interest of this study
is to examine whether CSR information influences jurors’ negligence assessments. As
predicted in H1, due to differences in perceived motives for undertaking CSR activities, I
expect non-strategic CSR activities to generate more favorable affect towards the
defendant compared to strategic CSR activities. Likewise, H2 predicts jurors receiving
disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities will view the company as a “good” actor and
perceive less intent relative to those receiving disclosure of strategic CSR activities.
Additionally, H3 predicts that external assurance of CSR disclosures detailing nonstrategic activities increases jurors’ affective reactions to the defendant, while having no
effect on disclosure of strategic activities. Therefore, I expect that disclosure of nonstrategic CSR activities will act through these intermediate judgments to reduce jurors’
perceptions of controllability compared to disclosure of strategic CSR activities. 75
Further, I expect the decreased perceptions of controllability resulting from disclosure of
non-strategic activities will reduce jurors’ perceptions of negligence relative to disclosure
of strategic CSR activities. Finally, I expect CSR assurance of non-strategic CSR
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While I do not formally propose hypotheses to test the determinants of jurors’ perceptions of
controllability identified by the CCM, other studies have established the relationship (e.g., Backof 2015).
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information to reduce jurors’ negligence assessments compared to disclosures that are not
assured. Formally, I predict the following ordinal interaction (see Figure 3.3):
H4a: Jurors’ negligence assessments will be lower when receiving disclosure of
non-strategic CSR activities compared to disclosure of strategic CSR activities.
H4b: Jurors’ negligence assessments will be lower when disclosures of nonstrategic CSR activities are externally assured compared to not assured.
Insert Figure 3.3 About Here
Study 2
Factors Influencing Jurors’ Damage Assessments
After jurors determine that the defendant is negligent, they must decide on the
level of damages to award to the plaintiff. Thus, I conduct Study 2 on the sub-sample of
participants who indicate they believe that the defendant is negligent. I ask this group to
assess damages, which come in two forms and serve two distinct purposes. First,
compensatory damages are assessments that are designed to return the plaintiff to a
comparable state prior to the negative event. Compensatory damages therefore consist of
any economic loss that the plaintiff incurred plus some level of damages to compensate
for any noneconomic loss (e.g., pain and suffering) (Greene and Bornstein 2000).
Therefore, compensatory damages should be associated with the severity of the negative
event (Cather, Greene, and Durham 1996). Alternatively, punitive damages are assessed
in order to punish the defendant for their actions and deter the behavior from happening
again (Greene and Bornstein 2000). Therefore, punitive damages should be associated
with the defendant’s conduct prior to the negative event (Cather et al. 1996).
Prior literature examines the factors influencing the level of compensatory
damages awarded by juries to test whether jurors follow the court’s instructions when
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determining damage amounts. 76 In a review of juror decision-making studies, Winter and
Greene (2007) find that the literature consistently supports that the severity of the
negative event influences the level of compensatory damages. This is consistent with the
goal of compensatory damages to return the plaintiff to their pre-negative event state.
However, several studies also find jurors rely on other factors when determining
compensatory damages. For example, Greene et al. (2001) find the defendant’s conduct
prior to a negative event influences the level of compensatory damages. More recently,
Cass, Levett, and Kovera (2010) also find the severity of organizational behavior is
associated with the compensatory damage awards. Likewise, Backof (2015) finds that the
auditor’s workpaper documentation (i.e., the auditor’s behavior leading up to the negative
event) influences the level of damage awards.
In their review, Winter and Greene (2007) suggest a “simulation heuristic” takes
place during jurors’ compensatory damage assessments that involves jurors evaluating
the events and constructing alternative scenarios. Likewise, Reffett (2010) relies on
counterfactual reasoning theory when examining jurors’ compensatory judgments in the
auditor negligence literature and finds that the level of counterfactual intensity influences
damage assessments. In other words, the more jurors consider alternative scenarios that
the auditor could have done to prevent the negative event, the greater compensatory
damages awarded. Also in the auditor negligence literature, Lowe et al. (2002) find that
the defendant’s ability to pay influences the level of damages as audit firms with “deeper
pockets” are assessed higher levels of damages.
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For additional information on the instructions jurors receive, refer to the Federal Civil Jury Instructions
of the Seventh Circuit (Seventh Circuit 2015).
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As described above, punitive damages are designed to punish and deter bad
behavior. Therefore, the defendant’s behavior leading up to the negative event should be
associated with the level of punitive damages (Cather et al. 1996). Cass et al. (2010)
support this, as they find organizational behavior influences punitive awards in a sexual
harassment case. In a similar context to the current study, Lee and Sweeney (2015)
examine the influence of environmental disclosure on punitive damage awards. They find
jurors assess lower punitive damages when a company provides disclosures discussing
future abatement and control following environmental malfeasance. Additionally, they
find that the environmental sensitivity of the company moderates this relationship as the
reduced punitive damages are only found in companies that are in a non-environmentally
sensitive industry. Further, they find that trust mediates this relationship. In sum, their
findings suggest that reactive disclosures related to the negative event can influence
jurors’ punitive assessments, but only when jurors perceive trust towards management.
Taken together, prior literature finds compensatory damage assessments are
influenced by the negligence assessment, as well as by four distinct factors: severity of
the negative event, conduct of the defendant prior to the negative event, ability of the
defendant to pay and counterfactual intensity. Punitive damages are influenced by the
defendant’s behavior prior to the negative event and disclosures that build jurors’ trust
towards management. Figure 3.4 depicts a model of the factors influencing jurors’
assessments of compensatory and punitive damages.
Insert Figure 3.4 About Here
Hypotheses Development
Compensatory damages
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As reviewed above, jurors are instructed to award compensatory damages in order
to restore the plaintiff to their initial state. Therefore, the severity of the negative event
(i.e., losses incurred by the defendant) should be the only factor influencing
compensatory damage amounts. This suggests that CSR information should not influence
jurors’ compensatory damage assessments. However, prior literature finds that jurors’
perceptions of bad conduct prior to the negative event influence compensatory damage
levels (Greene et al. 2001), which suggests that jurors make a judgment about the
defendant’s conduct and award greater damages against perceived “bad” actors.
Consistent with the theory argued in Study 1, I expect jurors’ perceptions of the
defendant to be influenced by the perceived motives of why the company practices CSR.
Specifically, I expect jurors to give the company the benefit of the doubt if they view the
company’s CSR motives as other-regarding and will assess lower compensatory damages
when receiving disclosures of non-strategic CSR activities relative to disclosures of
strategic CSR activities that are viewed as self-serving. Formally, I predict the following
(see Figure 3.4):
H5a: Jurors’ compensatory judgments will be lower when receiving disclosure of
non-strategic CSR activities compared to disclosure of strategic CSR activities.
H5a predicts that the CSR activity type influences jurors’ compensatory damage
assessments by providing a signal of the company’s CSR motives. Consistent with the
theoretical motivation developed in Study 1, I expect jurors to view CSR activities
eliciting perceptions of other-regarding CSR motives with skepticism, since the company
has the incentive to use other-regarding CSR motives to manage its perceived
organizational legitimacy. Therefore, I expect the presence of CSR assurance to interact
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with non-strategic CSR activities to provide insurance-like protection against jurors’
compensatory damage assessments. Formally, I predict the following:
H5b: External assurance of CSR disclosure will decrease jurors’ compensatory
damage assessments when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activity, but
will not influence their compensatory damage assessments when receiving
disclosure of strategic CSR activity.
Punitive Damages
Punitive damages serve two purposes. First, punitive damages should punish the
defendant for the specific negative event. Second, punitive damages should serve as a
warning to deter similar negative events from happening again in the future. Lee and
Sweeney (2015) find that following an environmental malfeasance, reactive
environmental disclosures discussing the company’s plans for future abatement and
pollution control decrease jurors’ punitive assessments. Their findings are consistent with
the second purpose of punitive damages and suggest that if jurors perceive the company
has taken steps to prevent a reoccurrence, they reduce their punitive damage assessments.
This study builds on their findings by focusing on the punishment element of punitive
damages by considering whether proactive CSR, unrelated to the negative event, can
provide insurance-like protection against damage awards. Similar to Study 1, I focus on
whether the CSR activity type influences jurors’ perceptions of CSR motives.
Prior literature suggests proactive CSR results in favorable stakeholder
perceptions of the company (e.g., consumers’ attitudes towards the firm) (Groza et al.
2011; Wagner, Lutz, and Weitz 2009; Becker-Olsen, Cudmore, and Hill 2006). Similarly,
I anticipate proactive CSR disclosures will influence jurors’ attitude towards the
defendant, which in turn will influence whether they perceive the company to be a
“good” or “bad” actor. Specifically, I expect jurors will view the company’s motives for
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non-strategic CSR to be other-regarding and determine that the company is a “good”
actor. Therefore, consistent with the legal principle of mens rea, I expect jurors will
assess lower punitive damages when receiving information on non-strategic CSR
activities compared to strategic CSR activities. As noted in Study 1, tension exists in this
prediction as jurors could perceive non-strategic CSR activities as a “greenwashing”
attempt and develop mistrust towards the company. However, I expect jurors will still
assess lower punitive damages when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities
compared to disclosure of strategic CSR activities that are viewed as self-serving.
Formally, I predict the following (see Figure 3.4):
H6a: Jurors’ punitive judgments will be lower when receiving disclosures of nonstrategic CSR activities compared to disclosures of strategic CSR activities.
Lee and Sweeney (2015) find that jurors’ perceived trust toward management
mediates the relationship between environmental disclosures and punitive damage
assessments. This study builds on their study by considering how the credibility of CSR
disclosures influences jurors’ reactions. As developed in Study 1, I expect jurors to view
non-strategic CSR activities as incentive-consistent and discount the credibility of the
information. Further, I expect that CSR assurance will act as a moderator that increases
jurors’ reactions to disclosure of non-strategic activities. Alternatively, I expect jurors
will view strategic CSR activities as incentive-inconsistent since the connection to future
economic benefits does not build moral capital that provides an insurance-like benefit
(Godfrey 2005). Therefore, I do not anticipate that CSR assurance of disclosures
discussing strategic CSR activities will influence jurors’ punitive damage assessments.
Formally, I predict the following (see Figure 3.4):
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H6b: External assurance of CSR disclosures will decrease jurors’ punitive
damage assessments when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activity, but
will not influence their punitive damage assessments when receiving disclosure of
strategic CSR activity.
H6a predicts the non-strategic CSR activities will influence jurors’ punitive
damage assessments since they perceive other-regarding motives. H6b predicts that CSR
assurance will moderate jurors’ reactions to non-strategic CSR disclosure since jurors
discount the credibility of incentive-consistent disclosures. Therefore, H7 predicts that
jurors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility will mediate the moderating relationship
between CSR activity type, CSR assurance and punitive damages. Formally, I predict
(see Figure 3.4):
H7: Jurors’ perceptions of CSR disclosure credibility mediate the moderation of
disclosures of non-strategic CSR activities by CSR assurance in affecting punitive
damages.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN (STUDY 1)
To examine the influence of CSR disclosure on jurors’ negligence assessments, I
use a 2x2 (plus control) between-participants experimental design. The two independent
variables are CSR activity type (strategic versus non-strategic) and CSR assurance
(present versus absent). The primary dependent variables are jurors’ affective reactions to
the defendant, perceptions of intent and assessments of negligence. Characteristics of the
defendant are held constant across all groups in order to isolate the effect of the
independent variables on jurors’ judgments.
Participants
A total of 204 participants were solicited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) and passed screening criteria consistent with the eligibility requirements to sit as
a juror. Consistent with prior studies soliciting juror participants from MTurk (e.g.,
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Maksymov and Nelson 2017; Brasel, Doxey, Grenier, and Reffett 2016; Grenier,
Pomeroy, and Stern 2015b) participants met the following criteria: (1) participants are
over 18 years of age; (2) participants are U.S. citizens; (3) participants consider
themselves proficient in the English language. Consistent with prior studies soliciting
investor participants from MTurk (e.g., Koonce, Leitter, and White 2016; Koonce, Miller,
and Winchel 2015; Asay, Libby, and Rennekamp 2014; Rennekamp 2012), participants
met the following additional criteria: (1) participants are physically located in the United
States; (2) participants have an MTurk approval rate of 95% or higher on at least 50 or
more completed assignments. Similar with recent MTurk juror studies, participants were
paid $2.00 upon completion of the experimental task (e.g., Brasel et al. 2016; Grenier et
al. 2015b).
Experimental Task
The experimental task involves a foodborne illness lawsuit brought against XYZ,
Inc. after a nationwide recall of products due to consumers becoming ill after using their
product. Participants are first given basic background information about the company.
Following the background information, participants are randomly assigned to treatment
groups to receive the experimental manipulations. Participants read a transcript of the
lawsuit where consumers are suing XYZ, Inc. for damages after allegedly suffering
sickness from using XYZ’s product. The plaintiffs claim XYZ, Inc. was negligent by not
following appropriate food safety protocols. The transcript provides participants with
opening and closing statements by the plaintiff and XYZ, Inc., expert testimony and juror
instructions. As part of XYZ’s closing statements, participants are given excerpts from
the XYZ’s most recent CSR report, where the CSR activity type and CSR assurance
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manipulations are included. Participants are then asked to make negligence assessments
(see measured variables below). Next, participants answer additional questions to capture
all factors influencing juror decision-making shown in Figure 3.1. Finally, participants
answer demographic and manipulation check questions.
CSR Activity Type Manipulation
CSR activity type (CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE) is manipulated between strategic and
non-strategic. Strategic CSR activities (CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE =1) are those that result
in future economic benefits to the company by helping to achieve a sustainable
competitive advantage. Participants are provided with an excerpt of the company’s most
recent CSR report detailing the company’s commitment to sustainable business practices.
The disclosures detail the company’s investments in sustainable energy upgrades and
reduction of pollution and waste in its production process. Further, the disclosures specify
the dollar amount invested, the number of years the company has invested in similar
activities. In order to ensure that the connection between the CSR activity and future
economic benefits is salient to participants, the strategic CSR disclosures include explicit
statements explaining how they are expected to contribute to positive future financial
performance. Alternatively, non-strategic activities (CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE =0) are those
without a direct link to future financial performance. Participants are provided an excerpt
from the company’s most recent CSR report detailing the same projects and investments
contained in the strategic manipulation. In addition, to ensure that participants recognize
the other-regarding nature of the non-strategic activities the case explicitly states that the
activities are undertaken by the company without anticipation of any financial benefit.
Both the strategic and non-strategic manipulations include cues to the importance of the
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CSR activities to the company. For example, I provide details of the dollar amount
invested during the most recent year, number of years participating in the cause and the
total amount invested over all years of participation.
CSR Assurance Manipulation
CSR assurance (CSR_ASSURANCE) is manipulated consistent with Cheng et al.
(2015). The assurance present treatment (CSR_ASSURANCE =1) includes a statement
that XYZ, Inc. engaged an independent assurer and that the assurer concluded all
information was fairly reported. In the assurance absent treatment (CSR_ASSURANCE
=0), participants are explicitly informed that XYZ Inc. did not engage an independent
assurer for their CSR disclosures. 77
Measured Variables
Consistent with prior juror research (e.g., Maksymov and Nelson 2017; Brasel et
al. 2016; Backof 2015) I measure jurors’ assessments of negligence in two ways. First,
participants are asked to estimate the likelihood that XYZ, Inc. was negligent using a
101-point scale (0= Not at all likely, 100= Extremely likely) (NEGLIGENCE_SCALE).
Second, participants are asked to respond to a dichotomous measure of negligence (0=
Not negligent, 1= Negligent) (VERDICT).
In order to consider how CSR influences jurors’ negligence assessments, I capture
measures included in the CCM (Figure 3.1). Following Backof (2015), I measure the
three identified intermediate judgments on 11-point scales: CAUSATION (0= Not at all
the cause, 10= Completely the cause), FORESEEABILITY (0= Not at all foreseeable, 10=
Completely foreseeable), and INTENTIONALITY (0= Not at all intended, 10=
77

Brown-Liburd and Zamora (2015) omit any mention of CSR assurance in the CSR assurance absent
treatment. However, in an effort to ensure participants attend to the assurance manipulation I include an
explicit statement.
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Completely intended). Consistent with Backof (2015) and Alicke (2000), these three
intermediate judgments load on a single factor that acts as my measure of jurors’
perceptions of controllability (CCM_CONTROL). Following Backof (2015) and Reffett
(2010), to measure jurors’ direct spontaneous reaction to the case, I first measure
participants’ feelings toward the defendant and plaintiffs on 11-point scales (0= Very
strong negative feelings, 10= Very strong positive feelings). Next, I subtract feelings
toward the plaintiffs from feelings toward the defendant, which results in the measure of
spontaneous reaction to the case (-10= Very pro-plaintiff, 10= Very pro-defendant)
(REACTION_CASE). Finally, I follow Backof (2015) in measuring the spontaneous
reaction to the defendant by asking participants to rate their impression of the company
(0= Very unfavorable, 10= Very favorable) (AFFECT_DEF) and how much blame the
company deserves (0= None of the blame, 10= All of the blame) (BLAME).
To capture participants’ perceptions of the CSR motives of the company, I follow
Groza et al. (2011), who measure consumer attributions. Participants respond to six
questions to measure their perceptions of motives on 11-point scales (0= highly unlikely,
10= highly likely). To measure perceptions of other-regarding motives, participants are
asked whether the company has a long-term interest in society, whether the company
believes in the CSR cause and whether the company is trying to give something back to
the community. Participants’ responses to these three questions load on a single factor
that I use as my measure of perceptions of other-regarding CSR motives
(OTHER_REGARDING). To measure perceptions of self-serving motives, participants
are asked whether the company will get more customers, will keep more of their
customers and whether they hope to increase profits by supporting the CSR initiatives.
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Participants’ responses to these three questions load on a single factor that I use as my
measure of perceptions of self-serving CSR motives (SELF_SERVING). Finally, I
measure participants’ perceptions on credibility of the CSR disclosure on a 11-point scale
(0= Very doubtful, 10= Very believable) (CREDIBILITY).
IV. RESULTS (STUDY 1)
Manipulation Checks
A total of 204 participants passed the screening requirements and completed
Study 1. To verify that participants attended to the CSR assurance manipulation, the
experimental materials asked participants whether the company engaged an independent
accounting firm to audit its CSR disclosures. A total of 22 (10.8%) of participants failed
this memory check question and were removed from the sample. The final sample
comprises 182 participants with cell sizes ranging from 40 to 50. 78 To ensure that that
CSR assurance manipulation had the intended effect, the experimental materials
measured jurors’ perceptions of the believability of the CSR disclosure (CREDIBILITY).
Consistent with expectations, jurors in the assurance present treatment group perceived
the disclosure as more believable (mean= 7.36) than those in the assurance absent
treatment (mean= 5.76; one tailed p< 0.01). The results suggest that the CSR
manipulation was successful and jurors perceive the credibility enhancing effect of CSR
assurance. 79
To ensure that the CSR activity type manipulation had the intended effect, the
experimental materials asked three questions measuring participants’ perceptions of
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I also collected a control group of 47 participants that did not receive either of the manipulations.
Interestingly, jurors in the assurance absent treatment still perceived above average (i.e., greater than the
midpoint of the scale) credibility of the CSR disclosures. This suggests that other contextual factors present
in this case influenced jurors’ perceptions of credibility.
79
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other-regarding CSR motives. Participants’ responses to the three questions load on a
single factor (eigenvalue 2.543) (OTHER_REGARDING). Consistent with expectations,
participants in the non-strategic CSR activity treatment perceived a higher level of otherregarding CSR motives (mean= 0.18) compared to participants in the strategic CSR
activity treatment (mean= -0.16; one tailed p= 0.009). 80 To further examine whether the
manipulation was successful, participants were asked three questions measuring their
perceptions of self-serving CSR motives. Participants’ responses load on a single factor
(eigenvalue 1.389) (SELF_SERVING). Consistent with expectations, participants in the
strategic CSR activity treatment perceived a higher level of self-serving CSR motives
(mean= 0.15) compared to participants in the non-strategic CSR activity treatment
(mean= -0.16; one tailed p= 0.011). Together, the results suggest that the CSR activity
type manipulation was successful. 81
Descriptive Statistics
The final sample of 182 participants is 55 percent male, and 74 percent are
between the ages of 25-44. In addition, 81 percent of the participants have never served
on a jury before. 82 In terms of education, 38 percent have a high school diploma and 35
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I also performed t-tests comparing participants’ perceptions of other-regarding CSR motives for each of
the three questions. For each question participants receiving non-strategic CSR disclosures perceived a
higher level of other-regarding CSR motives at the 0.05 level.
81
To further ensure the manipulations were successful, the experimental materials asked two questions
measuring participants’ perceptions of the connection between CSR activities and future financial
performance, and whether the company practices CSR activities to be a good corporate citizen (both
measured as 0= Highly unlikely, 10= Highly likely). Consistent with expectations, participants in the
strategic CSR activity treatment found it more likely that the company practices CSR to improve future
financial performance (mean= 7.04) than those in the non-strategic CSR activity treatment (mean= 5.48, t=
4.28, one-tailed p < 0.01). Also, participants in the non-strategic CSR activity treatment found it more
likely that the company practices CSR to be a good corporate citizen (mean= 5.99) than those in the
strategic CSR activity treatment (mean= 4.73, t= 3.26, one-tailed p < 0.01).
82
The high percentage of participants without prior jury service is consistent with prior studies using
MTurk participants (e.g., Grenier et al. 2015b). Also, prior juror studies often rely on undergraduate
students, who are not likely to have prior jury service due to limited years of eligibility. However, Kadous
(2001) finds that student judgments are similar to judgments of participants selected for jury duty.
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percent have a bachelor’s degree. On average, participants have taken 1.25 college-level
accounting and 0.82 college-level finance courses. Participants have limited professional
experience as CPAs (mean= 0.05 years), lawyers (mean= 0.10 years), or investors
(mean= 0.65 years). Finally, participants rate themselves as average in their CSR
knowledge (mean= 4.97, where 0= Below average, 10= Above average) and slightly
above average in their sustainability consciousness (mean= 6.35, where 0= Not at all
conscious, 10= Very conscious). Table 3.1 displays summary statistics for the dependent
and control variables and Table 3.2 displays the correlation matrix.
Insert Tables 3.1 and 3.2 About Here
Hypothesis Testing
CSR Activity Type and Affective Reactions; Test of H1
H1 predicts that jurors’ affective reactions to the defendant will be more favorable
when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities compared to disclosure of
strategic CSR activities. Table 3.3 Panel A reports the least square means of participants’
affective reaction to the defendant is 5.92 when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR
activities compared to 5.35 when receiving disclosure of strategic CSR activities. Table
3.3 Panel B reports the ANCOVA model that shows this difference in means is
significant (F=4.27, p=0.020). Thus, H1 is supported, as consistent with expectations,
jurors have a more favorable affective response to the defendant when disclosure
indicates that CSR actives are non-strategic relative to strategic.
Insert Table 3.3 About Here
CSR Activity Type and Intentionality; Test of H2
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H2 predicts that jurors’ perceptions of intentionality will be lower when receiving
disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities compared to receiving disclosure of strategic
CSR activities. Table 3.4 Panel A reports the least square means of participants’
perceptions of intentionality is 0.43 when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR
activities compared to 0.49 when receiving disclosure of strategic CSR activities. Table
3.4 Panel B reports the ANCOVA model that shows the difference in means is not
significant (F=0.12, p=0.725), suggesting H2 is not supported. Thus, in this setting
jurors’ perceptions of intentionality do not differ when receiving disclosure of nonstrategic CSR activities compared to disclosure of strategic CSR activities. 83
Insert Table 3.4 About Here
CSR Activity Type, CSR Assurance and Affective Reactions; Test of H3
H3 predicts an ordinal interaction where CSR assurance increases jurors’ affective
reaction to the defendant when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities. Table
3.3 Panel B reports the ANCOVA model that shows the interaction is significant
(F=3.92, p= .049). To formally test H3, I perform contrast analysis as reported in Table
3.3 Panel C (t=1.37, p=0.171). 84 Thus, the predicted ordinal interaction for H3 is not
supported. To further examine the significant interaction reported in Table 3.3 and shown
in Figure 3.5, I perform follow-up simple effect comparisons of the cell means. Table 3.3
Panel A shows that when receiving disclosures of non-strategic CSR activities jurors’
affective reactions are 6.27 when assurance is absent and 5.57 when assurance is present.

83

I also examine whether the CSR activity type and CSR assurance influence FORESEEABILITY and
CAUSATION. I find marginal support (p= 0.055) of a CSR assurance main effect on FORESEEABILITY
suggesting that jurors perceive the negative event as less foreseeable when CSR disclosure is assured. I find
no influence of CSR activity type and CSR assurance on CAUSATION.
84
Contrast weights are +3 for non-strategic, assured; +1 for non-strategic, not assured; -2 for strategic,
assured; -2 for strategic, not assured.
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Panel C shows that this difference in means is marginally significant (t=-1.75, p= 0.082).
However, assurance does not influence jurors’ affective response to strategic disclosures
(p= 0.304). Further, Panel A shows that when assurance is absent jurors’ affective
reactions when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities are 6.27 and 5.15
when receiving disclosure of strategic CSR activities. Panel C reports that this difference
is significant (t= 2.83, p= 0.005). Thus, results suggest that jurors have the most favorable
affective reaction when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities that are not
assured. This is contrary to expectations and suggests that not all jurors react to the
credibility-enhancing effect of assurance in the same way as capital market participants
and instead consider other contextual factors when judging the credibility of disclosures.
To further analyze this unexpected result, I consider the theoretical construct
underlying the assurance manipulation by splitting the sample at the mean of
CREDIBILITY, and estimating the ANCOVA model shown in Table 3.3 Panel B with
this new variable (PERC_CREDIBILITY) interacted with CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE.
Untabulated results show significant main effects for both CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE (p=
0.051) and PERC_CREDIBILITY (p< 0.01). However, the interaction is not significant
(p= 0.389). This suggests that participants have more favorable affective reactions to nonstrategic CSR activities (mean= 5.87) relative to strategic CSR activities (mean= 5.38),
and reactions are more favorable when participants perceive high disclosure credibility
(mean= 6.18) relative to low disclosure credibility (mean= 4.86). Combined, results
suggest that jurors in this setting are not uniform in recognizing the credibility-enhancing
effect of CSR assurance and perceptions of credibility are likely influenced by other
factors of the case.
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Insert Figure 3.5 About Here
CSR Activity Type, CSR Assurance and Negligence Assessments; Test of H4a and H4b
H1 through H3 examine how CSR activity type and CSR assurance influence
jurors’ intermediate judgments of the CCM model. H4a and H4b examine whether the
influence of CSR on jurors’ intermediate judgments extends to their negligence
assessments. H4a predicts that disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities will reduce
jurors’ negligence assessments relative to disclosure of strategic CSR activities. Table 3.5
Panel A reports the least square means of participants’ perceptions of negligence is 52.66
when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities compared to 48.22 when
receiving disclosure of strategic CSR activities. Table 3.5 Panel B reports the ANCOVA
model that shows the difference in means is not significant (F=1.77, p=0.185), suggesting
H4a is not supported. Results suggest that non-strategic CSR activities do not provide
incremental protection against perceptions of negligence compared to strategic CSR
activities.
Insert Table 3.5 About Here
H4b predicts that CSR assurance will interact with the CSR activity type, as jurors
will recognize that non-strategic CSR activities are incentive-consistent and therefore
have reduced perceptions of credibility. Further, the reduced perceptions of credibility
will limit the insurance-like protection from non-strategic CSR activities on jurors’
negligence assessments. Table 3.5 Panel B reports the ANCOVA model that shows the
interaction is not significant (F=0.01, p=0.925), suggesting H4b is not supported (see
Figure 3.6 Panel A). Therefore, results suggest that even though CSR disclosure
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influences jurors’ intermediate judgments identified in the CCM, the effects do not
directly influence jurors’ negligence assessments. 85
Insert Figure 3.6 About Here
In sum, results show that the manipulations had the intended effect as nonstrategic CSR activities elicited higher perceptions of other-regarding CSR motives and
CSR assurance elicited higher perceptions of disclosure credibility. Consistent with
predictions, disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities generated more favorable affect
towards the defendant relative to disclosure of strategic CSR activities. Further, CSR
assurance moderates the effect of non-strategic CSR activities on jurors’ affective
reactions, but not consistent with expectations. Additional analysis suggests that even
though CSR assurance elicits higher perceptions of disclosure credibility, jurors also
consider other credibility cues. Finally, the CCM suggests that since the manipulations
are influencing intermediate judgments that impact should flow through to the jurors’
negligence assessment. However, the results suggest that the manipulations do not have a
strong enough influence on the elements of the CCM model to directly influence jurors’
negligence assessment.
V. RESEARCH DESIGN (STUDY 2)
Study 2 extends Study 1 by examining the influence of CSR disclosure on jurors’
compensatory and punitive damage assessments. Of the 182 participants from Study 1, 83

85
To further support examine this conclusion, I examine participants’ responses to the dichotomous
variable VERDICT in the control group compared those in the treatment groups. In the control group 55.3
percent of participants judged the company to be negligent compared to 45.6 percent of participants in all
other treatment groups. The difference is not significant (p= 0.236). Further, participants’ perception of
negligence captured by the NEGLIGENCE_SCALE is 51.60 for control group and 50.33 for all treatment
groups. The difference is not significant (p= 0.801).
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determined the company was negligent and continued to Study 2. 86 To examine the
influence of CSR disclosure on jurors’ damage assessments, I use a 2x2 (plus control)
between-participants experimental design. The two independent variables are
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE

activity

type

(strategic

versus

non-strategic)

and

CSR_ASSURANCE (present versus absent). Characteristics of the defendant are held
constant across all groups in order to isolate the effect of the independent variables on
jurors’ judgments.
Measured Variables
In order to determine the influence of CSR activity type and CSR assurance on
jurors’ damage assessments, Study 1 participants who judge XYZ, Inc. to be negligent
are asked three additional questions that assess compensatory damages and punitive
damages. Compensatory damages (COMPENSATORY) are measured between $0 and $10
million, which the case materials cite as the amount of losses incurred by the plaintiffs.
Following Lee and Sweeney (2015), I capture punitive damages (PUNITIVE) using an
11-point scale (0= zero times compensatory damages, 10= ten times the compensatory
damages). Participants also respond to questions that measure other factors that influence
damage assessments as shown in Figure 3.4. Participants rate their perceptions of the
company’s behavior leading up to the negative event on an 11-point scale (0= Very bad,
10= Very good) (BEHAVIOR). Participants also rate their perceptions on the significance
of the food safety recall on an 11-point scale (0= Not at all significant, 10= Very
significant) (NEG_SIGNIFICANCE). I follow Reffett (2010) and measure counterfactual
intensity by asking participants how frequently they thought about what the company
86

The mean negligence assessment for participants that only complete Study 1 (n= 99) is 25.92 and the
mean negligence assessment for those in that complete Study 2 (n= 83) is 79.46 and the difference is
significant (p<0.000).
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could have done differently to prevent the negative event on an 11-point scale (0= Never
thought about it, 10= Frequently thought about it) (COUNTER_FREQ), as well as the
strength of their thoughts on an 11-point scale (0= Not very strong, 10= Very strong)
(COUNTER_STRENGTH). Also, participants provide their perceptions on the company’s
ability to pay the assessed damages on an 11-point scale (0= Highly unlikely, 10= Highly
likely) (ABILITY_PAY). Finally, participants are asked to provide their motivation for
their punitive damage assessment on an 11-point scale (0= Punishment motived, 10=
Deterrence motivated) (DET_PUNISH).
VI. RESULTS (STUDY 2)
Manipulation Checks
To ensure participants in Study 2 attended to the CSR activity type manipulation,
I compared participants’ perceptions of CSR motives across treatment groups. Consistent
with Study 1, Study 2 participants perceived greater other-regarding CSR motives when
receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR (mean= -0.02) compared to those receiving
disclosure of strategic CSR (mean= -0.36; one tailed p= 0.072). However, unlike Study 1
participants in Study 2 did not perceive a difference in self-serving motives when
receiving disclosure of strategic CSR activities (mean= 0.24) compared to non-strategic
CSR activities (mean= 0.09; one tailed p= 0.21). Also, Study 2 participants in the CSR
assurance present condition perceived higher disclosure credibility (mean= 6.63)
compared to participants in the assurance absent treatment (mean= 4.58; one tailed p<
0.01).
Descriptive Statistics
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Of the final sample 61 percent are male, and 73 percent are between the ages of
25-44. In addition, 80 percent of the participants have never served on a jury before. In
terms of education, 37 percent have a high school diploma and 36 percent have a
bachelor’s degree. On average, participants have taken 1.19 college-level accounting and
0.86 college-level finance courses. Participants have limited professional experience as
CPAs (mean= 0.11 years), lawyers (mean= 0.11 years), or investors (mean= 0.92 years).
Finally, participants rate themselves as average in their CSR knowledge (mean= 4.69,
where 0= Below average, 10= Above average) and slightly above average in their
sustainability consciousness (mean= 6.59, where 0= Not at all conscious, 10= Very
conscious). Overall, the demographics of the participants is similar with Study 1. Table
3.6 displays summary statistics for the dependent and control variables and Table 3.7
displays the correlation matrix.
Insert Tables 3.6 and 3.7 About Here
Hypothesis Testing
CSR Activity Type and Compensatory Damages; Tests of H5a and H5b
H5a predicts that jurors’ compensatory damage assessments will be lower when
receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities compared to receiving disclosure of
strategic CSR activities. Table 3.8 Panel A reports the least square means of participants
receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities is 7.43 compared to 7.01 for those
receiving disclosure of strategic CSR activities. Table 3.8 Panel B reports the ANCOVA
model that shows this difference is not significant (p= 0.387), and Panel C shows the
follow-up simple effect comparison is also not significant (t=0.87; p= 0.387). The results
suggest that H5a is not supported.
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Insert Table 3.8 About Here
H5b predicts that CSR assurance will interact with CSR activity type to reduce
jurors’ compensatory damage assessments when receiving disclosure of non-strategic
CSR activities. Table 3.8 Panel B reports the ANCOVA model that shows a marginally
significant interaction (F= 2.85; p= 0.096). To formally test H5b, I perform contrast
analysis as reported in Table 3.8 Panel C (t=1.93, p= 0.058). 87 To analyze whether the
interaction follows the predicted ordinal pattern, I follow Guggenmos, Piercey, and
Agoglia (2016) and examine the pattern of means, as well as the semi-omnibus F-test of
the residual between-cells variance. As shown in Figure 3.7, the data do not match the
hypothesized pattern. Further, the semi-omnibus F-Test is significant (p = 0.06). Thus,
the predicted ordinal interaction for H5b is not supported.
To further examine the significant interaction reported in Table 3.8 and shown in
Figure 3.7, I perform follow-up simple effect comparisons of the cell means. Table 3.8
Panel A shows that when receiving disclosures of non-strategic CSR activities jurors’
compensatory damage assessments are 8.35 when assurance is absent and 6.45 when
assurance is present. Panel C shows that this difference in means is significant (t=2.86,
p= 0.003). However, when receiving disclosures of strategic CSR activities jurors’
compensatory damage assessments are 7.17 when assurance is absent and 6.83 when
assurance is present, and this difference is not significant (t= 0.58, p= 0.560). This
suggests that assurance significantly influences jurors’ assessments when receiving
disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities, but has no effect on assessments when jurors
receive disclosure of strategic CSR activities. Further, Panel C shows that when
assurance is absent the difference between compensatory damage assessments when
87

Contrast weights are -3 for non-strategic, assured; +1 for all other treatment groups.
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receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities (mean= 8.35) is significantly higher
than when receiving disclosure of strategic CSR activities (mean= 7.17) (t= -1.81, p=
0.074). However, when assurance is present the difference between damage assessments
when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities (mean= 6.45) is not different
than when receiving disclosure of strategic CSR activities (mean= 6.83) (t= 0.52; p=
0.607). Together, the results suggest that jurors recognize the company’s incentive to
report non-strategic CSR activities as a means to protect its organizational legitimacy
during litigation, and assess the highest compensatory damage assessments when the
disclosures are not assured. Further, the value of assurance appears to be economically
significant as the mean compensatory assessment is $1.90 million higher when disclosure
of non-strategic activities is not assured, which is equivalent to 19 percent of the
maximum compensatory assessment.
Insert Figure 3.7 About Here
CSR Activity Type, CSR Assurance and Punitive Damage Assessments; Test of H6a
and H6b
Similar to H5a, H6a predicts that jurors’ punitive damage assessments will be
lower when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities relative to receiving
disclosure of strategic CSR activities. Table 3.9 Panel A reports the least square means
for punitive damage assessments is 2.71 for those receiving disclosure of non-strategic
CSR activities and 3.04 for those receiving disclosure of strategic CSR activities. Table
3.9 Panel B reports the ANCOVA model that shows this difference is not significant (p=
0.408). Thus, H6a is not supported.
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H6b predicts that the CSR activity type will interact with CSR assurance to
influence punitive damage assessments. Table 3.9 Panel B reports the ANCOVA model
that shows a significant interaction (F=4.93; p= 0.029). Table 3.9 Panel C shows the
planned contrast results that support the predicted ordinal interaction (t= 2.46; p= 0.008).
Further, Figure 3.8 shows that results visually support the predicted ordinal interaction,
and the semi-omnibus F-test is not significant (p= 0.395). Thus, H6b is supported.
Overall, results suggest that non-strategic CSR can reduce jurors’ punitive damage
assessments, but only if it is assured. Further, the reduction in punitive damage
assessments appears to be economically significant, as disclosure of non-strategic
activities that are not assured result in punitive assessments that are 230 percent higher
compared to disclosure that is assured. 88
Insert Figure 3.8 About Here
Insert Table 3.9 About Here
Credibility as Mediator; Test of H7
H7 predicts that jurors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility will mediate the
moderating relationship between CSR activity type and CSR assurance. Therefore, I
follow Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005) and estimate the following three regression
models.
Model 1

Punitive Damage Award= β10 + β11 CSR Activity Type + β12 CSR
Assurance + β13 CSR Activity Type*CSR Assurance + Ɛ1

Model 2

Perceived Disclosure Credibility= β20 + β21 CSR Activity Type +
β22 CSR Assurance + β23 CSR Activity Type*CSR Assurance + Ɛ2

88

The punitive damage assessment judgement is a multiplier of the compensatory damage assessment. To
calculate economic significance, I multiplied the mean punitive damage assessment by the mean
compensatory damage assessment before calculating the economic significance.
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Model 3

Punitive Damage Award= β30 + β31 CSR Activity Type + β32 CSR
Assurance + β33 CSR Activity Type*CSR Assurance + β34
Credibility + β35 Credibility*CSR Assurance + Ɛ3

Following Muller et al. (2005), mediated moderation occurs if the following three
conditions exist: (1) overall moderation of CSR activity type exists (β13 ≠ 0 and
significant); (2) both β23 and β34 are significant; (3) moderation of CSR activity type, β33,
should be smaller than β13 in the case of partial mediated moderation (β13 will become
non-significant in the case of full mediated moderation). Table 3.10 reports the result of
the three regression models. Model 1 reports the significant effect of the CSR activity
type and CSR assurance interaction on jurors’ punitive damage assessments (one tailed
p= 0.015) and Model 2 reports that the interaction is marginally significant when
credibility is the dependent variable (one-tailed p= 0.074). Finally, Model 3 reports that
the main effect of credibility is significant (one-tailed p= 0.002) and the CSR activity
type and CSR assurance interaction is smaller. Thus, results support H7 and suggest
credibility partially mediates the moderation of CSR assurance on CSR activity type.
Insert Table 3.10 About Here
The findings of Study 2 suggest that CSR activity type and CSR assurance
interact to influence both compensatory and punitive damage assessments. Specifically,
non-strategic CSR activities only reduce the damage assessment level when CSR
assurance is present. Thus, jurors recognize a company’s incentive to disclosure nonstrategic CSR activities when facing litigation and discount the disclosure, unless
assurance is present. Further, the moderation is partially mediated by credibility. This
finding is consistent with other juror studies that suggest credibility of the information
presented to jurors is important in the trial setting.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This paper examines whether CSR information influences jurors’ judgements for
a non-related issue. Specifically, I examine whether the CSR activity type and CSR
assurance influence jurors’ negligence, compensatory damage and punitive damage
assessments. Results from Study 1 suggest that the CSR activity type and CSR assurance
do elicit the theoretical constructs predicted to influence jurors’ decisions; non-strategic
CSR activity is associated with greater perceptions of other-regarding CSR motives and
CSR assurance is associated with greater perceptions of credibility. Further, the
experimental manipulations have a direct effect on jurors’ affective reaction to the
defendant. However, the experimental manipulations do not have a direct effect on
jurors’ perceptions of intentionality or negligence assessments, implying that indirect
effects of activity type and assurance flow through participants’ affective reactions
towards the defendant. Findings are consistent with prior literature that finds CSR
disclosure can provide insurance-like protection from negative reactions of consumers
(e.g., Klein and Dawar 2004) and investors (e.g., Christensen 2016; Groening and Kanuri
2016; Zahller et al. 2015; Godfrey et al. 2009) following a negative event.
Results from Study 2 suggest that for those jurors believing the company to be
negligent, damage assessments are influenced by CSR activity type and CSR assurance.
For this subset of jurors, CSR activity type and CSR assurance interact to influence the
level of compensatory damages; i.e., jurors award the highest level of compensatory
damages when receiving disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities that are not assured.
This is consistent with jurors recognizing the company’s incentive of disclosing nonstrategic CSR activities when faced with litigation in order to increase its perceived
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organizational legitimacy (i.e., a “greenwashing” attempt), and penalize the company to a
greater extent. Results suggest that if a company undertakes non-strategic CSR activities,
the activities will not provide protection against compensatory damages unless they are
assured. Further, Study 2 finds that the highest level of insurance-like protection against
punitive damages occurs when jurors receive disclosure of non-strategic CSR activities
that is assured. Further, this relationship is mediated by jurors’ perceptions of credibility.
This finding is contrary to literature examining other stakeholder groups that absent a
negative event investors prefer strategic CSR activities (Cheng et al. 2015). This suggests
that jurors are more concerned with non-strategic CSR activities (i.e., potential
greenwashing attempt) than strategic CSR activities. Overall, Study 2 finds support that
CSR disclosure can provide insurance-like protection during the damage assessment
phase of a trial and this protection is economically significant.
Study 1 and Study 2 provide several important contributions to the literature.
First, I extend the literature that relies on the CCM by finding that CSR disclosure can
influence jurors’ intermediate judgments that are part of the CCM. Second, I extend the
CSR literature that finds stakeholders’ perceptions of CSR motives influence their
reactions by examining an additional stakeholder group. Study 1 finds that perceptions of
other-regarding CSR motives is an important predictor of juror behavior. Third, this study
contributes to the CSR assurance literature by examining a new stakeholder group not
previously considered. Findings suggest that the credibility-enhancing benefit of CSR
assurance found for investors does not extend to jurors during the negligence phase of the
trial, but does when assessing damages. Further, findings suggest that CSR assurance can
increase credibility in the litigation setting, not previously studied, but does not always
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help litigation outcomes (i.e., negligence assessments). Thus, this study provides
additional insight into the benefits of CSR assurance. Finally, this study builds on Lee
and Sweeney 2015 by finding that the CSR activity type and CSR assurance influence
punitive damage assessments.
These studies also provide implications to practice. First, the findings of Study 1
suggest that companies can create a more positive affective reaction for jurors by
undertaking non-strategic CSR activity. This is contrary to the findings in Part II of this
dissertation that suggests investors react similarly to strategic or non-strategic CSR
activities following a negative event. Therefore, companies should continue non-strategic
CSR activities since they can still create value for the company during litigation. This
suggestion is further supported in Study 2, which finds jurors award the lowest level of
punitive damages to non-strategic CSR activities that are assured. Further, the findings of
Study 2 show the importance of CSR assurance in the litigation setting. Thus, companies
need to consider the benefits that CSR assurance provides during litigation when
determining whether the benefits of purchasing assurance outweigh the costs.
This study has several limitations that provide opportunities for future research.
First, this study assumes CSR information is presented to jurors as part of the closing
statements of the trial. Future research could examine whether the timing of when jurors
are presented CSR information influences their reactions. Further, future research could
examine whether jurors’ opinions about the CSR initiatives of a company (i.e., the
company’s CSR reputation) prior to the trial influence their decision-making. Second, the
current study uses a unitary trial format (all evidence is shown to jurors at one time).
However, prior research suggests that a bifurcated trial format (evidence for
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compensatory versus punitive damages is presented separately) influences damage
assessments (e.g., Adams and Bourgeois 2006). Future research could alter the trial
format to explore whether CSR information has the same effect across the various
formats. Third, results suggest that jurors behave differently than investors, but it is
unclear whether this difference in behavior is due to the different stakeholder group or the
negative event context present in this study. Future research could manipulate the
presence or absence of a negative event to examine how the negative event context
influences other stakeholder groups (i.e., investors). Finally, the current study presents
jurors with two disclosures from the company’s CSR report. Future research could
examine whether providing jurors with larger amounts of CSR disclosures alters their
reactions.
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Figure 2.1
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Figure 2.3
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Figure 2.4
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>
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Figure 2.5

Graphical Representation of Results of the Interaction of
Negative Event and CSR Assurance
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Figure 2.6

Graphical Representation of Results of the Interaction of
Negative Event, CSR Activity Type and CSR Assurance
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Figure 3.1

Study 1: Model of Jurors’ Evaluations of Negligence

Affective Reaction
to the Defendant
(-)

(-)
(-)

Causation

Foreseeability

(+)

(+)

Intentionality

(+)

Controllability
Controllability

(-)

Direct Spontaneous
Reaction to the Case

(+)

Negligence
Assessment

Notes: Figure 3.1 represents the Culpable Control Model as adapted by Backof (2015).
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Figure 3.2

Study 1: Graphical Representation of Expected Interaction
H3: CSR activity type X CSR Assurance Interaction

Jurors' Affective
Reactions to
Defendant

Assurance absent
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Figure 3.3
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Study 1: Graphical Representation of Expected Interaction
H4a and H4b: CSR activity type X CSR Assurance Interaction
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Assurance present
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Figure 3.4

Study 2: Factors Influencing Jurors’ Compensatory and
Punitive Damage Assessments
(+)

Counterfactual
Intensity

Perceived
Disclosure
Credibility

CSR Activity Type
CSR Assurance

(+)
H5a (+)

Ability to Pay

H5b (+)

H7 (-)
H6a (-)

H6b (+)

(+)

Negligence
Assessment

(+)

Compensatory
Damages

(+)

Punitive Damages

(+)
Severity of Negative
Event

(+)
(+)

Bad Conduct Prior
to Negative Event

Notes: Figure 3.4 represents factors identified in prior literature that influence compensatory and
puntive damages. The righthand side of the diagram (shaded boxes) is adapted from Lee and
Sweeney (2015) who examine the influence of the presence of environmental disclosure, industry
and trust on the level of punitive damages.
Counterfactual intensity refers to the level of thought jurors’ give to alternative scenarios where
the negative event would not have occurred.
Ability to pay refers to whether the defendant as the means to make a significant damages
payment.
Negligence assessment refers to the carry-over effect of the level of perceived negligence
Severity of the negative event refers to the level of losses incurred by the plaintiff.
Bad conduct prior to the negative event refers to jurors’ perceptions of the reprehensibilty of the
defendants conduct leading up to the negative event.
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Figure 3.5

Study 1: Graphical Representations of Results
H3: CSR Activity Type X CSR Assurance
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Study 1: Graphical Representations of Results
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Figure 3.7

Study 2: Graphical Representation of Results
H5b: CSR Activity Type X CSR Assurance
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Study 2: Graphical Representation of Results
H6b: CSR Activity Type X CSR Assurance
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Table 1.1

Summary of Reviewed Studies by Journal and Year
1970's

1980's

1990's

2000's

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

Accounting, Organizations and Society

2

6

6

7

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

27

The Accounting Review

0

0

0

1

0

1

2

0

4

0

1

9

Accounting Horizons

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

2

Journal of Information Systems

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

1

3

Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

6

0

7

Accounting and the Public Interest

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

2

Journal of Management Accounting Research

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

3

Journal of International Accounting Research

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

Contemporary Accounting Research

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Behavioral Research in Accounting

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

2

0

3

Journal of Accounting and Economics

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Current Issues in Auditing

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

2

Total

2

6

6

8

1

4

5

3

8

9

9

62
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Table 2.1

VALUATION_1
DESIRABILITY_1
VALUATION_2
DESIRABILITY_2
ΔVALUATION
ΔDESIRABILITY
FCF_CONNECTION
ETHICS
CSR_MOTIVES
FIN_HEALTH
CREDIBILITY

Summary Statistics
Number of
observations
399
399
399
399
399
399
399
399
399
399
399

MEAN

MEDIAN

39.63
36.92
39.00
35.23
-0.73
-1.73
6.28
7.15
6.04
4.93
7.03

39.00
35.00
39.00
32.00
0.00
0.00
6.67
7.16
6.15
5.00
7.13

STD

MIN

MAX

18.29
22.68
20.45
24.29
17.01
19.73
2.63
2.37
2.53
2.06
2.60

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-53.00
-62.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
52.00
59.00
11.00
11.00
11.00
11.00
11.00

Notes: Table 2.1 displays the dependent and control variables used in the analysis. The variables are
defined as follows:
VALUATION_1 measures participants’ initial valuation judgments after receiving background information
on the company, but before receiving the manipulations.
DESIRABILITY_1 measures participants’ perceptions of investment desirability after receiving background
information on the company, but before receiving the manipulations.
VALUATION_2 measures participants’ valuation judgments after receiving the manipulations.
DESIRABILITY_2 measures participants’ perceptions of investment desirability after receiving the
manipulations.
ΔVALUATION measures the change in participants’ valuation judgments and is calculated as updated
valuation less initial valuation.
ΔDESIRABILITY measures the change in participants’ perceptions of investment desirability and is
calculated as updated desirability less initial desirability.
FCF_CONNECTION measures participants’ perceptions of the connection between the company’s CSR
activities and future financial performance.
ETHICS measures participants’ perceptions of the connection between the company’s CSR activities and
the ethical culture of the company.
CSR_MOTIVES measures participants’ perceptions of the connection between the company’s CSR
activities and its desire to be a good corporate citizen.
FIN_HEALTH measures participants’ perceptions of the financial health of the company.
CREDIBILITY measures participants’ perceptions of CSR disclosure credibility.
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Table 2.2

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

Correlation Matrix

ΔVALUATION
ΔDESIRABILITY
NEGATIVE_EVENT
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE
CSR_ASSURANCE
FCF_CONNECTION
ETHICS
CSR_MOTIVES
FIN_HEALTH
CREDIBILITY

(1)
1
0.692***
-0.316***
0.060
0.138**
0.129**
0.285***
0.280***
0.288***
0.307***

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

1
-0.393***
0.078
0.184***
0.159**
0.258***
0.243***
0.223***
0.340***

1
0.031
-0.035
0.071
-0.188***
-0.213***
-0.289***
-0.181***

1
-0.009
0.302***
-0.062
-0.162**
0.051
0.021

1
0.230***
0.124*
0.197***
0.102*
0.323***

1
0.011
-0.112*
0.185***
0.121*

1
0.627***
0.259***
0.568***

1
0.299***
0.518***

1
0.256***

Notes: Table 2.2 displays the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and control variables used in the analysis. Correlations that are significant are
shown in bold with significance levels defined as: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The dependent and control variables are defined in Table 2.1. The
independent variables are defined as follows:
NEGATIVE_EVENT is manipulated between present (NEGATIVE_EVENT =1) and absent (NEGATIVE_EVENT =0)
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE is manipulated between strategic (CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE =1) and non-strategic (CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE =0)
CSR_ASSURANCE is manipulated between present (CSR_ASSURANCE =1) and absent (CSR_ASSURANCE =0)
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Table 2.3

Descriptive Statistics: Least Square Means, (Standard Error), Number of Observations

Panel A: Change in Valuation Judgment

CSR
Assurance
Absent

Present
E
Overall

Negative Event - Absent
CSR Activity Type
NonStrategic
Average
strategic
1.67
4.90
A
3.27
(2.22)
(2.26)
(1.60)
n=44
n=42
n=86
4.46
8.55
C
6.50
(2.15)
(2.04)
(1.48)
n=50
n=51
n=101
3.18
F
6.87
5.01
(1.51)
(1.51)
(1.53)
n=94
n=93
n=187
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Negative Event - Present
CSR Activity Type
NonStrategic
Average
strategic
-8.19
-5.50
B
-6.77
(2.37)
(2.20)
(1.60)
n=48
n=57
n=105
-5.57
-4.24
D
-4.87
(2.30)
(2.23)
(1.58)
n=52
n=55
n=107
G
-6.87
H
-4.87
-5.81
(1.66)
(1.56)
(1.61)
n=100
n=112
n=212

Overall
-2.20
(1.13)
n=191
0.55
(1.09)
n=208

Table 2.3 (continued)
Panel B: Change in Desirability Judgment
Negative Event - Absent
CSR Activity Type
NonStrategic
Average
strategic
0.30
5.26
I
2.77
(2.41)
(2.45)
(1.74)
n=44
n=42
n=86

CSR
Assurance
Absent

6.72
(5.26)
n=50

Present
M
Overall

3.77
(1.64)
n=94

12.72
(2.22)
n=51
N

9.29
(1.64)
n=93

K

Negative Event - Present
CSR Activity Type
NonStrategic
Average
strategic
-11.76
-10.01
J -10.84
(2.76)
(2.55)
(1.86)
n=48
n=57
n=105

9.70
(1.60)
n=101

-8.98
(2.67)
n=52

6.51
(1.65)
n=187

O
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-10.36
(1.86)
n=100

-5.58
(2.59)
n=55
P

-7.78
(1.81)
n=112

L

-7.19
(1.84)
n=107
-9.00
(1.84)
n=212

Overall
-4.64
(1.28)
n=191
0.88
(1.23)
n=208

Table 2.4

Analysis of Covariance Model and Planned Contrasts

Panel A: Three-Way ANCOVA

Source
NEGATIVE_EVENT (H1)
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE
CSR_ASSURANCE (H3)
NEGATIVE_EVENT * CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE
NEGATIVE_EVENT * CSR_ASSURANCE
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE * CSR_ASSURANCE
NEGATIVE_EVENT * CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE *
CSR_ASSURANCE
Covariates:
ETHICS
CSR_MOTIVES
FIN_HEALTH
Error

Model (1) DV: ΔVALUATION
Mean
pdf
Square
F
value
5306.05
1
22.04
0.000
800.96
1
3.33
0.069
721.41
1
3.00
0.084
41.07
1
0.17
0.680
63.47
1
0.26
0.608
2.05
1
0.01
0.927
5.91
1
0.02
0.876
1
1
1
388

1312.45
600.65
2003.03
240.72

5.45
2.50
8.32

0.020
0.115
0.004

Model (2) DV: ΔDESIRABILITY
Mean
pdf
Square
F
value
1
15614.92
50.86
0.000
1
1608.58
5.24
0.023
1
2993.70
9.75
0.002
1
75.77
0.25
0.620
1
481.43
1.57
0.211
1
13.21
0.04
0.836
1
1
1
1
388

22.42

0.07

0.787

1572.50
254.61
378.06
307.00

5.12
0.83
1.23

0.024
0.363
0.268

Panel B: Planned Contrast Comparison; Tests of H2a and H2b
DV
ΔVALUATION
ΔDESIRABILITY

Planned Contrast Comparison
H2a: Negative event absent, Strategic/Non-strategic [F > E]
H2a: Negative event absent, Strategic/Non-strategic [N > M]

t
1.70
2.34

One-Tailed
p-value
0.046
0.010

ΔVALUATION
H2b: Negative event present, Strategic/Non-strategic [G > H]
-0.87
0.193
ΔDESIRABILITY
H2b: Negative event present, Strategic/Non-strategic [O > P]
-0.96
0.169
Notes: Simple effect comparison testing H2a and H2b are performed to compare cell means in Table 2.3 Panels A and B.

143

Table 2.5

Planned Contrast Comparison; Test of H4

DV

Planned Contrasts

ΔVALUATION

ΔDESIRABILITY

Negative event absent, Assurance
absent/present [C > A]
Negative event present, Assurance
absent/present [D > B]
Negative event absent, Assurance
absent/present [K > I]
Negative event present, Assurance
absent/present [L > J]

ΔVALUATION
ΔDESIRABILITY

H4: D-B > C-A
H4: L-J > K-I

ΔVALUATION
ΔDESIRABILITY

t

One-Tailed
p-value

1.44

0.075

0.86

0.196

2.86

0.002

1.37

0.086

0.38
0.94

0.352
0.175

Notes: Planned contrast comparison testing H4 are performed to compare cell means in Table 2.3 Panels A
and B.

Table 2.6

DV
ΔVALUATION
ΔDESIRABILITY

Planned Contrast Comparison; Tests of H5a and H5b

Planned Contrasts*
H5a
H5a

t
2.05
3.03

One-Tailed
p-value
0.021
0.002

ΔVALUATION
H5b
-0.55
0.290
ΔDESIRABILITY
H5b
-0.66
0.254
Notes:
* We test H5a using the same contrast weights as Cheng et al. (2015): +3 for strategic/assurance
present, +1 for strategic/assurance absent, -2 for non-strategic/assurance present and -2 for nonstrategic/assurance absent. To test H5b we use the following contrast weightings: -2 for
strategic/assurance present, -2 for strategic/assurance absent, +3 for non-strategic/assurance
present and +1 for non-strategic/assurance absent.
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Table 3.1

NEGLIGENCE_SCALE
CAUSATION
FORESEEABILITY
INTENTIONALITY
AFFECT_DEF
REACTION_CASE
CREDIBILITY
OTHER_REGARDING
SELF_SERVING
CONTROLLABILITY

Study 1: Summary Statistics
Number of
observations
182
182
182
182
182
182
182
182
182
182

MEAN

MEDIAN

STD

MIN

MAX

50.33
5.14
3.32
0.46
5.60
-0.80
6.57
0.00
0.00
-0.04

50.00
5.00
3.00
0.00
5.00
0.00
7.00
-0.06
0.04
-0.21

30.45
3.22
2.55
1.14
2.17
2.55
2.55
0.97
0.91
0.92

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-9.00
0.00
-1.91
-2.22
-1.33

100.00
10.00
10.00
7.00
10.00
8.00
10.00
1.78
1.57
2.34

Notes: Table 3.1 displays the dependent and control variables used in the analysis for Study 1. The
variables are defined as follows:
NEGLIGENCE_SCALE measures participants’ perceptions of the likelihood that the defendant was
negligent on a 0 (Not at all likely) to 100 (Extremely likely) scale.
CAUSATION measures participants’ perceptions of whether the company caused the negative event on a 0
(No they did not cause the illness) to 100 (Yes they did cause the illness) scale.
FORESEEABILITY measures participants’ perceptions on the foreseeability of the negative event on a 0
(Not at all foreseeable) to 10 (Completely foreseeable) scale.
INTENTIONALITY measures participants’ perceptions on whether the company intended for the negative
event to occur on a 0 (Not at all intended) to 10 (Completely intended) scale.
AFFECT_DEF measures participants’ affective reaction to the defendant on a 0 (Very unfavorable) to 10
(Very favorable) scale.
REACTION_CASE is calculated by subtracting participants’ feelings towards the plaintiffs from their
feelings towards the defendant. Both are measured on a 0 (Very strong negative feelings) to 10 (Very
strong positive feelings) scale.
CREDIBILITY measures participants’ perceptions of the believability of the CSR disclosure on a 0 (Very
doubtful) to 10 (Very believable) scale.
OTHER_REGARDING measures participants’ perceptions of other-regarding CSR motives. Participants
were asked three questions on whether the company practices CSR because it has a long-term interest in
society, believes in the cause, and is trying to give something back to the community. Each question was
asked using a 0 (Highly unlikely) to 10 (Highly likely) scale. Participants’ responses load on a single factor
(eigenvalue 2.543).
SELF_SERVING measures participants’ perceptions of self-serving CSR motives. Participants were asked
three questions on whether the company practices CSR because it is trying to get more customers, trying to
keep its customers, and trying to improve its financial performance. Each question was asked using a 0
(Highly unlikely) to 10 (Highly likely) scale. Participants’ responses load on a single factor (eigenvalue
1.389).
CONTROLLABILITY measures participants’ perceptions of the defendant’s control over the negative event.
Consistent with prior research, participants’ perceptions of causation, foreseeability and intentionality load
on a single factor (eigenvalue= 1.249).
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Table 3.2

Study 1: Correlation Matrix
(1)

(1) NEGLIGENCE_
SCALE
(2) CSR_ACTIVITY_
TYPE
(3) CSR_ASSURANCE
(4) CAUSATION
(5) FORESEEABILITY
(6) INTENTIONALITY
(7) AFFECT_DEF
(8) REACTION_CASE
(9) CREDIBILITY
(10) OTHER_
REGARDING

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

1
0.021

1

-0.067
0.736***
0.539***
0.223**
0.533***
0.369***
0.379***

-0.067
0.070
0.072
0.070
0.155*

1
0.006

-0.032

0.092

-0.038

0.316***

0.177*

0.111

-0.199**

-0.148*
-0.063
0.043

1
0.456***
0.184*
0.510***
0.424***
0.265***

1
0.296***
0.271***
0.265***
0.287***

1

-0.229**

-0.146*

-0.201**

1

-0.037

0.473***

1

0.278***

0.493***

0.291***

1

0.021

0.548***

0.289***

0.556***

1

-0.062
1
-0.164*
0.298***
0.368***
(12)
-0.140
0.589*** 0.078
0.537*** 0.995*** 0.334***
-0.307***
-0.160*
0.161*
CONTROLLABILITY
0.314*** 0.293***
Notes: Table 3.2 displays the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and control variables used in the analysis for Study 1. Correlations that are
significant are shown in bold with significance levels defined as: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The dependent and control variables are defined in Table
3.1. The independent variables are defined as follows:
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE is manipulated between strategic (CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE =1) and non-strategic (CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE =0)
CSR_ASSURANCE is manipulated between present (CSR_ASSURANCE =1) and absent (CSR_ASSURANCE =0)
(11) SELF_SERVING

0.193**

0.171*

-0.030

0.109

0.160*
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-0.011

Table 3.3

Study 1: Affective Reaction to Defendant

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Least Square Means, (Standard Error), Number of
Observations

CSR Assurance
Absent

CSR Activity Type
Nonstrategic
Strategic
[A] 6.27
[B]
5.15
(0.29)
(0.27)
40
50

Present

[C]

5.57
(0.27)
47

[D]

5.55
(0.28)
45

Overall

[E]

5.92
(0.20)
87

[F]

5.35
(0.19)
95

Overall
5.69
(0.20)
90
5.56
(0.19)
92

Panel B: Analysis of Covariance
Source
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE (H1)
CSR_ASSURANCE
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE *
CSR_ASSURANCE (H3)
Covariates:
CONTROLLABILITY
REACTION_CASE
Error

Sum of
Squares
14.71
1.01

df
1
1

Mean
Square
14.71
1.01

F
4.27
0.29

pvalue**
0.040
0.589

13.49

1

13.49

3.92

0.049

22.29
138.52
605.74

1
1
176

22.29
138.52
3.44

6.48
40.25

0.012
0.000

Panel C: Planned Contrast and Follow-up Tests of H1 and H3
Source
Planned contrast*** (H3)
Simple effect comparison of:
Strategic/Non-strategic [E - F] (H1)*
Assurance Absent/Present, Non-strategic [C - A]**
Assurance Absent/Present, Strategic [D - B]**
Non-strategic/Strategic, Assurance absent [A - B]**
Non-strategic/Strategic, Assurance present [C - D]**

df
1

t-stat
1.37

p-value
0.171

1
1
1
1
1

2.05
-1.75
1.03
2.83
0.06

0.021
0.082
0.304
0.005
0.954

Notes: * Expectation is directional p-value is based on one-tailed tests.
** p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
*** Contrast weights are +3 for non-strategic, assured; +1 for non-strategic, not assured; -2 for strategic,
assured; -2 for strategic, not assured.
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Table 3.4

Study 1: Intentionality Assessment

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Least Square Means, (Standard Error), Number of
Observations

CSR Assurance
Absent

CSR Activity Type
Non-strategic
Strategic
[A]
0.43
[B] 0.55
(0.17)
(0.16)
40
50

Present

[C]

0.43
(0.16)
47

[D]

0.43
(0.16)
45

Overall

[E]

0.43
(0.12)
87

[F]

0.49
(0.11)
95

Overall
0.49
(0.12)
90
0.43
(0.11)
92

Panel B: Analysis of Covariance
Source
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE (H2)
CSR_ASSURANCE
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE *
CSR_ASSURANCE
Covariates:
AFFECT_DEF
REACTION_CASE
FORESEEABILITY
CAUSATION
Error

Sum of
Squares
0.15
0.15

df
1
1

Mean
Square
0.15
0.15

F
0.12
0.13

pvalue**
0.725
0.723

0.17

1

0.17

0.14

0.706

4.07
2.71
12.19
0.13
208.82

1
1
1
1
174

4.07
2.71
12.19
0.13
1.18

3.44
2.29
10.31
0.11

0.065
0.132
0.002
0.741

Notes: ** p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
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Table 3.5

Study 1: Negligence Assessment

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Least Square Means, (Standard Error), Number of
Observations
CSR Assurance
Absent

CSR Activity Type
Non-strategic
Strategic
[A]
52.38
[B] 47.62
(3.55)
(3.19)
40
50

Present

[C]

52.93
(3.23)
47

[D]

48.81
(3.31)
45

Overall

[E]

52.66
(2.40)
87

[F]

48.22
(2.29)
95

Overall
49.89
(2.35)
90
50.78
(2.32)
92

Panel B: Analysis of Covariance
Source
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE (H4a)
CSR_ASSURANCE
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE *
CSR_ASSURANCE (H4b)
Covariates:
CONTROLLABILITY
AFFECT_DEF
REACTION_CASE
Error

Sum of
Squares
865.32
33.52

df
1
1

Mean
Square
865.32
33.52

F
1.77
0.07

pvalue**
0.185
0.794

4.40

1

4.40

0.01

0.925

30801.67
16414.38
466.46
85552.01

1
1
1
175

30801.67
16414.38
466.46
488.87

63.01
33.58
0.95

0.000
0.000
0.330

Panel C: Planned Contrast and Follow-up Tests of H4a & H4b
Source
Planned contrast** (H4b)
Simple effect comparison of:
Strategic/Non-strategic [F - E] (H4a)**

df
1

t-stat
-1.32

p-value
0.188

1

1.33

0.185

Notes:
** p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
*** Contrast weights are -3 for non-strategic, assured; -1 for non-strategic, not assured; +2 for strategic,
assured; +2 for strategic, not assured.
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Table 3.6

Study 2: Summary Statistics

COMPENSATORY
PUNITIVE
COUNTER_FREQ
COUNTER_STRENGTH
ABILITY_PAY
NEGLIGENCE_SCALE
NEG_SIGNIFICANCE
NEG_SEVERITY
BEHAVIOR
DET_PUNISH
CREDIBILITY
OTHER_REGARDING
SELF_SERVING
CONTROLLABILITY

Number of
observations
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83

MEAN

MEDIAN

STD

MIN

MAX

7.17
2.83
5.96
6.28
6.93
79.45
8.29
6.53
5.78
6.06
5.57
-0.19
0.17
0.52

7.55
2.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
80.00
9.00
7.00
5.00
6.00
6.00
-0.07
0.20
0.59

2.41
2.32
2.65
2.60
2.92
13.02
1.66
2.99
2.18
2.76
2.82
0.98
0.82
0.87

0.11
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
45.00
3.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
-1.91
-1.83
-1.18

10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
100.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
1.78
1.57
2.34

Notes: Table 3.6 displays the dependent and control variables used in the analysis for Study 1. The
variables are defined as follows:
COMPENSATORY measures participants’ compensatory damages assessment on a $0 to $10 million scale.
PUNITIVE measures participants’ punitive damages assessment on a 0 to 10 (times compensatory
damages) scale.
COUNTER_FREQ measures the frequency of participants’ counterfactual thinking on a 0 (Never thought
about it) to 10 (Frequently thought about it) scale.
COUNTER_STRENGTH measures the strength of participants’ counterfactual thinking on a 0 (No serious
thoughts) to 10 (Very serious thoughts) scale.
ABILITY_PAY measures participants’ perceptions of the likelihood the defendant has the financial ability to
pay the damage assessments on a 0 (Highly unlikely) to 10 (Highly likely) scale.
NEGLIGENCE_SCALE measures participants’ perceptions of the likelihood that the defendant was
negligent on a 0 (Not at all likely) to 100 (Extremely likely) scale.
NEG_SIGNIFICANCE measures participants’ perceptions of the significance of the negative event on a 0
(Not at all significant) to 10 (Very significant).
NEG_SEVERITY measures participants’ perceptions of the importance of the extent plaintiffs’ losses when
making assessments on a 0 (Did not consider losses) to 10 (Seriously considered losses).
BEHAVIOR measures participants’ perceptions of the behavior of the defendant leading up to the negative
event on a 0 (Very bad) to 10 (Very good) scale.
DET_PUNISH measures participants’ motivation for their punitive damage assessment on a 0 (Punishment
motivated) to 10 (Deterrent motivated) scale.
CREDIBILITY measures participants’ perceptions of the believability of the CSR disclosure on a 0 (Very
doubtful) to 10 (Very believable) scale.
OTHER_REGARDING measures participants’ perceptions of other-regarding CSR motives. Participants
were asked three questions on whether the company practices CSR because it has a long-term interest in
society, believes in the cause, and is trying to give something back to the community. Each question was
asked using a 0 (Highly unlikely) to 10 (Highly likely) scale. Participants’ responses load on a single factor
(eigenvalue 2.543).
SELF_SERVING measures participants’ perceptions of self-serving CSR motives. Participants were asked
three questions on whether the company practices CSR because it is trying to get more customers, trying to
keep its customers, and trying to improve its financial performance. Each question was asked using a 0
(Highly unlikely) to 10 (Highly likely) scale. Participants’ responses load on a single factor (eigenvalue
1.389).
CONTROLLABILITY measures participants’ perceptions of the defendant’s control over the negative event.
Consistent with prior research, participants’ perceptions of causation, foreseeability and intentionality load
on a single factor (eigenvalue= 1.249).
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Table 3.7

Study 2: Correlation Matrix
(1)
1

(2)

(2) PUNITIVE
(3) CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE

0.329**
-0.014

1
0.109

1

(4) CSR_ASSURANCE

-0.305**

-0.170

-0.107

1

0.138

0.024

-0.170

1

0.198

-0.086

-0.178

0.722***

0.062

-0.205

***

0.038

-0.115

(1) COMPENSATORY

(5) COUNTER_FREQ
(6) COUNTER_STRENGTH
(7) NEGLIGENCE_SCALE
(8) NEG_SIGNIFICANCE
(9) BEHAVIOR
(10) DET_PUNISH

*

0.245
0.100
0.487

***
*

0.242
-0.057
0.006

(3)

**

0.348
0.133
-0.304

**

**

(11) NEG_SIGNIFICANCE

0.153

0.314
-0.016

(12) CREDIBILITY

-0.210

-0.380***

*

-0.050

(4)

(5)

0.130
0.076

(6)

0.390
0.166

(7)

0.253*
0.102

-0.187

-0.108

0.166

**

0.019

-0.038

0.089

0.341
0.041

-0.154

0.364***

0.006

0.067

***

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

1

-0.015

**

(8)

**

1
0.267*
-0.244
0.096

*

1
-0.053

1

0.082

-0.105

1

*

0.082

-0.117

0.098

1

-0.223*

-0.082

0.520***

0.051

0.045

0.267

*

1

(13) CONTROLLABILITY
0.111
0.113
0.164
0.035
-0.134 0.263
0.119
-0.181
0.228
-0.308
0.360
0.331
Notes: Table 3.7 displays the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and control variables used in the analysis for Study 2. Correlations that are
significant are shown in bold with significance levels defined as: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The dependent and control variables are defined in Table
3.6. The independent variables are defined as follows:
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE is manipulated between strategic (CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE =1) and non-strategic (CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE =0)
CSR_ASSURANCE is manipulated between present (CSR_ASSURANCE =1) and absent (CSR_ASSURANCE =0)
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Table 3.8

Study 2: Compensatory Damages Assessments

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Least Square Means, (Standard Error), Number of
Observations
CSR Assurance
Absent

CSR Activity Type
Non-strategic
Strategic
[A]
8.35
[B] 7.17
(0.49)
(0.42)
18
25

Present

[C]

6.45
(0.45)
21

[D]

6.83
(0.48)
19

Overall

[E]

7.43
(0.33)
39

[F]

7.01
(0.31)
44

Overall
7.73
(0.32)
43
6.65
(0.33)
40

Panel B: Analysis of Covariance
Source
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE (H5a)
CSR_ASSURANCE
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE *
CSR_ASSURANCE (H5b)
Covariates:
NEGLIGENCE_SCALE
COUNTER_FREQ
COUNTER_STRENGTH
Error

Sum of
Squares
3.20
24.21

df
1
1

Mean
Square
3.20
24.21

F
0.76
5.74

pvalue**
0.387
0.019

12.01

1

12.01

2.85

0.096

78.01
7.73
8.83
320.85

1
1
1
76

78.01
7.73
8.83
4.22

18.48
1.83
2.09

0.000
0.180
0.152

Panel C: Follow-up Tests of H5a and H5b
Source
Planned contrast*** (H5b)
Simple effect comparison of:
Strategic/Non-strategic [E - F] (H5a)**
Assurance Absent/Present, Non-strategic [C - A]*
Assurance Absent/Present, Strategic [D - B]**
Non-strategic/Strategic, Assurance absent [A - B]**
Non-strategic/Strategic, Assurance present [C - D]**

df
1

t-stat
1.93

p-value
0.058

1
1
1
1
1

0.87
2.86
0.52
-1.81
0.58

0.387
0.003
0.607
0.074
0.560

Notes: * Expectation is directional; p-value is based on one-tailed tests.
** p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
*** Contrast weights are -3 for non-strategic, assurance present; +1 for the other three conditions. To
analyze whether the interaction follows the predicted ordinal pattern, I follow Guggenmos et al. (2016)
and examine the pattern of means, as well as the semi-omnibus F-test of the residual between-cells
variance. As shown in Figure 3.7, the data do not match the hypothesized pattern. Further, the semiomnibus F-Test is significant (p = 0.006).
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Table 3.9

Study 2: Punitive Damages Assessments

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Least Square Means, (Standard Error), Number of
Observations
CSR Assurance
Absent

CSR Activity Type
Non-strategic
Strategic
[A]
3.44
[B] 2.77
(0.47)
(0.42)
18
25

Present

[C]

1.93
(0.44)
21

[D]

3.33
(0.47)
19

Overall

[E]

2.71
(0.32)
39

[F]

3.04
(0.30)
44

Overall
3.09
(0.31)
43
2.67
(0.32)
40

Panel B: Analysis of Covariance
Source
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE (H6a)
CSR_ASSURANCE
CSR_ACTIVITY_TYPE *
CSR_ASSURANCE (H6b)
Covariates:
NEGLIGENCE_SCALE
BEHAVIOR
DET_PUNISH
NEG_SIGNIFICANCE
Error

Sum of
Squares
2.75
4.40

df
1
1

Mean
Square
2.75
4.40

F
0.69
1.11

p-value*
0.408
0.296

19.60

1

19.60

4.93

0.029

38.03
25.19
35.74
12.88
298.33

1
1
1
1
75

38.03
25.19
35.74
12.88
3.98

9.56
6.33
8.98
3.24

0.003
0.014
0.004
0.076

Panel C: Follow-up Tests of H6a and H6b
Source
Planned contrast*** (H6b)*
Simple effect comparison of:
Strategic/Non-strategic [E - F] (H6a)**
Assurance Absent/Present, Non-strategic [C - A]*
Assurance Absent/Present, Strategic [D - B]**
Non-strategic/Strategic, Assurance absent [A - B]**
Non-strategic/Strategic, Assurance present [C - D]*

df
1

t-stat
2.46

p-value*
0.008

1
1
1
1
1

0.83
2.33
0.85
1.04
2.17

0.408
0.012
0.397
0.301
0.017

Notes: * Expectation is directional; p-value is based on one-tailed tests. ** p-values are based on twotailed tests. *** Contrast weights are -3 for non-strategic, assurance present; +1 for the other three
conditions. To further analyze whether an ordinal interaction exists, I follow Guggenmos et al. (2016)
and examine the visual, as well as a semi-omnibus F-test of the residual between-cells variance. As
shown in Figure 3.8, the data matches the hypothesized pattern. Finally, the semi-omnibus F-Test is not
significant (p= 0.395).
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Table 3.10

Study 2: Mediated Moderation Analysis Results

Model #: dependent variable

Model 1
Punitive damage assessment

Model 2
Credibility

Model 3
Punitive damage assessment

Independent variables
CSR Activity Type
CSR Assurance
(A)
(B)
(A * B)
-1.04
(0.301)

-2.33
(0.012)

2.22
(0.015)

-1.83
(0.035)

1.28
(0.203)

1.46
(0.074)

-0.74
(0.459)

-1.39
(0.085)

1.39
(0.085)

Credibility
(C)
(C * B)

-3.11
(0.002)

0.94
(0.348)

Notes: Table 3.10 reports the results of the mediated moderation analysis of credibility on punitive damage assessments. Significant p-values are shown in bold.
For mediated moderation to occur three conditions must be met: (1) CSR assurance must moderate the influence of CSR activity type on punitive damage
assessments (Model 1); (2) CSR assurance must moderate the influence of CSR activity type on credibility (Model 2); (3) Credibility must have a main effect on
punitive damage assessments, and there must be a decrease in the CSR assurance moderation of the influence of CSR activity type on punitive damages (Model
3). The marginally significant moderation of CSR assurance on the influence of CSR activity type in Model 3 suggests partial mediation.
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Appendix A
Section

Part One: Section III Literature Review Matrix
Citation

Disclosure
Characteristic
Examined

Disclosure Source

Disclosure Topic

Disclosure Measure

III

Patten 2005

Disclosure quality

Corporate annual reports/10-ks

Environmental

III
III
III
III
III

Cho et al. 2010
Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004
de Villiers and Van Staden 2006
Wiseman 1982
Richardson and Welker 2001

Disclosure quality
Disclosure quality
Disclosure quality
Disclosure quality
Disclosure quality

Environmental
Environmental
Environmental
Environmental
Mixed

III

Aerts and Cormier 2009

Disclosure quality

Environmental

Scoring methodology

III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III

Roberts 1992
Solomon et al. 2013
Cho et al. 2012
Huang et al. 2012
Bowman and Haire 1976
Neu et al. 1998
Trotman and Bradley 1981
Cohen et al. 2012
Adams and Harte 1998
Teoh and Thong 1984

Disclosure quality
Disclosure quality
Disclosure quality
Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure

Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Environmental
Environmental
Mixed
Mixed
Social
Social

Scoring methodology
Perception of credibility
Qualitative aspects
Percentage of discussion
Percentage of discussion
Percentage of discussion
Percentage of discussion
Present/absent
Longitudinal comparison
Present/absent

III

Cowen et al. 1987

Extent of disclosure

Mixed

Percentage of discussion

III
III
III
III
III
III

Chakravarthy et al. 2014
Clarkson et al. 2008
Ling and Mowen 2013
Casey and Grenier 2015
Dhaliwal et al. 2011
Dhaliwal et al. 2012

Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure

Corporate annual reports/10-ks
Corporate annual reports/10-ks
Corporate annual reports/10-ks
Corporate annual reports/10-ks
Corporate annual reports/10-ks
Corporate annual reports/10-ks;
Press releases
Council of Economic Priorities
Private disclosure
Stand-alone CSR reports
Analyst Reports
Corporate annual reports/10-ks
Corporate annual reports/10-ks
Corporate annual reports/10-ks
Corporate annual reports/10-ks
Corporate annual reports/10-ks
Corporate annual reports/10-ks
Ernst & Whinney 1978 survey
of CSR disclosures
Press Releases
Stand-alone CSR reports
Stand-alone CSR reports
Stand-alone CSR reports
Stand-alone CSR reports
Stand-alone CSR reports

Comparison to actual
performance
Qualitative aspects
Scoring methodology
Scoring methodology
Scoring methodology
Scoring methodology

Mixed
Environmental
Environmental
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed

Present/absent
Comparison to GRI framework
Comparison to GRI framework
Present/absent
Present/absent
Present/absent
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Appendix A (continued)
Section
III
III
III

Citation
Peters and Romi 2015
Simnett et al. 2009
Rockness and Williams 1988

Disclosure
Characteristic
Examined
Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure
Extent of disclosure

Disclosure Source
Stand-alone CSR reports
Stand-alone CSR reports
Various
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Disclosure Topic
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed

Disclosure Measure
Present/absent
Present/absent
Present/absent

Appendix B
Section(s)

Citation

IV

Arnold
and
Hammon
d 1994

Part One: Sections IV-VI Literature Review Matrix
Theoretical or
Practical
Framework
Role of CSR
disclosure in
ideological debates

Purpose

Sample/Participants

Method

Contribution / Key Findings

Examines the ideological
role accounting and social
disclosure played in the
South African divestment
debates in the US during
the 1970s and 1980s
Examines the usefulness of
annual report disclosure
related to intensity and
nature of CSR activities

US companies
signing the Sullivan
Principles

Case-Study

Provides history of social responsibility disclosure
related to the Sullivan Principles

82 food-processing
corporations in 1973

Qualitative
Content
Analysis

Identifies company characteristics positively
associated with voluntary reporting (CSR strategic
alignment)

Examines the relationship
between corporate
characteristics and CSR
disclosures
Examines national cultural
factors on propensity to
issue carbon disclosures

Fortune 500
companies

Archival

Identifies company characteristics positively
associated with voluntary reporting (size, CSR
corporate governance committees, industry)

1,762 firms from 33
countries

Archival

National cultural factors (masculinity, power
distance, uncertainty avoidance) influence propensity
to issue carbon disclosures

Social disclosures can be used as a legitimation tool
on both sides of a social issue debate

IV

Bowman
and
Haire
1976

Voluntary reporting
characteristics

IV

Cowen et
al. 1987

Voluntary reporting
characteristics

IV

Luo and
Tang
2016

Voluntary reporting
characteristics

IV

Teoh and
Thong
1984

Voluntary reporting
characteristics

Examines aspects of CSR
reporting in a developing
country

Interviews with
senior management at
100 Malaysian
companies

Qualitative
Interview

Identifies company characteristics positively
associated with voluntary reporting (size, national
origin of company)

IV

Trotman
and
Bradley
1981

Voluntary reporting
characteristics

Investigates company
characteristics associated
with CSR disclosures

207 companies listed
on the Australian
stock exchange with
83 having social
disclosures

Archival

Identifies company characteristics positively
associated with voluntary reporting (size, higher
systematic risk, CSR strategic alignment)
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Appendix B (continued)
Section(s)

Citation

IV, V

Simnett
et al.
2009

Theoretical or
Practical
Framework
Voluntary reporting
characteristics;

Purpose

Sample/Participants

Method

Contribution / Key Findings

Examines the international
voluntary CSR assurance
market

2,113 companies
from 31 countries
that produced
sustainability reports
between 2002-2004

Archival

Identifies company characteristics positively
associated with voluntary reporting (size, national
origin of company, industry);

CSR assurance
decision;

Companies seeking to enhance the credibility of CSR
reports are more likely to have their reports assured;

Choice of CSR
assurance provider

IV, V

Casey
and
Grenier
2015

Voluntary reporting
characteristics;

Comprehensive
investigation of the CSR
assurance market in the US

2,649 CSR reports
from US firms from
1993 to 2010

Archival

CSR assurance
decision;

CSR assurance demand is influenced by CSR
performance;

Choice of CSR
assurance provider

IV, VI

Chen et
al. 2016

Voluntary reporting
characteristics;
Investor use of
disclosure

Identifies company characteristics associated with
choice of assurance provider (size, leverage, country
stakeholder-orientation)
Identifies company characteristics associated with
voluntary reporting (size, company industry, CSR
performance, global companies, liquidity, leverage,
cost of capital, competition, advertising intensity);

Examines whether a
commitment to higherquality financial audit
influences investor use of
CSR disclosures

12,429 firm-year
observations from
2000-2008 consisting
of 731 stand-alone
CSR reports

158

Archival

Identifies company characteristics associated with
choice of CSR assurance provider with strong CSR
performers choosing professional accountant and
weak CSR performers choosing non-accounting
provider
Identifies company characteristics associated with
voluntary reporting (higher audit fees);
Find that CSR reports issued by firms committing to
high audit fees accelerate the incorporation of future
earnings information into current stock price

Appendix B (continued)
Section(s)

Citation

IV, VI

Dhaliwal
et al.
2011

Theoretical or
Practical
Framework
Voluntary reporting
characteristics
Analyst use of
disclosure

IV

IV

IV

Purpose

Sample/Participants

Method

Contribution / Key Findings

Investigates the association
between CSR disclosure
and the cost of equity
capital

213 first-time standalone CSR reports

Archival

Identifies company characteristics associated with
voluntary reporting (high cost of equity capital);
Firms with a high cost of equity capital realize a
reduction in the cost of equity capital after initiating
CSR disclosure;
Lower analyst forecast errors and dispersion for
firms issuing CSR reports
Details the opportunities and challenges of the first
CSR information required to be reported and audited

Herda
and
Snyder
2013
Sankara
et al.
2016

Voluntary reporting
motivations

Investigates SEC
requirement of audits of
conflict minerals

Review of section
1502 of the DoddFrank Act

Case Study

Voluntary reporting
motivations

Investigates SEC
requirement of audits of
conflict minerals

Review of section
1502 of the DoddFrank Act

Case Study

Investigate extent companies have complied with
requirement, as well as considers future audit issues

Roberts
1992

Voluntary reporting
characteristics and
motivations;
Stakeholder theory

Tests stakeholder theory to
explain social
responsibility disclosure
behavior

130 major
corporations
investigated by the
Council on Economic
Priorities (CEP) from
1984-1986

Archival

Identifies company characteristics associated with
voluntary reporting (CSR strategic alignment);
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Consistent with stakeholder theory, stakeholder
power influences CSR disclosure level

Appendix B (continued)
Section(s)

Citation

IV

Neu et al.
1998

IV

Ling and
Mowen
2013

Theoretical or
Practical
Framework
Voluntary reporting
characteristics and
motivations;
Legitimacy theory

Purpose

Sample/Participants

Method

Contribution / Key Findings

Examines the role and
functioning of
environmental disclosures
in the annual report

33 Canadian public
companies in
environmentally
sensitive industries
from 1982 to 1991

Archival

Identifies company characteristics positively
associated with voluntary reporting (size);

Voluntary reporting
characteristics and
motivations;
Legitimacy theory

Investigates the
relationship between
corporate competitive
strategy and voluntary
environmental disclosure

120 US public
chemical companies

Archival

Consistent with legitimacy theory, external pressure
from financial stakeholders, regulators,
environmentalists and general society influences the
level of environmental disclosure
Identifies company characteristics associated with
voluntary reporting (CSR strategic alignment);
Corporate strategy influences how disclosure is used
for impression management with companies using
brand image and research and development strategies
associated with higher levels of environmental
disclosure
Support that early adopters of CSR reporting are
influenced by external stakeholder pressure. Late
adopters of CSR reporting are influenced by memetic
isomorphism

IV

Bhimani
et al.
2016

Voluntary reporting
motivations;
Legitimacy theory,
Isomorphism

Examines CSR reporting
motivations for early and
late adopters

80 survey responses;
field data from five
companies

Survey,
Qualitative
Interviews

IV

Deegan
and
Blomqui
st 2006

Voluntary reporting
motivations;
Legitimacy theory

Examines the influence of
lobby groups on
corporations CSR reporting

Companies operating
within the Australian
minerals industry

Case Study

Consistent with legitimacy theory, external pressure
from lobby groups influences the level of
environmental disclosure

IV, V

Patten
2005

Voluntary reporting
motivations;
Legitimacy theory;

Examines environmental
disclosure quality by
comparing projections of
future spending for
pollution to actual future
expenditures

119 US companies
from the chemical,
petroleum, metals
processing, and paper
industries from 1993
to 2002

Archival

Support for impression management motivation for
disclosure due to projected pollution abatement
expenditures may be more misleading than
meaningful

Disclosure
credibility
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Appendix B (continued)
Section(s)

Citation

IV

de
Villiers
and Van
Staden
2006
Aerts and
Cormier
2009

IV

Theoretical or
Practical
Framework
Voluntary reporting
motivations;
Legitimacy theory

Purpose

Sample/Participants

Method

Contribution / Key Findings

Examines environmental
disclosure trends of South
African companies from
1994-2002

140 corporate annual
reports

Qualitative
- Content
Analysis

Voluntary reporting
motivations;
Legitimacy theory

Explores the impact of
environmental disclosures
as legitimation tools

158 non-financial
North American
firms from 2002

Archival

Investigates if there are
self-serving biases in the
language and verbal tone
of environmental
disclosures
Examine whether
corporations use graphs in
their sustainability reports
as impression management
tools to present a more
favorable view of their
performance.
Examines methods used by
companies to repair their
reputations after a
reporting scandal

190 S&P 500 firms
from 2002

Archival

Evidence for companies using CSR disclosure for
legitimacy reasons including a reduction in
environmental disclosures, especially specific
disclosures compared to general disclosures over
time
Companies influence perceived environmental
legitimacy by issuing reactive press releases and
altering extent and quality of annual report
environmental disclosures
Worse environmental performers use language and
verbal tone to bias the message presented in 10-k
environmental disclosures

77 stand-alone CSR
reports issued in the
US in 2006

Archival

Selectivity bias in items graphed and graph distortion
suggests graphs in CSR reports are used for
impression management

94 restating firms
from the US

Archival

Companies increase reputation-building actions
toward capital and non-capital-provider stakeholders
following restatements;

IV

Cho et al.
2010

Voluntary reporting
motivations;
Legitimacy theory

IV

Cho et al.
2012

Voluntary reporting
motivations;
Legitimacy theory

IV, VI

Chakrava
rthy et al.
2014

Voluntary reporting
motivations;
Legitimacy theory
Investor perception
of disclosure

Positive abnormal returns suggest investors see the
reputation-building actions as value-increasing
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Appendix B (continued)
Section(s)

Citation

IV, V, VI

Solomon
et al.
2013

Theoretical or
Practical
Framework
Voluntary reporting
motivations;
Legitimacy theory
Investor perception
of disclosure
Voluntary reporting
motivations;
Voluntary disclosure
theory

IV

Clarkson
et al.
2008

IV

Cho et al.
2015

Voluntary reporting
motivations;
Organized hypocrisy

IV

Bebbingt
on et al.
2012

Reporting norms

IV

Contrafat
to 2014

Reporting norms

Purpose

Sample/Participants

Method

Contribution / Key Findings

Examines private social
and environmental
reporting between
companies and investors

Interviews with
senior management at
20 leading UK
investment
institutions

Qualitative
Interview

Companies use private social and environmental
reporting to investors as an impression management
tool

Examines the link between
environmental
performance and
environmental disclosure

191 firms from pulp
and paper, chemicals,
oil and gas, metals
and mining and
utility industries from
2003

Archival

Examines new theory
beyond signaling and
legitimacy theories to
better understand voluntary
corporate sustainability
reporting
Examines the production
of normativity with respect
to environmental reporting
regimes, in Spain and the
UK, from 1997 to 2001.

Two large US based
multinational oil and
gas corporations

Case-study

Organizations have multiple facades with corporate
messages and activities consistent within each
façade, but inconsistencies found when comparing
across facades

Electricity companies
in Spain and the UK
between 1997 and
2001

Case Study

Societal norms rather than legislation is needed to
establish CSR reporting norm

Investigates how CSR
reporting became
institutionalized in an
Italian multinational
company

Italian multinational
company

Case Study

Institutionalized reporting came from 1) construction
of a common meaning system 2) practicalisation of
rules and routines 3) reinforcement through
organizational procedures and structures
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Investors do not perceive disclosure as credible and
discount the information
Consistent with voluntary disclosure theory, finds
support for superior environmental reporters using
disclosure as a signal of firm type to stakeholders
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Section(s)

Citation

V

Wiseman
1982

V footnote

Cohen
and
Simnett
2015

V

V

Peters
and
Romi
2015

Gray et
al. 2013

Theoretical or
Practical
Framework
Disclosure
credibility

CSR assurance
decision;
Choice of CSR
assurance provider
CSR assurance
decision;
Choice of CSR
assurance provider

Disclosure
credibility and CSR
assurance

Purpose

Sample/Participants

Method

Contribution / Key Findings

Examines the quality of
voluntary environmental
disclosures made in annual
reports

26 of the largest
companies in the
steel, oil, and pulp
and paper industries

Archival

Corporate environmental disclosures are incomplete
and not associated with actual environmental
performance

Review the CSR assurance
literature and provide
suggestions for future
research

CSR assurance
literature

Review

Reviews CSR assurance literature with suggestions
for future research

Investigates corporate
governance impact on the
decision to purchase
sustainability assurance
and choice of assurance
provider

912 US sustainability
reports issued from
2002 through 2010.

Archival

The presence of a corporate sustainability officers
(CSO) is positively associated with CSR report
assurance and the association increases when the
CSO is a sustainability expert;

Examines internal audits
role in environmental
compliances of information
technology

Expert CSOs prefer assurance from consultants;

372 internal auditors
from the US or
Canada
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Survey

An environmental committee with a director that is a
sustainability expert is positively associated with
sustainability assurance and prefers to use
professional accounting firms as assurer
Internal auditors believe they should be more
involved in green IT activities including providing
assurance
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Theoretical or
Practical
Framework
Disclosure
credibility and CSR
assurance

Section(s)

Citation

V

Trotman
and
Trotman
2015

V

O’Dwyer
et al.
2011

Credibility and CSR
assurance;
Legitimacy theory

V

BrownLiburd
and
Zamora
2015
Pflugrath
et al.
2011

Disclosure
credibility and CSR
assurance; Mercer's
2004 Framework

V

V

Kim et
al. 2016

Disclosure
credibility and CSR
assurance

CSR assurance
quality

Purpose

Sample/Participants

Method

Contribution / Key Findings

Investigates the present
and future role of internal
audit in the assurance of
greenhouse gas emissions
reporting

29 Australian senior
audit committee
members, senior
accountants, internal
auditors and partners
from major
accounting firms

Qualitative
Interview

Internal auditors believe they should be involved in
the assurance of greenhouse gas reporting

Analyzes the legitimation
process of public
accounting firms when
constructing CSR
assurance lines of service
Examines the role of CSR
assurance on investors'
judgments

Interviews of
partners, managers
and seniors from Big
4 firms in Europe

Qualitative
Interview

116 investors

Experiment

In order to build CSR assurance legitimacy, the
accounting firms needed to convince the client, nonclient users of CSR reports and the accounting firm's
internal risk department of the benefits of CSR
assurance
CSR assurance is a credibility signal to investors

Examines perceptions of
credibility of CSR reports
of financial analysts from
Australia, UK and US
depending on whether they
are assured and by the type
of assurance provider
Examines decision-making
of multidisciplinary CSR
audit teams

106 analysts from
Australia, UK and
US

Experiment

Credibility of CSR reports is greater when it is
assured;
US analysts prefer professional accountant while
Australia and UK analysts perceive little difference
in credibility between assurance providers

119 financial auditors
from Big 4
accounting firms
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Experiment

Participants incorrectly rely on CSR expert
explanations
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Theoretical or
Practical
Framework
CSR assurance
quality

Section(s)

Citation

V

Moroney
and
Trotman
2016

V, VI

Cheng et
al. 2015

Disclosure
credibility and CSR
assurance

V, VI

Cohen et
al. 2011

Disclosure
credibility;

V, VI

VI

Rockness
and
Williams
1988

Buzby
and Falk
1978

Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures
Disclosure
credibility;
Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures

Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures

Purpose

Sample/Participants

Method

Contribution / Key Findings

Examines materiality
judgments during CSR
audits

82 auditors from Big
4 accounting firms

Experiment

Qualitative factors have a greater impact on CSR
audits compared to financial audits

Examines non-professional
investor reactions to
strategic relevance and
assurance of sustainability
indicators
Examines retail investors
perceptions of economic
performance, corporate
governance and CSR

128 graduate students

Experiment

Investors perceive ESG indicators as more important
and are more willing to invest when there is high
strategic relevance and CSR assurance increases the
reaction.

750 retail investors

Survey

Investors prefer to receive CSR information from a
third-party source;

Descriptive study of the
investment policies,
criteria for investments,
information sources and
portfolios of socially
responsible mutual funds
in the US

8 mutual funds
identified as socially
responsible
investments

Qualitative
Interview

Examine how mutual funds
use social responsibility
disclosure when making
investment decisions

102 mutual fund
presidents

Survey
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Retail investors care most about economic
performance, then corporate governance, followed
by CSR
Fund managers find CSR disclosures difficult to
obtain and incomplete;
Six common performance factors considered by the
funds: environmental protection, equal employment
opportunity, treatment of employees, business
relations with repressive regimes, product quality
and innovation and defense contracting
Majority of funds had investment policies which
considered social activities, but relative importance
was less than financial information
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Theoretical or
Practical
Framework
Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures;
signaling theory

Section(s)

Citation

Purpose

Sample/Participants

Method

Contribution / Key Findings

VI

Basoglu
and Hess
2014

Investigates how
nonfinancial information
disclosed via electronic
business reporting
influences investor
perceptions and purchase
intentions
Examines how socioeconomic accounting
information influences the
investment decision

125 undergraduate
students

Experiment

High quality nonfinancial content in electronic
business reporting influences perceptions of
trustworthiness and perceived investment quality

VI

Belkaoui
1980

Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures;
linguistic relativity
paradigm

225 participants
including:
undergraduate
students, senior bank
officers and
accountants

Experiment

Disclosure of pollution abatement information
influences the investment decisions of bankers and
accountants

VI

Christens
en 2016

Investor use of
disclosures

Examines whether CSR
reporting influences
investors’ perceptions of
managerial intent
following high-profile
misconduct

2,097 stand-alone
CSR reports
published by 476
companies

Archival

Issuance of CSR report provides protection against
negative stock market reaction following a highprofile misconduct

VI

Dhaliwal
et al.
2012

Analyst use of
disclosures

Investigates the association
between CSR disclosure
and analyst accuracy

7,108 stand-alone
CSR reports
published by 1,297
unique companies
from 1994 to 2007
from 31 different
countries

Archival

Issuance of CSR report is associated with lower
analyst forecast error and the relationship is stronger
for stakeholder-oriented countries;
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Issuance of CSR report plays a complementary role
to financial disclosure
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Section(s)

Citation

VI

Matsumu
ra et al.
2014

Theoretical or
Practical
Framework
Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures

VI

Subrama
niam et
al. 2015

VI

Elliott et
al. 2014

VI

Herrema
ns et al.
1993

VI

VI

Purpose

Sample/Participants

Method

Contribution / Key Findings

Investigates market
response to voluntary
carbon emissions
disclosure

S&P 500 firms from
2006 to 2008 that
disclosed carbon
emissions data to the
Carbon Disclosure
Project

Archival

Capital markets integrate both carbon emissions data
and the act of voluntary disclosure of this
information into firm valuations

Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures

Investigates the influence
of CSR disclosures are
stock liquidity

Archival

Higher disclosure levels increases liquidity

Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures; Affectas-information
theory
Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures

Investigates intentional
versus unintentional effects
of CSR on investors'
estimates of fundamental
value
Examine the links between
CSR and economic
performance

194 most actively
traded companies
listed on Malaysian
stock exchange in
2009
88 graduate business
students

Experiment

Investors' fundamental value estimates are
unintentionally influenced by CSR performance
disclosure

96 firms from
manufacturing
industries from 19821987

Archival

Companies with better CSR reputations have
positive abnormal returns compared to companies
with weak CSR reputations

Huang et
al. 2012

Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures

Investigates the usefulness
of nonfinancial information
contained in analyst reports

Analyst reports for
S&P 500 firms from
1995-2008

Archival

Analyst text is more useful when it places emphasis
on nonfinancial topics including CSR information

Cohen et
al. 2015

Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures

Examines professional
investors’ perceptions of
CSR information

228 professional
investors

Survey

Professional investors care most about economic
performance, then corporate governance, followed
by CSR
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Theoretical or
Practical
Framework
Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures

Section(s)

Citation

VI

Jain et al.
2016

VI

Patten
1990

Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures

VI

Richards
on and
Welker
2001

Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures

VI

Zahller et
al. 2015

Investor perceptions
and use of
disclosures;
organizational
legitimacy, social
resilience
Consumer use of
disclosure

VII

Bradford
et al.
2017

Purpose

Sample/Participants

Method

Contribution / Key Findings

Examines whether short
sellers consider CSR
performance and disclosure
when making investment
decisions

19,566 firm-years
with 3,131 unique
firms from 20042012

Archival

Find short sellers consider CSR information when
making investment decisions. Strong CSR
performers are less likely to be sold short

Examines how investors
use social responsibility
disclosure by examining
market reaction to
companies agreeing to the
Sullivan Principles
Examines the relationship
between financial and
social disclosure and the
cost of equity capital

37 firms that
publically disclosed
the signing of the
Sullivan Principles

Archival

Market reaction to Sullivan Principles disclosure
suggests investors use social disclosure when making
investment decisions

225 firm year
observations from 87
different Canadian
companies from
1990-1992

Archival

Positive relationship between social disclosures and
the cost of equity capital and the positive relationship
is moderated by firm financial performance with
more successful firms being less penalized for social
disclosures

Tests a theory of social
resilience to exogenous
shocks with high-quality
CSR disclosure promoting
the perception of
organizational legitimacy
Examines the GRI
reporting framework to
consider whether it
provides useful
information to consumers

100 experienced
nonprofessional
investors

Experiment

Investors perceive higher organizational legitimacy
when CSR disclosure quality is high;
Increased legitimacy provides organizational
resilience to an intra-industry exogenous shock

15 companies
following GRI
reporting framework
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Qualitative
– Content
Analysis

GRI reporting framework does not provide
information that aligns with consumers’ interests

Appendix C

Part Two: Research Instrument
Block 1: General Instructions & Informed Consent
General Instructions

Thank you in advance for your participation in this study. The purpose of the study is to
examine investors’ judgments based on a hypothetical situation. We are seeking your
responses to this situation; there are no right or wrong answers. Although actual
investment decisions may be more complex, we ask that you base your judgments solely
on the information provided in the case materials.
Your participation is completely voluntary and there are no foreseeable physical risks or
discomforts if you choose to participate in this study. All responses are anonymous. The
study should take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. None of the questions will
require you to identify yourself. Please note that there will be comprehension checks in
the survey to verify that you carefully read and understood the materials.
You will be pre-screened based on your responses to four questions.
•

If your answers indicate that you do not meet the required criteria to participate in
the study, then you will be redirected to Amazon Mechanical Turk's website and
will not be paid.

•

If you do meet the required criteria and choose to participate in the study, then
you must answer ALL of the questions completely and within the allotted time in
order to be paid for your participation. You will be paid $2.00 for completing the
task.

To verify your participation in the study, you will be required to enter your Amazon
Mechanical Turk Worker ID AND a randomly generated code at the end of the
survey, which will be used to confirm payment claims. Therefore, you must enter your
Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker ID and the randomly generated code at the end of the
study to be paid.
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval
Our university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) has reviewed this study. The IRB
determined that this study fulfills the human research subject protections obligations
required by state and federal law and university policies. If you have any questions,
concerns, or reports regarding your rights as a participant of research, please contact me
at (csr.research10@gmail.com).
Your Consent:
I have read this form and the research study has been explained to me. If I have
questions, I have been told whom to contact. By clicking on the “>>” on the lower righthand corner of this screen, I am indicating that I am 18 years of age or older, I have read
169

Appendix C (continued)
and understood the information presented above, I have decided to participate in the
study described above, and I consent to the procedures described above.
To continue, please click on the “>>” on the lower right-hand corner of this screen.
Block 2: Screening Criteria in Qualtrics
(Note: The screening criteria shown below are administered in Qualtrics after
participants have already passed initial screening requirements in Mechanical Turk. The
initial requirements include: (1) participants are over 18 years of age; (2) participants
are physically located in the United States; (3) participants have an AMT approval rate
of 95% or higher on at least 50 or more completed assignments. If MTurkers do not meet
the initial screening requirements, they are not able to view the survey request on
Mechanical Turk website.)
Next you will be asked 4 screening questions.
As a reminder, if your answers indicate that you do not meet the required criteria to
participate in the study, then you will be redirected to Amazon Mechanical Turk's
website and will not be paid.
1. Have you purchased or sold individual stocks at least three times in the past?
 Yes
 No
2. Do you have experience reading financial statements?
 Yes
 No
3. Do you consider yourself proficient in the English language?
 Yes
 No
4. Have you taken at least two college-level accounting and/or finance classes?
 Yes
 No
Block 3: Background Information & Initial Valuation Judgments
Assume you are an investor with a long-term investment horizon who is considering
an investment in the common stock of XYZ, Inc.
Background Information about XYZ, Inc.
XYZ, Inc. is a U.S. publicly-traded company that has been in operation for over 50 years
in the food products industry. Its core business operations involve procuring, processing
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and transporting an array of branded food products that are sold by large national grocery
store chains. XYZ, Inc. prides itself on maintaining positive long-term relationships with
farmers who source its products, and enjoys high brand recognition across U.S.
households. Financial results over the past three years have been mixed relative to
industry peers. Condensed financial information and key financial statistics are shown
below.
Condensed Financial Information
XYZ, Inc.
3-Year Trend
($ in millions)
12/31/2015

12/31/2014

12/31/2013

Total current assets
Fixed assets, net
Investments
Intangible assets
Total current liabilities
Total long-term liabilities
Total shareholder's equity

$

3,937
3,744
519
13,513
5,015
10,545
6,153

$

3,786
3,783
531
13,865
4,890
10,903
6,172

$

4,394
3,942
508
14,303
5,424
9,733
7,990

Net sales
Gross profit
Income from operations
Net income

$

6,563
2,574
847
497

$

7,630
2,614
718
221

$

7,910
2,978
958
824

Key Statistics

XYZ, Inc.

Earnings/Share Growth (Last 5 Years)
Revenue % Change From Prior Year
Return on Investment (Prior 12 Months)
Profit Margin (Most Recent Quarter)
Total Debt/Equity
Share Price/Earnings
Estimate of Future Earnings per Share Long Term Growth
(3-5 Years)

0.51%
-6.05%
10.55%
9.66%
181.22%
23.48
6.66%

Industry
Average
3.94%
24.24%
6.45%
7.80%
93.86%
24.21
8.35%

Based on the information available for XYZ, Inc., please answer the following
questions.
(Note: All scale measurements will appear to participants as sliders.)
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1. On a scale of 0-100 how would you value the common stock of XYZ, Inc. relative to
its industry?
0
Very Low

50
Average

100_______
Very High

2. On a scale of 0-100 how desirable is XYZ, Inc. as an investment opportunity?
0
Not at all desirable

50

100

Average

Very Desirable

Block 4: CSR Activity Type Manipulation
(Note: In order to control for possible order effects, the order participants receive Block
4 and Block 6 is randomized so that some participants receive the negative event
information prior to the CSR disclosure and assurance manipulations.)
(Note: The underlined text highlights differences between the strategic and non-strategic
CSR conditions.)
In recent years, XYZ, Inc. has invested in a corporate social responsibility (CSR)
agenda. The following disclosures were included in its most recent CSR report.
Strategic Manipulation
“XYZ, Inc. seeks to demonstrate our commitment to a sustainable environment by
annually upgrading our source of energy to more sustainable options. Although we
initially committed to spending $10 million to install solar panels that could provide 50%
of our electricity needs, thus far we have spent $5 million. The expenditures to date are
expected to reduce our operating costs by $7 million (1.4% of net income) per year for
each of the next three years due to anticipated rising prices of traditional electricity
sources.
XYZ, Inc. is committed to doing its part in maintaining a healthy environment for
all. Accordingly, during the past year we continued our long-term commitment to the
environment by investing over $10 million in our production process in order to reduce
pollution and waste in our value chain. This marks the fifth straight year we have made
significant investments to enhance the sustainability of our production process. Changes
include upgrading to equipment that reduces emissions and replacing 20% of our
packaging materials with environmentally friendly options. We anticipate that this
investment will decrease production costs by $2 million (0.5% of net income) per year.
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In addition to reducing future operating costs, we expect that due to consumer
preferences for sustainably produced products, these two investments will allow us to
increase our market share and future profitability.”
Non-Strategic Manipulation
“XYZ, Inc. seeks to demonstrate our commitment to a sustainable environment by
annually upgrading our source of energy to more sustainable options. Although we
initially committed to spending $10 million to install solar panels that could provide 50%
of our electricity needs, thus far we have spent $5 million. The expenditures to date are
not expected to have any direct impact on our operating costs.
XYZ, Inc. is committed to doing its part in maintaining a healthy environment for
all. Accordingly, during the past year we continued our long-term commitment to the
environment by investing over $10 million in our production process in order to reduce
pollution and waste in our value chain. This marks the fifth straight year we have made
significant investments to enhance the sustainability of our production process. Changes
include upgrading to equipment that reduces emissions and replacing 20% of our
packaging materials with environmentally friendly options. We do not anticipate that this
investment will have any direct impact on our production costs.
We do not anticipate that these two investments will have any direct impact on
our market share and future profitability.”
Block 5: CSR Assurance Manipulations
CSR Assurance Present Manipulation
Assurance Report on Nonfinancial Information
XYZ, Inc. engaged a professional accounting firm with expertise in evaluating corporate
social responsibility reporting to provide assurance on the accuracy of reported
information. Following is the accounting firm’s report and conclusion.
Professional Accounting Firm’s Report
To the Shareholders of XYZ, Inc.
We have reviewed the nonfinancial information contained in the corporate social
responsibility report for the year ended December 31, 2016 detailed above. The directors
are responsible for the preparation and presentation of the nonfinancial information and
the information contained therein. We have conducted an independent review of the
nonfinancial information to provide a conclusion to the shareholders. This review
included such tests and procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
These procedures have been undertaken to determine whether the nonfinancial
information has been properly collected, summarized and reported.
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Conclusion
Based on our review, we conclude that in all material respects the nonfinancial indicators
were properly collected, summarized, and reported.
CSR Assurance Absent Manipulation
XYZ, Inc. did not engage a professional accounting firm to provide assurance on the
accuracy of the nonfinancial information contained in the corporate social responsibility
report for the year ended December 31, 2016 detailed above.
Block 6: Negative Event Manipulation
Negative Event Present Manipulation
Recently, a respected business newspaper reported that XYZ, Inc. is recalling one
of its food products due to food safety concerns. The following is an excerpt from the
article.
“XYZ, Inc. recently announced a voluntary recall of one of its food products due
to a possible connection to an illness outbreak impacting at least 50 people across 15
states. The recall involves over ten million pounds of product with an estimated retail
value of $20 million. In addition, XYZ, Inc. has shut down two of its factories as it works
to find the source of the contaminant and take corrective action. The factory shutdown is
estimated to result in approximately $10 million of additional lost sales (i.e., beyond the
recall). To date, total costs incurred by XYZ, Inc. for the negative event are 6% of net
income, a significant amount. Additional risk of future lawsuits coming from those that
became ill also exists.”
Negative Event Absent Manipulation
No information about negative events is given to the participants in this treatment.
Block 7: CSR Activity Type & CSR Assurance Manipulation Checks
MC #1: Did XYZ, Inc. engage a professional accounting firm to provide assurance on
the accuracy of its corporate social responsibility disclosures?
 Yes
 No
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MC #2: In your opinion, does XYZ Inc. practice corporate social responsibility primarily
to improve its financial performance?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Highly unlikely

10

11
Highly likely

(Note: MC #2 measures participants’ perceptions of the connection between CSR and
future net cash inflows. We expect that participants receiving disclosure of strategic
activities will have a statistically higher mean compared to those receiving disclosure of
non-strategic activities.)
Block 8: Post-Manipulation Judgments
After considering the additional information about XYZ, Inc. please answer the following
questions.
1. On a scale of 0-100 how would you value the common stock of XYZ, Inc. relative to
its industry?
0
Very Low

50
Average

100
Very High

2. On a scale of 0-100 how desirable is XYZ, Inc. as an investment opportunity?
0
Not at all desirable

50

100

Average

Very Desirable

(Note: We will randomize the order in which participants receive questions 3-8 below. An
additional attention check question (question 8 below) will be randomly presented within
this set of questions. Each question will be presented on a separate screen so participants
cannot go back and change their answer after reading additional questions.)
3. In your opinion, does XYZ, Inc.’s investments in its two corporate social responsibility
projects (solar panels and equipment that reduces pollution and waste) provide a signal
about the company’s ethical culture?
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Definitely does not

Definitely

does

4. How believable do you find XYZ, Inc.’s disclosures about its two corporate social
responsibility investments?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Very doubtful

Very

believable

5. In your opinion, does XYZ Inc. practice corporate social responsibility primarily to be
a good corporate citizen?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Highly unlikely

11
Highly likely

6. Did XYZ, Inc. expect to gain a competitive advantage by investing in solar panels and
equipment that reduces pollution and waste?
 Yes
 No
7. In your opinion, what is XYZ’s financial health compared to industry peers?
1

2

Very low

3

4

5

6

7

Average

8

9

10

11
Very high

(Note: Question 8 below is an attention check question designed to gauge the
attentiveness of the AMT participant pool. Participants must read the entire paragraph in
order to correctly answer the question.)
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8. Recent research on decision making shows that choices are affected by context.
Differences in how people feel, their previous knowledge and experience, and their
environment can affect choices. To help us understand how people make decisions, it is
important that participants in studies actually take the time to read the directions; if not,
some results may not tell us very much about decision making in the real world. To show
that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question below about how you are
feeling and instead drag the slider to fifty-eight.
Please drag the slider to describe your current level of happiness.
0
10
20
Very unhappy

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
Very happy

Block 9: Negative Event Manipulation Check
MC #3: Did XYZ, Inc. recall one of its products due to food safety concerns?
 Yes
 No
(Note: If participants answer yes to question MC #3, they will be asked to answer
question MC #3a. If they answer no, they will go directly to question 4.)
MC #3a: In your opinion, how significant was the food safety recall to XYZ, Inc.?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Not at all Significant

11
Very significant

Block 10: Demographic Questions
1.

10

What is your age?
 18-24 years old
 25-34 years old
 35-44 years old
 45-54 years old
 55-64 years old
 65-44 years old
 75 years or older
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2.

What is your gender?
 Female
 Male
 Prefer not to answer

3. What is your occupation? ____________

4.

How many years of work experience do you have?
 0-5 years of experience
 6-10 years of experience
 11-15 years of experience
 16-20 years of experience
 21-25 years of experience
 26-30 years of experience
 More than 30 years of experience

5.
If you have experience in the following professions, please indicate how many
years.
CPA __________
Lawyer __________
Investor __________
6.

What is your education level?
 Some high school, no diploma
 High school graduate
 Associate degree
 Bachelor’s degree
 Graduate degree

7.

How many college-level accounting classes have you taken? __________

8.

How many college-level finance classes have you taken? _____________

9.

How would you rate your knowledge of corporate social responsibility?

1
2
3
Below average

4

5

6
7
Average
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10.

Are you solely responsible for managing your investment portfolio?

 Yes
 No

11.

How many years of investing experience do you have? __________________

12.

How likely are you to investment in individual stocks in the next 12 months?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Highly unlikely
likely

Highly

13.

In general, what is your view of the stock market?

1

2

3

4

5

Pessimistic

6

7

8

9

10

11

Neutral

Optimistic

14.

In your opinion, how conscious of sustainability issues are you?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all conscious

8

9

10

11
Very conscious

Block 11: Amazon Mechanical Turk ID & End of Survey
Participation Verification:
As mentioned in the instructions, you must enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID AND
a randomly generated survey code to verify your participation in the study. These items
will be used to confirm payment claims.
Please enter your Worker ID below. Your random survey code will be generated and
presented on the following screen. You will enter this survey code in the Mechanical
Turk window.
Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker ID:

___________________

Thank you for participating.
Your survey code is:
XXXXXXX
To receive payment for participating, click “Accept HIT” in the Mechanical Turk
window, enter this survey code, then click “Submit”.
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Part Three: Research Instrument
Block 1: General Instructions & Informed Consent
General Instructions

Thank you in advance for your participation in this study. The purpose of the study is to
examine jurors’ judgments based on a hypothetical situation. I am seeking your
responses to this situation; there are no right or wrong answers. Although actual
juror decisions may be more complex, I ask that you base your judgments solely on the
information provided in the case materials.
Your participation is completely voluntary and there are no foreseeable physical risks or
discomforts if you choose to participate in this study. All responses are anonymous. The
study should take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. None of the questions will
require you to identify yourself. Please note that there will be comprehension checks in
the survey to verify that you are carefully reading and understanding the materials.
You will be pre-screened based on your responses to two questions.
• If your answers indicate that you do not meet the required criteria to participate in
the study, then you will be redirected to Amazon Mechanical Turk's website and
will not be paid.
• If you do meet the required criteria and choose to participate in the study, then
you must answer ALL of the questions completely and within the allotted time in
order to be paid for your participation. You will be paid $1.00 for completing the
task.
To verify your participation in the study, you will be required to enter your Amazon
Mechanical Turk Worker ID AND a randomly generated code at the end of the
survey, which will be used to confirm payment claims. Therefore, you must enter your
Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker ID and the randomly generated code at the end of the
study to be paid.
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval
My university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) has reviewed this study. The IRB
determined that this study fulfills the human research subject protections obligations
required by state and federal law and university policies. If you have any questions,
concerns, or reports regarding your rights as a participant of research, please contact me
at (csr.research10@gmail.com).
Your Consent:
I have read this form and the research study has been explained to me. If I have
questions, I have been told whom to contact. By clicking on the “>>” on the lower righthand corner of this screen, I am indicating that I am 18 years of age or older, I have read
and understood the information presented above, I have decided to participate in the
study described above, and I consent to the procedures described above.
To continue, please click on the “>>” on the lower right-hand corner of this screen.
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Block 2: Screening Criteria in Qualtrics
(Note: The screening criteria shown below are administered in Qualtrics after
participants have already passed initial screening requirements in Mechanical Turk. The
initial requirements include: (1) participants are over 18 years of age; (2) participants
are physically located in the United States; (3) participants have an AMT approval rate
of 95% or higher on at least 50 or more completed assignments. If MTurkers do not meet
the initial screening requirements, they are not able to view the survey request on the
Mechanical Turk website.)
Next you will be asked 2 screening questions.
As a reminder, if your answers indicate that you do not meet the required criteria to
participate in the study, then you will be redirected to Amazon Mechanical Turk's
website and will not be paid.
1. Do you consider yourself proficient in the English language?
 Yes
 No

Block 3a: Instructions
Instructions: In this case, you will first read background information, including financial
information, about a fictitious company. Next, you will assume the role of a juror in a
court case involving a corporation and injured consumers. In your role as a juror, you will
read a summary of the trial testimony and answer questions regarding your opinions
related to the case. It is important that you read all case materials carefully and
answer the included questions thoughtfully & honestly. Throughout the case you will
answer the following three types of questions:
• Review Questions reflect whether you read and understand the presented
material. These questions will not be difficult if you read the materials carefully.
• Case Questions ask you for your judgments about the outcomes described in the
case.
• Wrap-Up Questions ask you some miscellaneous and demographic questions.
You are allowed to review previous pages of the case when answering the review and
case questions.
IMPORTANT:
YOU MUST ANSWER AT LEAST 90% OF THE REVIEW QUESTIONS
CORRECTLY IN ORDER TO BE COMPENSATED.
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Review Question
In order to be compensated, I must answer at least
• 60% of the review questions correctly.
• 75% of the review questions correctly.
• 90% of the review questions correctly.
Block 3b: Background Information
The following is background information on XYZ, Inc.
Background Information about XYZ, Inc.
XYZ, Inc. is a U.S. publicly-traded company that has been in operation for over 50 years
in the food products industry. Its core business operations involve procuring, processing
and transporting an array of branded food products that are sold by large national grocery
store chains. XYZ, Inc. prides itself on maintaining positive long-term relationships with
farmers who source its products and enjoys high brand recognition across U.S.
households. Financial results over the past three years have been mixed relative to
industry peers.
Condensed Financial Information
XYZ, Inc.
3-Year Trend
($ in millions)
12/31/2015

12/31/2014

12/31/2013

Total current assets
Fixed assets, net
Investments
Intangible assets
Total current liabilities
Total long-term
liabilities
Total shareholder's
equity

$

$

$

Net sales
Gross profit
Income from operations
Net income

$

3,937
3,744
519
13,513
5,015

3,786
3,783
531
13,865
4,890

4,394
3,942
508
14,303
5,424

10,545

10,903

9,733

6,153

6,172

7,990

6,563
2,574
847
497

$

7,630
2,614
718
221
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Key Statistics

XYZ, Inc.

Industry
Average
3.94%
24.24%
6.45%
7.80%
93.86%
24.21
8.35%

Earnings/Share Growth (Last 5 Years)
0.51%
Revenue % Change From Prior Year
-6.05%
Return on Investment (Prior 12 Months)
10.55%
Profit Margin (Most Recent Quarter)
9.66%
Total Debt/Equity
181.22%
Share Price/Earnings
23.48
Estimate of Future Earnings per Share Long Term
6.66%
Growth (3-5 Years)
Review Question
(Note: The following question will be asked of participants after reading the background
information. If they answer correctly, they move on to the next part of the survey. If they
answer incorrectly, they are returned to the background information to read it again.)
What is XYZ’s financial health compared to its industry peers?
 High
 Mixed
 Low
Block 4: Introduction of the Negative Event
Recently, a respected business newspaper reported that XYZ, Inc. is recalling one
of its food products due to food safety concerns. The following is an excerpt from the
article.
“XYZ, Inc. recently announced a voluntary recall of one of its food products due
to a possible connection to an illness outbreak impacting at least 50 people across 15
states. The recall involves over ten million pounds of product with an estimated retail
value of $20 million. In addition, XYZ, Inc. has shut down two of its factories as it works
to find the potential source of the contaminant and take corrective actions. The factory
shutdown is estimated to result in approximately $10 million of additional lost sales (i.e.,
beyond the recall). To date, total costs incurred by XYZ, Inc. for this event are 6% of net
income, a significant amount. Additional risk of future lawsuits coming from those that
became ill also exists.”
Review Questions
Did XYZ, Inc. voluntarily recall one of its food products due to a foodborne illness
outbreak?
• True
• False
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Are the total costs incurred by XYZ, Inc. for the voluntarily recall a significant loss for
the company?
• True
• False
As mentioned in the article, XYZ, Inc. now finds itself as a defendant in a lawsuit filed
by consumers who became ill after consuming XYZ’s product. Assume you have been
selected to serve as a juror for a foodborne illness litigation trial against XYZ, Inc.
After reviewing the case materials, you will be asked to provide typical juror
assessments.
IMPORTANT: Over the next several pages, the transcript from the lawsuit filed by
consumers against XYZ, Inc. will be presented. Please carefully read the transcript
as you will be asked to answer review questions and make several judgments about
XYZ’s level of liability.
Block 5: Trial Transcript – Opening Statements
Summary, Case #196BE
Complaint: The plaintiffs, injured consumers, allege that the defendant, XYZ, Inc., was
negligent in following food safety regulations.
Answer: The defendant, XYZ, Inc., responds that it complied with all food safety
regulations and therefore was not negligent.
Plaintiffs’ Opening Statement:
The attorney for the Plaintiffs, injured consumers, outlines key arguments for the case
and details why the Plaintiffs believes XYZ, Inc. was negligent and should be held
responsible for their losses.
“We are here today to decide if the defendant, XYZ, Inc., was negligent in its food
safety protocols leading to the foodborne illnesses of our clients. The plaintiffs we are
representing were all diagnosed with E.Coli (bacterial infection of the intestines), and
continue to require medical treatment and monitoring. Lab results confirm that each of
our clients contracted the same strain of bacteria, which matches with the source of the
outbreak. We will provide compelling testimony from public health authorities that
investigated the outbreak of illnesses to provide a link of the illnesses to XYZ, Inc. Our
clients are hardworking and honest citizens who have been unfairly harmed by XYZ’s
products. At the conclusion of this trial, we hope you will find in favor of our clients that
XYZ, Inc. was negligent in its food safety protocols.”
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Review Question
The Plaintiffs argue that XYZ, Inc. was negligent.
• True
• False

XYZ’s Opening Statement:
The attorney for the Defendant, XYZ, Inc., outlines key arguments for the case and
details why the Defendant believes XYZ, Inc. was not negligent and should not be held
responsible for the Plaintiffs losses.
“It is true that we are here today to determine whether our client, XYZ, Inc. was
negligent in its food safety protocols. The plaintiff must prove its allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence. This means that it must show that the charges are more
probably true than not true. The Plaintiffs cannot do so. The safety protocols in place at
all of XYZ’s factory locations closely follow the strict legal regulations. However, even
100 percent adherence to the legal regulations does not reduce the possibility of
foodborne illness to zero. We will provide expert testimony to show that XYZ, Inc. has the
proper protocols in place and were consistently following them at the time of the
outbreak. In addition, our experts will explain that foodborne illnesses are often the
result of consumer cooking errors compounded by other underlying medical conditions.
XYZ, Inc. is a nationally recognized brand that has been safely providing food products
to consumers for decades. At the conclusion of this trial, we hope that you will find in
favor of XYZ, Inc.”
Review Question
The defendant argues that XYZ, Inc. follows all legal regulations and was, therefore, not
negligent.
• True
• False
Block 6: Trial Transcript – Expert Testimony
Plaintiffs’ Expert Testimony:
Mr. Robert Kesler, Witness for the Plaintiffs: After the foodborne illnesses were
reported, public health authorities began an investigation to determine the source of the
illnesses. The Plaintiffs’ lawyer calls an expert witness from the public health authority to
the stand.
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“After investigating the recent E.Coli outbreak, we have been able to trace the
source back to XYZ, Inc. We are certain of our findings since the strain of E.Coli bacteria
infecting customers matches the strain found at one of XYZ’s factories. Matching the
strain of bacteria is an important step to determining the source of the outbreak. Further,
our review of the safety protocols in place at XYZ’s factory shows the possibility that
bacteria contamination could occur at two separate points in the production process.”
Review Question
The public health authorities traced the E.Coli outbreak to one of XYZ’s factories.
• True
• False

The public health authorities identified two possible points in XYZ’s production process
where the bacteria contamination could have occurred.
• True
• False
Defendant’s Expert Testimony:
Professor Irene Evans, Expert Witness for the Defendants
XYZ, Inc. calls a food safety expert witness to the stand.
“Foodborne illnesses are often very difficult to trace to the original source due to
often lengthy incubation periods. These lengthy incubation periods provide many
different possibilities of original sources of the illness. In addition, many foodborne
illnesses are caused by improper food handling by the consumer. This can be caused by
undercooking food items or not properly sanitizing the food preparation areas. Further,
due to prior food safety concerns, most products, including those of XYZ, Inc. come with
adequate warning statements on the products. It is also important to recognize that food
safety protocols are not 100% effective, but decrease the risk of illness to a very small
percentage. We reviewed XYZ’s protocols and found them to be in compliance with legal
requirements.”
Review Question
The food safety expert testified that improper food handling by the consumer is often a
cause of foodborne illness.
• True
• False
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The food safety expert testified that following all legal safety protocols does not
eliminate all risk of bacterial contamination.
• True
• False
Block 7: Trial Transcript – Closing Statements – Control Group
Plaintiffs’ Closing Statement:
The attorney for the plaintiffs, injured consumers, reviews the key arguments for the case
and summarizes why the plaintiffs believe XYZ, Inc. was negligent and should be held
responsible for their losses.
“You have just heard the testimony from the public health authorities that states
convincing evidence that XYZ, Inc. was the source of the foodborne illness experienced
by our clients. The public health authorities established a connection between the E.Coli
bacteria infecting our clients and the bacteria found at XYZ’s factory. Further, they
identified two points in XYZ’s production process where the contamination could have
occurred. XYZ, Inc. did not exercise due care and diligence in the food production
process, resulting in products unsafe for consumption. This illness has caused significant
losses to our clients, both in monetary and nonmonetary amounts. We estimate monetary
losses to be approximately $7 million from medical bills and lost wages due to time out of
work. Nonmonetary losses are estimated to be an additional $3 million due to emotional
strain on our clients. We hope that you find XYZ, Inc. was negligent and award our
clients appropriate damages.”
Defendant’s Closing Statement:
The attorney for the Defendant, XYZ, Inc., reviews the key arguments for the case and
summarizes why the Defendant believes XYZ, Inc. was not negligent and should not be
held responsible for the Plaintiffs’ losses.
“You have just heard the testimony of experts suggesting that the cause of
foodborne illnesses, such as E.Coli, can come from a multitude of sources and has a long
incubation period. Further, XYZ, Inc. followed all legal safety protocols in its production
process and provided adequate safe handling warnings on the label of its products. It is
your job to evaluate whether XYZ, Inc. was negligent. For XYZ, Inc. to found liable for
the losses, the Plaintiffs must provide a preponderance of evidence to show that the
charges of negligence are more probably true than not true. As shared by the food safety
expert, we believed XYZ, Inc. practiced reasonable care in its food production process by
following legal safety protocols.
XYZ, Inc. is a company of strong ethical culture that cares deeply about its
customers. Our client has great sympathy for the struggles of the plaintiffs and wishes
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them a speedy recovery. However, our client carefully followed all safety protocols
required by law. We hope that you will find in favor of XYZ, Inc.”
Block 7a: Trial Transcript – Closing Statements – Treatment Groups
Plaintiffs’ Closing Statement:
The attorney for the Plaintiffs, injured consumers, reviews the key arguments for the case
and summarizes why the Plaintiffs believe XYZ, Inc. was negligent and should be held
responsible for their losses.
“You have just heard the testimony from the public health authorities that states
convincing evidence that XYZ, Inc. was the source of the foodborne illness experienced
by our clients. The public health authorities established a connection between the E.Coli
bacteria infecting our clients and the bacteria found at XYZ’s factory. Further, they
identified two points in the production process where the contamination could have
occurred. XYZ, Inc. did not exercise due care and diligence in the food production
process, resulting in products unsafe for consumption. This illness has caused significant
losses to our clients, both in monetary and nonmonetary amounts. We estimate monetary
losses to be approximately $7 million from medical bills and lost wages due to time out of
work. Nonmonetary losses are estimated to be an additional $3 million due to emotional
strain on our clients. We hope that you find XYZ, Inc. was negligent and award our
clients appropriate damages.”
Defendant’s Closing Statement:
The attorney for the Defendant, XYZ, Inc., reviews the key arguments for the case and
summarizes why the Defendant believes XYZ, Inc. was not negligent and should not be
held responsible for the Plaintiffs’ losses.
“You have just heard the testimony of experts suggesting that the cause of
foodborne illnesses, such as E.Coli, can come from a multitude of sources and has a long
incubation period. Further, XYZ, Inc. followed all legal safety protocols in its production
process and provided adequate safe handling warnings on the label of its products. It is
your job to evaluate whether XYZ, Inc. was negligent. For XYZ, Inc. to found liable for
the losses, the Plaintiffs must provide a preponderance of evidence proving that XYZ, Inc.
was negligent. As shared by the food safety expert, we believed XYZ, Inc. practiced
reasonable care in its food production process by following legal safety protocols.
XYZ, Inc. is a company of strong ethical culture that cares deeply about its customers.
XYZ., Inc. is committed to operating its business as a positive corporate citizen, as
evidenced by its corporate social responsibility track record. Here are a few examples
from its most recent corporate social responsibility report.”
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(Note: The defendant’s closing statement contains both manipulations. Participants will
randomly receive either the strategic or non-strategic disclosures. The underlined text
highlights differences between the strategic and non-strategic CSR conditions.)
Strategic Manipulation
“XYZ, Inc. seeks to demonstrate our commitment to a sustainable environment by
annually upgrading our source of energy to more sustainable options. Although we
initially committed to spending $10 million to install solar panels that could provide 50%
of our electricity needs, thus far we have spent $5 million. The expenditures to date are
expected to reduce our operating costs by $7 million (1.4% of net income) per year for
each of the next three years due to anticipated rising prices of traditional electricity
sources.
XYZ, Inc. is committed to doing its part in maintaining a healthy environment for
all. Accordingly, during the past year we continued our long-term commitment to the
environment by investing over $10 million in our production process in order to reduce
pollution and waste in our value chain. This marks the fifth straight year we have made
significant investments to enhance the sustainability of our production process. Changes
include upgrading to equipment that reduces emissions and replacing 20% of our
packaging materials with environmentally friendly options. We anticipate that this
investment will decrease production costs by $2 million (0.5% of net income) per year.
In addition to reducing future operating costs, we expect that due to consumer
preferences for sustainably produced products, these two investments will allow us to
increase our market share and future profitability.”
Non-Strategic Manipulation
“XYZ, Inc. seeks to demonstrate our commitment to a sustainable environment by
annually upgrading our source of energy to more sustainable options. Although we
initially committed to spending $10 million to install solar panels that could provide 50%
of our electricity needs, thus far we have spent $5 million. The expenditures to date are
not expected to have any direct impact on our operating costs.
XYZ, Inc. is committed to doing its part in maintaining a healthy environment for
all. Accordingly, during the past year we continued our long-term commitment to the
environment by investing over $10 million in our production process in order to reduce
pollution and waste in our value chain. This marks the fifth straight year we have made
significant investments to enhance the sustainability of our production process. Changes
include upgrading to equipment that reduces emissions and replacing 20% of our
packaging materials with environmentally friendly options. We do not anticipate that this
investment will have any direct impact on our production costs.
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We do not anticipate that these two investments will have any direct impact on
our market share and future profitability.”
CSR Assurance Manipulations
(Note: Participants will be randomly assigned to either the assurance present or
assurance absent treatments.)
CSR Assurance Present Manipulation
XYZ, Inc. engaged the assurance service of a professional accounting firm with expertise
in evaluating corporate social responsibility reporting to provide assurance on the
accuracy of the nonfinancial information contained in the corporate social responsibility
report detailed above. The accounting firm concluded that in all material respects the
nonfinancial indicators (including CSR measures) were properly collected, summarized,
and reported.
CSR Assurance Absent Manipulation
XYZ, Inc. did not engage a professional accounting firm to provide assurance on the
accuracy of the nonfinancial information contained in the corporate social responsibility
report detailed above.
“As you can see, XYZ, Inc. takes corporate social responsibility seriously. Our client has
great sympathy for the struggles of the plaintiffs and wishes them a speedy recovery.
However, our client carefully followed all safety protocols required by law and cares
deeply about its stakeholders. We hope that you will find in favor of XYZ, Inc.”
Block 8: Judge’s Instructions to the Jury
Before allowing the jury to deliberate and determine a verdict, the Judge provides
instructions to the jury.
It is your responsibility to determine the facts from the evidence presented to you. You
will use these facts and the law given in these instructions to decide the case. You should
consider the evidence in light of your own observations and experiences in life. You may
draw any reasonable inferences from the proven facts. You must not, however, draw any
inference from the number of witnesses who testified on one side or the other. In
addition, keep in mind that statements made by attorneys are not evidence.
The burden of proof lies with the plaintiffs. The level of proof required is the
preponderance of the evidence, which means that the charges of negligence are more
probably true than not true. In order to be successful on a claim of professional
negligence, the plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that XYZ, Inc.
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committed wrongful acts that caused harm to the plaintiffs. You should consider whether
the XYZ, Inc. used reasonable care in its production process. If you decide that the
defendant, XYZ, Inc., did exercise reasonable care, you must find in its favor. If you
decide that XYZ, Inc. did not exercise reasonable care, you must find for the plaintiffs.
Review Question
It is my responsibility to determine the facts from the evidence presented to me.
Statements made by attorneys are not evidence.
•
True
•
False
Block 9: Jurors’ Judgments
The following questions are intended to assess your views of XYZ, Inc.’s level of
liability for the plaintiffs’ alleged losses. There are no right or wrong answers - these
questions ask for your personal views. Please answer the following response questions
about the case openly and honestly.
Assume that you are a juror on this case. Would you find XYZ, Inc. negligent in their
production processes?
1. On a scale of 0-100 how likely is it that XYZ, Inc. was negligent?
0
50
100
Not at all likely
Neither likely or unlikely
Extremely
likely
2. In your opinion, would you find XYZ, Inc. negligent or not negligent?
 Negligent
 Not Negligent

3. How confident are you in your verdict?
0
Positive I would Find
XYZ, Inc. NOT Negligent

50
Not Sure

100
Positive I would Find
XYZ, Inc. Negligent

(Note: if participants select negligent on question 2, they will be asked to provide
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as intermediate judgments in questions 3-6
below as part of Study 2. Since participants are completing additional questions, they
will be paid bonus compensation in addition to the $1 payment made to participants only
completing Study 1.)
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Since you found XYZ, Inc. negligent in this case, you must determine the amount of
money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiffs for their $10,000,000 loss
resulting from their E. Coli sickness. The amount of money that you determine must be
based on the principle of proportional liability. The principle of proportional liability
states that jurors must consider the extent to which XYZ, Inc. was responsible for the
sickness relative to the plaintiffs. For example, assume that a jury in a lawsuit determined
the plaintiffs lost $10,000,000 due to their injuries. Then, the jury judged that the
company’s management was 60% responsible and the plaintiffs were 40% responsible for
the injuries. The jury would require the company to pay the plaintiffs $6,000,000 (=
$10,000,000 X 60%); or, if the jury determined that the company was 80% responsible,
the company would be required to pay $8,000,000, and so on.
4. What level of compensatory damages, if any, you would be willing to require that
XYZ, Inc. pay the plaintiffs?
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
$ (millions)

Punitive damages are designed to punish past bad behavior and deter future bad behavior,
and are typically based on the level of compensatory damages. Please answer the
following question to assess punitive damages.
5. What level of punitive damages should be awarded to the plaintiffs?
0
1
2
Zero times
the compensatory
damages

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
10
Ten times
the compensatory
damages

6. In your opinion, how likely is it that XYZ Inc. has the financial ability to pay the
compensatory and punitive damages you assessed?
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Highly unlikely

Highly likely

7. Would you rate your motivation for the level of punitive damages you assessed against
XYZ, Inc. to be punishment for the foodborne illnesses or as a deterrent against future
food safety issues?
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Punishment motivated

Deterrence motivated
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(Note: All participants will receive the following questions. I will randomize the order in
which participants receive the questions below. An additional attention check question
(question 15 below) will be randomly presented within this set of questions. Each
question will be presented on a separate screen so participants cannot go back and
change their answer after reading additional questions.)
8. In your opinion, did XYZ, Inc. cause the foodborne illnesses?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

No they did not cause the illness

9

10

Yes they did cause the

illness

9. In your opinion, how foreseeable was the foodborne illness?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Not at all foreseeable

9

10

Completely

foreseeable

10. In your opinion, did XYZ, Inc. intend for the foodborne illnesses to occur?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all intended

7

8

9

10

Completely intended

11. While reading the case and making your judgments, did you experience negative
feelings (e.g. anger or disgust) or positive feelings (e.g. sympathy or compassion)
towards XYZ, Inc.?
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Very strong
No feelings
Very strong
negative feelings
positive
feelings
12. While reading the case and making your judgments, did you experience negative
feelings (e.g. anger or disgust) or positive feelings (e.g. sympathy or compassion)
towards the plaintiffs?
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Very strong
No feelings
Very strong
negative feelings
positive
feelings
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13. What is your impression of XYZ, Inc.?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very unfavorable

10
Very favorable

14. How much blame does XYZ, Inc. deserve for the foodborne illnesses?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

None of the blame

10
All of the

blame

15. How would you rate XYZ’s behavior leading up to the negative event?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very bad

10
Very good

16. Recent research on decision making shows that choices are affected by context.
Differences in how people feel, their previous knowledge and experience, and their
environment can affect choices. To help us understand how people make decisions, it is
important that participants in studies actually take the time to read the directions; if not,
some results may not tell us very much about decision making in the real world. To show
that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question below about how you are
feeling and instead drag the slider to fifty-eight.
Please drag the slider to describe your current level of happiness.
0
10
20
Very unhappy

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
Very happy

17a. On a scale between 0 and 10, please indicate how frequently, while making your
judgments, you thought about actions XYZ, Inc. could have taken or done differently that
may have allowed them to prevent selling contaminated products (0 indicates you did not
think at all about it and 10 indicates you frequently thought about it).
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Never thought about it

Frequently thought about it
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17b. On a scale between 0 and 10, please indicate the “strength”, of your thoughts about
what XYZ, Inc. could have done differently that may have allowed them to prevent
selling contaminated products (0 indicates you had no serious thoughts about it and 10
indicates you thought very seriously about it).
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Never thought about it

Frequently thought about it

17c. Please indicate the extent to which you considered the plaintiffs’ losses in

making your decisions of XYZ’s negligence.
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Did not consider losses

8

9

10

Seriously considered losses

(Note: The questions below (18-24) relate to the CSR activities of XYZ, Inc. Therefore,
they will not be shown to participants in the control group.)
18. How believable do you find XYZ, Inc.’s disclosures about its two corporate social
responsibility investments?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Very doubtful

Very

believable

19. In your opinion, does XYZ Inc. practice corporate social responsibility primarily to
be a good corporate citizen?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Highly unlikely

10
Highly likely

20. In your opinion, does XYZ Inc. practice corporate social responsibility because they
have a long-term interest in society?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Highly unlikely

7

8

9

10
Highly likely
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21. In your opinion, does XYZ Inc. practice corporate social responsibility because they
believe in the cause?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Highly unlikely

10
Highly likely

22. In your opinion, does XYZ Inc. practice corporate social responsibility because they
are trying to give something back to the community?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Highly unlikely

10
Highly likely

23. In your opinion, does XYZ Inc. practice corporate social responsibility primarily to
get more customers?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Highly unlikely

10
Highly likely

24. In your opinion, does XYZ Inc. practice corporate social responsibility primarily to
keep its customers?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Highly unlikely

9

10
Highly likely

Block 10: Manipulation Checks
25.

Did XYZ, Inc. engage an independent accounting firm to provide assurance on

the accuracy of its corporate social responsibility disclosures?
 Yes
 No
26.

In your opinion, does XYZ Inc. practice corporate social responsibility primarily

to improve its financial performance?
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0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Highly unlikely

10
Highly likely

27.

In your opinion, how significant was the food safety recall to XYZ, Inc.?

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Not at all significant

What is your age?
 18-24 years old
 25-34 years old
 35-44 years old
 45-54 years old
 55-64 years old
 65-74 years old
 75 years or older

29.

10
Very significant

Block 11: Demographic Questions
28.

9

What is your gender?
 Female
 Male
 Prefer not to answer

30.

What is your occupation? ____________

31.

How many years of work experience do you have?
 0-5 years
 6-10 years
 11-15 years
 16-20 years
 21-25 years
 26-30 years
 30 or more years
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32.

What is your education level?
 Some high school, no diploma
 High school graduate
 Associate degree
 Bachelor’s degree
 Graduate degree

(Note: the following two questions will be answered using sliders ranging from 0-15)
33.

How many college-level accounting classes have you taken?

34.

How many college-level finance classes have you taken?

35.

How would you rate your knowledge of corporate social responsibility?

1
2
3
Below average

4

5

6
7
Average

8

9

10

11
Above average

36.

In your opinion, how conscious of sustainability issues are you?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all conscious

11
Highly conscious

37. Have you previously served on a jury?
 Yes
 No
38. Do you have any prior work experience in the following areas?
 CPA
 Lawyer
 Investor
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Block 12: Amazon Mechanical Turk ID & End of Survey
Participation Verification:
As mentioned in the instructions, you must enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID AND
a randomly generated survey code to verify your participation in the study. These items
will be used to confirm payment claims.
Please enter your Worker ID below. Your random survey code will be generated and
presented on the following screen. You will enter this survey code in the Mechanical
Turk window.
Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker ID:
Thank you for participating.
Your survey code is:
XXXXXXX

___________________

To receive payment for participating, click “Accept HIT” in the Mechanical Turk
window, enter this survey code, then click “Submit”.
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